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“The modern cigarette is a work of art (or piece of work),  
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The complex interplay among organizations, society, and the government, 
has been central to the organization and management scholarship. However, prior 
research has mainly examined the dyadic relationship between these actors. In fact, 
Edelman, Leachman, and McAdam (2010) identify the need to theorize and test the 
relationship among all of the aforementioned actors, especially so in the presence of 
contestation. This dissertation links these three different actors - organizations, 
society, and the government - laying bare the dynamics and outcomes of their 
intertwined actions. In doing so, this dissertation understands organizations not only 
as belonging to an institutional environment that has an influence on them, but as 
actors with agency that can actively shape their institutional environment (Vaara & 
Durand, 2012; Walker & Rea, 2014). In short, this dissertation offers an industry 
level approach that sheds light on the importance of research that incorporates 
organizations, society, and the government when looking at the complete pathway of 
institutional change, ranging from its antecedents to its implications on the 
legitimacy and performance of the industry.  
This dissertation consists of three essays that consider: i) the institutional 
change generated by the simultaneous actions of activist organizations and 
corporations, ii) the influence of coercive pressures and legitimacy threats on 
industry performance, and iii) the importance of the concept of legitimacy in 
organization and management scholarship, with particular emphasis on the strength 
of the performance implications of legitimacy. Using the empirical setting of a 
contested industry, this dissertation combines strategy and institutional theory in 
order to conceptualize and test how industry participants shape institutions, and 
simultaneously, how institutions shape industry strategies and performance. Hence, 
from a theoretical perspective, the dissertation intersects with the study of social 
movements and legal environments. In short, the essays that comprise this 
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dissertation shed light on where institutional pressures and legitimacy threats 
originate, and how they affect industry performance. 
This dissertation contributes to the literature by integrating institutional 
theory and strategy research in an effort to shed light on the dynamics associated 
with contested industries. Although previous efforts put forward that contested 
industries are socially condemned not only because their products are harmful and/or 
addictive but also because of the disparity between their economic interests and 
societal welfare, little research attention has been paid to conceptualizing 
contestation (Galvin, Ventresca, & Hudson, 2005). Despite few efforts to study 
contested industries such as arms (Durand & Vergne, 2015; Vergne, 2012), alcohol, 
gambling (Galvin et al., 2005), and tobacco (Hsu & Grodal, 2015; Simons, 
Vermeulen, & Knoben, 2016), our theoretical understanding of contestation remains 
limited. Contested industries, which are often times referred to as ‘evil, shunned 
and/or sin’, are those that confront continuous societal disagreements over their 
‘right to exist’ (Cai, Jo, & Pan, 2011; Fabozzi, Ma, & Oliphant, 2008; Hong & 
Kacperczyk, 2009; Kim & Venkatachalam, 2011; Leventis, Hasan, & Dedoulis, 
2013). In other words, a contested industry is one in which there is a lack of societal 
agreement over the industry (Gallie, 1956), or absence of taken for grantedness or of 
general societal approval (Schneiberg & Clemens, 2006). Specifically, industries 
like alcohol, gambling, and tobacco are contested because they face disapproval 
from some society members that find them “offensive, inappropriate, or harmful” 
(Davidson, 2003: 2), whilst other societal members argue that “the personal 
freedoms of drinking, smoking, and gambling are woven into the very fabric of 
American society” (Ahrens, 2004: 12). Using the data collected by Sharkey (2014)1, 
I find that the ratings given based on a 5 points Likert scale to the question: ‘How 
virtuous or morally good do you think organizations in these industries are?’, are 
extremely low for alcohol, gambling, and tobacco (average = 1.65/5.0). Moreover, a 
comparison of the mean ratings between tobacco and alcohol (two-sample t(119) = -
                                                     
1 I thank Amanda Sharkey for providing access to these data. For a detailed description of the 
data, please refer to Sharkey (2014). 
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8.03, p-value = 0.00), and between tobacco and gambling (two-sample t(121) = -
4.36, p-value = 0.00), indicates that there is a statistically significant difference in 
how virtuous these industries are perceived to be (see Table 1). In particular, among 
these industries, tobacco has been found to be the least virtuous (average = 
1.13/5.0). Therefore, the tobacco industry is a particularly well suited empirical 
setting for this dissertation, due to the multiplicity of norms, values, and beliefs 
surrounding it.  
Ever since 2008 the WHO has called tobacco an epidemic, for smoking is 
the top social burden generated by human beings in terms of its aggregated costs, 
which are calculated to be 2.9% of the global GDP ($2.1 trillion dollars). Moreover, 
the Surgeon General (2014) has referred to smoking caused diseases as the “greatest 
public health catastrophes of the century”, as tobacco kills more than 6 million 
people each year. In the US alone, cigarette deaths are “like two jumbo jets crashing 
every day” (Proctor, 2011: 2). The addictive nature of cigarettes and the harmful 
effects associated with smoking further solidify the classification of the tobacco 
industry as a contested industry. However, although nowadays the tobacco industry 
is contested, in its early years tobacco was used for religious rituals, as a medical 
herb, and as an important export product. In the 19th century, the industrialization of 
agricultural production induced several changes in the tobacco production process, 
which transformed the main form of tobacco consumption from chewing tobacco 
leaves to smoking cigarettes. With industrialization, massive cigarette production 
was born. As a result, tobacco companies evolved from national-bounded, small-
scaled, and labor-intensive, to multinational enterprises (Lock, Reynolds, & Tansey, 
1998). In parallel with the change in the industry’s structure, by the mid-20th 
century, the causal relation between tobacco and lung cancer was discovered and 
scientifically supported (Nathanson, 1999). A pivotal change in the development of 
this industry occurred in 1964, when the US Surgeon General, the leading 
spokesman on public health in the US, released a breaking report on smoking and 
health in which smoking was categorized as a health hazard. Ever since the 
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publication of this groundbreaking report, scientific evidence against smoking piled 
up; not only the negative externalities of second hand smoke were revealed in 1986, 
but also the addictive nature of cigarettes was uncovered in 1988. Moreover, in 
1998, litigation efforts against the tobacco industry reached a peak, as the four 
largest tobacco companies (i.e. Philip Morris, R. J. Reynolds, Lorillard, and Brown 
& Williamson) and the Attorney Generals of 46 states signed the Tobacco Master 
Settlement Agreement, which mandated the companies:“(1) to pay the states 
annually and in perpetuity billions of dollars; (2) to restrict permanently their 
advertising, promotion, and marketing of cigarettes; and (3) to contribute $1.5 
billion to establish what has become the American Legacy Foundation, an entity 
dedicated to counter-advertising and public education against cigarette smoking” 
(National Association of Attorneys General, 2007). As a result, during the last 
couple of decades (see Table 2), tobacco companies have faced a tougher regulatory 
environment as well as increasing threats to their legitimacy, while simultaneously, 
have had to devise strategies to protect their performance to remain strong, creative, 
and relentless. The next paragraphs outline the three chapters that form the core of 
this dissertation.  
Chapter one - On two sides of the smoke screen: How activist organizations 
and corporations use protests, campaign contributions, and lobbyists to influence 
institutional change – considers the simultaneous influence of movements and 
counter-movements on institutional change, understood as changes in the regulative 
pillar of institutions. Specifically, this chapter proposes that activist organizations 
and corporations use a combination of conspicuous (i.e. protests) and inconspicuous 
(i.e. campaign contributions and lobbyists) strategies to influence the enactment of 
laws. Thus, this chapter considers the effects of protests, campaign contributions, 
and lobbyists, by analyzing their simultaneous impact on disrupting or maintaining 
the status quo. Using data from the tobacco industry, this chapter examines the 
interplay between anti-smoking groups and tobacco companies that simultaneously 
use the mentioned strategies to support or deter the enactment of tobacco control 
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regulations. The simultaneous strategies used by these actors to influence the 
probability of enactment of a comprehensive smoking ban, are tested on yearly US 
state-level data for the period 2000-2012 and using a two-stage residual inclusion 
estimation method to deal with endogeneity. The results reveal that information and 
financial strategies (i.e. campaign contributions and lobbyists) are less effective than 
constituency building strategies (i.e. protests) to influence institutional change for 
actors that belong to a contested industry. Overall, this chapter contributes to the 
literature by answering the question of how activist organizations and corporations 
change institutions in an established contested industry.   
Chapter two - Clearing the smoke: Coercive pressures, legitimacy, and 
performance in the US tobacco industry – deals with the mediating role of 
legitimacy in the relationship between increasing coercive pressures and 
performance. This chapter examines increasing coercive pressures as an antecedent 
of legitimacy, which in turn is a precursor of industry performance. The hypotheses 
are tested using a panel of monthly US state-level data for the 1994-2010 period and 
an instrumental variable estimation method to test for mediation. The results provide 
support for the mediating role of legitimacy, but only in the case where societal 
members support coercive pressures. Specifically, the effect of the enactment of 
tobacco control regulations that operate as a normative influence (i.e. youth access 
laws) on the performance of the tobacco industry (i.e. cigarette sales) goes through 
changes in the legitimacy of the tobacco companies. However, in the case of tobacco 
control regulations that are contested (i.e. smoking bans), the mediating effect of 
legitimacy is not present. In other words, the results reveal that increasing coercive 
pressures that operate as a normative influence affect industry performance through 
influencing societal perceptions about what is deemed legitimate, whereas this is not 
the case for pressures that transfer a set of incentives and sanctions. Moreover, the 
results indicate that tobacco control regulations that restrict the strategies available 
for the industry and that enable or discourage the use of cigarettes (i.e. youth access 
laws) have a significant impact on performance when compared to regulations aimed 
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at changing the behavior of adult smokers by restricting the occasions of 
consumption of cigarettes (i.e. smoking bans). Overall, this chapter contributes to 
the literature by including a fine-grained look at the concept of coercive pressures, 
by conceptually and empirically disentangling and separating the effects of 
increasing coercive pressures and legitimacy, and by empirically testing the 
performance consequences of legitimacy in an established contested industry. 
Chapter three - Performing by adhering? A review and meta-analysis of 
legitimacy – takes stock of the extant theoretical and empirical work on legitimacy 
and performance in the organization and management scholarship. In the last 
decades, the concept of legitimacy has become an increasingly utilized construct in 
the organization and management literature. However, the myriad of theories and 
measures employed in studies using legitimacy has contributed to a fragmented 
field, especially so with respect to the performance consequences of legitimacy. 
Therefore, to gain an encompassing perspective on the legitimacy literature, this 
chapter reviews 127 papers published in top journals in the field, in an effort to 
integrate and expand extant scholarship using the concept of legitimacy. Moreover, 
this chapter uses meta-analysis techniques in a sub-sample of 84 papers to study the 
relationship between legitimacy and performance, in order to bring deeper and 
sharper focus to the relationship between these concepts. The results reveal that the 
correlation between legitimacy and performance is on average positive but small in 
absolute terms. Moreover, there is considerable variation in the observed effect size, 
pointing towards the presence of unobserved moderator variables in this 
relationship. Based on these results, and building on the review of the legitimacy 
literature, a framework is proposed that integrates antecedents, moderators, and 
consequences of legitimacy, and identifies a future research agenda.   
The relationship between the three chapters in this dissertation is depicted in 
Figure 1. As Figure 1 and the previous discussion illustrate, there is a significant 
overlap between the chapters in terms of theoretical framework and research design. 
Moreover, in chapters one and two the empirical setting is in the contested tobacco 
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industry (this only differs in chapter three, where it is not applicable). Specifically, 
Figure 1 shows that chapter one examines the actions of activist organizations and 
corporations as precursors of institutional change, which is understood as the 
enactment of laws (i.e. tobacco control regulations). Chapter two investigates effects 
further down the chain, namely how increasing coercive pressures (i.e. tobacco 
control regulations) and legitimacy threats affect industry performance (e.g. the 
tobacco industry). Finally, chapter three digs deeper on the relationship between 
legitimacy and performance by presenting an exhaustive and comprehensive 
coverage of scholarship that uses the concept of legitimacy, and by providing an 
integrative meta-analysis of research on the performance consequences of 
legitimacy. Together, the three essays that compose this dissertation advance our 
understanding of how organizations shape their institutional environment which in 
turn determines their performance, and provide further insights into the advantages 
of integrating strategy and institutional theory research in order to better understand 




Table 1: How virtuous or morally good do you think organizations in these 
industries are? 
 Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Alcohol 2.18 0.88 1 4 
Gambling 1.64 0.78 1 4 
Tobacco 1.13 0.39 1 3 
Table 2: Timeline of federal tobacco control efforts in the US 
Year Milestone 
1964 Surgeon General Report on Smoking and Health 
1965 Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act 
1970 Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act 
1984 Comprehensive Smoking Education Act 
1986 
Surgeon General Report on the Health Consequences of Involuntary 
Smoking 
1988 Surgeon General Report on The Health Consequences of Smoking 
1990 Non-smoking flights 
1992 Synar Amendment 
1996 FDA issues regulations of tobacco products 
1998 Master Settlement Agreement 
2000 Supreme court rules that FDA cannot regulate tobacco 
2005 World Health Organization’s Framework Convention on Tobacco Control  
2009 Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act 










ON TWO SIDES OF THE SMOKE SCREEN: HOW 
ACTIVIST ORGANIZATIONS AND CORPORATIONS USE 
PROTESTS, CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS, AND 




This study explores the simultaneous influence of activist organizations and 
corporations on institutional change. Examining the enactment of comprehensive 
smoking bans by US states between 2000 and 2012, institutional change is identified 
as the enactment of tobacco control regulations. Focusing on protests, campaign 
contributions, and lobbyists as the strategies used by activist organizations and 
corporations to influence the enactment of bans, the dynamics between movements 
and counter-movements in the tobacco industry and their influence on the 
probability of the enactment of tobacco control regulations are studied. The results 
shed light on the effectiveness of these strategies to influence institutional change, 
and uncover potential moderators of this relationship. The results show that 
controlling resources is not a sufficient condition for an actor to be able to influence 
institutions, as financial and information strategies (i.e. campaign contributions and 
lobbyists) are found to be less effective than constituency building strategies (i.e. 
protests) to influence institutional change by actors involved with a contested 
industry. Overall, the study contributes to the theory by demonstrating the 
simultaneous and asymmetric effects of activist organizations and corporations that 
use conspicuous (e.g. protests) and inconspicuous (e.g. campaign contributions and 




Decades after the 1964 US Surgeon General concluded that smoking causes 
lung cancer and other diseases, and after the accumulation of scientific evidence on 
the health risks and costs associated with smoking, tobacco remains the leading 
cause of preventable death in the US (MGI, 2014). Although legislation has been 
implemented to control the epidemic of tobacco-related diseases, the history of 
tobacco control has been a continuous struggle between anti-smoking groups 
focused on the hazards created by smoking on the one hand, and tobacco companies 
focused on the economic benefits associated with tobacco production and 
consumption on the other. This struggle has been fueled by the apparent success of 
the anti-smoking groups, whose actions increased the social unacceptability of 
smoking and fostered the enactment of laws to reduce cigarette consumption by 
highlighting the harmful effects of smoking. The anti-smoking movement, thus, has 
threatened tobacco companies and has sparked the emergence of the smokers’ rights 
movement, a group aimed at resisting the enactment of smoking bans by 
representing smokers and others whose interests have been threatened by the success 
of anti-smoking activists (Meyer & Staggenborg, 1996; Zald & McCarthy, 1987). 
Two sides characterize the struggle between these actors: “the projection of honesty 
and trustworthiness for the tobacco industry, countered by public health’s master 
frame of distrust of the industry” (Derry & Waikar, 2008: 102). In this contested 
industry, where anti-smoking groups and tobacco companies interact and compete 
for support, we seek to understand how different actors use various strategies to 
shape the enactment of tobacco control regulations.   
We build on research in the intersection between social movement theory, 
institutional theory, and non-market strategy. Traditionally, these streams of 
research have focused either on the broad impact of social movements on 
institutions (Amenta & Caren, 2004; Andrews, 2002; King & Pearce, 2010; Olzak & 
Soule, 2009; Schneiberg & Lounsbury, 2008), or on the influence of social 
movements on corporations (de Bakker & den Hond, 2008; McDonnell & King, 
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2013). However, to the best of our knowledge, the simultaneous influence of social 
movements (hereafter activist organizations) and corporations on institutions 
remains understudied (Vogus & Davis, 2005). In fact, as Edelman and coauthors 
(2010) posit, we know relatively little about the interplay among corporations, 
activist organizations, and institutions, whereas we know more about each of these 
dyadic relationships. Considering this interplay is of importance as it has been 
recognized that institutional change is rarely achieved without contests between 
actors that have divergent goals (O’Mahony & Bechky, 2008) and that are 
differently affected by such change (Kim, Shin, Oh, & Jeong, 2007). Hence, we 
examine the actions of activist organizations to promote their interests, mobilize 
public opinion, and obtain political support, while simultaneously explore the 
actions of corporations that counter-mobilize to promote their own, and often times 
contrary, interests (Weber & King, 2013). Specifically, we aim to uncover the role 
of activist organizations and of corporations that counter-mobilize as producers of 
institutional change (Schneiberg & Lounsbury, 2008).  
In this paper, we are interested in contributing to research on how 
institutional change comes about (Davis & Greve, 1997). To do so, we consider how 
activist organizations and corporations bring about changes in the regulative pillar of 
institutions, which is the most common target of their actions (Bosi & Uba, 2009; 
Weber & King, 2013). That is, we understand institutional change as the enactment 
of new laws. Therefore, we recognize that activist organizations and corporations 
contribute to institutional change by promoting laws that further their interests, or by 
obstructing laws that challenge or disregard their interests. Specifically, we argue 
that contests between activist organizations and corporations result from innate 
differences in their respective objectives that lead activists to recognize the need to 
promote laws which embed their interests over the interests promoted by 
corporations, and vice versa (de Bakker, den Hond, King, & Weber, 2013). For 
instance, in November of 2002 Delaware became the first state to enact a 
comprehensive smoking ban (i.e. a ban in restaurants, bars, and workplaces). 
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IMPACT – a social movement of tobacco control and smoking prevention 
organizations – successfully organized to encourage the passing of the ban by 
gathering public support with the message: "Second-hand smoke causes diseases and 
death!" (Boyer & Ratledge, 2009). The tobacco industry fiercely opposed the 
passage of the ban on the grounds of its possible negative economic consequences, 
yet the ban was enacted. Thus, we study contests between activist organizations and 
corporations as central precursors of an industry’s particular regulative structure.  
We study the US tobacco industry from 2000 to 2012. Although scarcely 
studied (Hsu & Grodal, 2015; Simons et al., 2016), the tobacco industry provides a 
suitable empirical setting for this paper for the reasons outlined below. First, 
mobilization in the tobacco industry has involved two sides: anti-smoking groups 
that aim to advance the enactment of tobacco control regulations, on the one hand; 
and tobacco companies that aim to prevent regulations, on the other hand 
(Pertschuk, 2001). Moreover, as smoking is a disputed social issue, actors on each 
side of the smoking debate play a central role in shaping societal perceptions and 
attitudes towards smoking, and ultimately, in influencing tobacco control regulations 
(Derthick, 2002). Second, the dynamics occurring in the tobacco industry shed light 
on the pursuit of institutional change through conspicuous (e.g. protests) versus 
inconspicuous (e.g. campaign contributions and lobbyists) strategies. Specifically, 
the tobacco industry is known for spending considerable efforts and for investing 
substantial resources on campaign contributions and lobbyists to undermine the 
enactment of tobacco control regulations (CRP, 2013); while, at the same time, both 
anti-smoking organizations and tobacco companies - through Astroturf groups1 - 
have used protests in order to either encourage or promote the enactment of tobacco 
control regulations, or to oppose or thwart the enactment of such regulations (Derry 
& Waikar, 2008; Nathanson, 1999). Thus, this industry provides an opportunity to 
examine the effect of simultaneous conspicuous and inconspicuous means to 
                                                     
1 Astroturf, contrary to grassroots organizing, is the practice by which organizations secretly 




influence institutional change. Finally, the importance of studying the tobacco 
industry is also related to the fact that tobacco is considered to be at the top of the 
list of social issues (other issues being violence, obesity, and alcoholism) which 
require laws intended to reduce the preventable deaths associated with them (MGI, 
2014). In sum, the tobacco industry represents a particularly relevant empirical 
setting to study the unexplored dynamics underlying the interaction between 
movements and counter-movements and their impact on institutional change, and to 
explore the different strategies used by activist organizations and corporations to 
influence institutional change.  
By answering the question of how activist organizations and corporations 
change institutions our contribution to the literature is three-fold. First, we respond 
to the call for research on identifying the causal influences of activist organizations 
and corporations on institutions, and shed light on the differential effects that these 
actors have on institutional change (Walker & Rea, 2014). Specifically, studying the 
interplay between activists that support and corporations that counter-mobilize to 
oppose institutional change is of interest as the importance of examining the 
‘countervailing effects’ of movements and counter-movements has been recognized 
(Soule & King, 2006), yet understudied (Vogus & Davis, 2005). Second, we respond 
to the call for research on “how lobbying and business collective actions shapes 
government” (Walker & Rea, 2014: 35), by uncovering the effects of the strategies 
used by activist organizations and corporations to shape laws. That is, we not only 
examine different actors (i.e. activist organizations and corporations), but also the 
different strategies they use (i.e. constituency-building, financial, and information 
strategies) (Andrews & Caren, 2010; Soule, 2009; Walker & Rea, 2014), in an effort 
to gain a deeper understanding of their influence on the enactment of laws. Finally, 
we provide a longitudinal conceptualization of the multi-level process of 
institutional change at the industry level. Taking an industry perspective for the 
understanding of institutional change is pertinent because contests between activist 
organizations and corporations often take place within industries (Hiatt, Sine, & 
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Tolbert, 2009). Overall, this study presents a comparison between movements and 
counter-movements, and between different strategies in an effort to contribute to the 
understanding of the causal dynamics in the process of institutional change.  
Theory and Hypotheses 
Our work differs from prior research by focusing on institutions as targets of 
the simultaneous actions of both activist organizations and corporations. Previous 
research has found that activist organizations have been successful in their attempts 
to change institutions (Bosi & Uba, 2009; Earl, 2004; Giugni, 1998). McCammon 
and colleagues (2001), for instance, document the expansion in women’s voting 
rights brought about by women’s suffrage activists. In the same vein, McVeigh, 
Myers, and Sikkink (2004) examine the political consequences of the Indiana Ku 
Klux Klan and find that the Klan’s actions impacted political change by influencing 
electoral outcomes. Similarly, Soule and Olzak (2004) show that social movements’ 
actions, along with the public opinion and political climate of a given state, 
influenced the ratification of the Equal Rights Amendment. Schneiberg and Soule 
(2005), study rate regulation in fire insurance and find that the actions of challengers 
anteceded the enactment of such laws. Hiatt and coauthors (2009) explain how the 
temperance movement changed societal normative expectations about drinking as 
well as alcohol related laws, which in turn promoted the founding of soft drink 
manufacturers. Recently, Guérard, Bode, & Gustafsson (2013) analyzed how 
struggles between proponents (i.e. customers/users) and opponents (i.e. 
corporations) of the diesel filter lead to the inclusion of this filter as the default 
technology for diesel cars in Germany. As can be noted, previous research has made 
some progress towards understanding the influence of activist organizations on 
institutions (Amenta, Caren, Chiarello, & Su, 2010).    
Comparatively, there is much less research on the influence of corporations 
on changing institutions (Hillman, Keim, & Schuler, 2004), a notable exception 
being the work of Davis (1991) on the adoption of the poison pill as a takeover 
defense. Within the organizations and management literature, most research on this 
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topic has taken a non-market strategy perspective (Walker & Rea, 2014). Work 
originating from this stream of research has discussed how corporations influence 
institutional change by implementing non-market strategies (de Figueiredo, 2009; 
Keim & Zeithaml, 1986), has uncovered the factors that predict the use of these 
strategies (Boies, 1989; Grier, Munger, & Roberts, 1994; Meznar & Nigh, 1995; 
Schuler, Rehbein, & Cramer, 2002), and has identified their antecedents and 
performance consequences (Lux, Crook, & Woehr, 2010). For instance, Davis and 
Thompson (1994) describe the effects of shareholder activism on legislation related 
to corporate takeovers. Similarly, Hillman (2003) examines the determinants of 
political strategies by American companies in Europe, and finds support for the 
influence of organizational as well as institutional (i.e. corporatism/pluralism) 
determinants on the choice of political strategy. Bonardi and coauthors (2005) 
propose a conceptual framework which identifies the political strategies used by 
corporations aiming to influence public policy to advance their interests based on the 
attractiveness of the political market. Although prior studies have contributed to our 
understanding of how corporations influence institutions, few empirical tests of non-
market strategies are available (Soule, 2012).  
With respect to research that examines the actions of both activist 
organizations and corporations, the bulk of research causally linking the strategies 
used by these actors to institutional change has mainly been from the political 
science and sociology literatures. Baumgartner and co-authors (2009, 2014; 2001; 
2012; 2015; 2012; 2005) have conducted several studies on the influence of 
organized interests groups and social movements on institutional change. These 
authors have examined the different tactics of organized interest groups and social 
movements (Gilens & Page, 2014), and the outcomes of their efforts (Hojnacki et 
al., 2012). Much of the work of Baumgartner and co-authors pays special attention 
to the influence of different actors on the political process (often times on roll call 
votes or attention) either through PAC contributions, mobilization, or lobbying 
efforts (Baumgartner & Leech, 1996; Burstein & Linton, 2002; Grossmann, 2012; 
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Hojnacki et al., 2012). However, within this line of work, the simultaneous influence 
of different actors using several strategies to influence institutional change remains 
to be explored, especially so in the specific context of contested industries. 
Therefore, this paper follows the suggestion by Hojnacki et al. (2012) and differs 
from previous work on interest group advocacy and institutional change by 
specifying the direct interconnectedness of actors and strategies, and by studying the 
strategies of actors to achieve their goals, not in isolation but, with special attention 
to context.  
Hypotheses 
We identify two central actors in the debates over institutional change: 
activist organizations and corporations. As the struggle “between the public interest 
and corporate interests is perhaps nowhere better illustrated than in the decades-long 
struggle between the tobacco industry and advocates for public health” (Pertschuk, 
2001), we follow prior research that has recognized two main sides in the tobacco 
control debate (Derry & Waikar, 2008; Nathanson, 1999). On the one hand, activist 
organizations represented by ‘anti-smoking groups’ (e.g. coalitions on smoking or 
health, groups against smoking pollution, tobacco control and prevention 
organizations, etc.) that advocate for restrictions on smoking or that encourage the 
enactment of tobacco control regulations. On the other hand, corporations that 
represent the counter-movement and oppose the enactment of tobacco control 
regulations. Although tobacco companies play a leading role in organizing efforts 
and funding campaigns to oppose tobacco control regulations (Blanke & da Costa e 
Silva, 2004), the counter-movement is a broad group that features tobacco 
companies, smoker’s rights groups, and other associations (e.g. tobacco growers). 
Hence, we use the label ‘Big Tobacco’ to broadly represent the counter-movement. 
By identifying the struggle over tobacco control regulations as being between ‘anti-
smoking groups’ (i.e. tobacco control organizations or groups that support the 
enactment of bans) and ‘Big Tobacco’ (i.e. organizations or advocates representing 
the tobacco industry who fight the enactment of laws), we thoroughly represent the 
two sides that compose the “tobacco wars” (Pertschuk, 2001). This classification is 
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also in line with the characterization of the media, where the struggle has been 
portrayed as being between anti-smoking groups on one side, and the tobacco 
industry -which has been commonly labeled ‘Big Tobacco’- on the other (Menashe 
& Siegel, 1998).2  
We model the interaction between activist organizations and corporations 
that counter-mobilize taking into account that these actors use various strategies to 
change institutions. Scholars have identified the most prominent strategies used by 
contesting actors to be conspicuous and inconspicuous strategies (Andrews & Caren, 
2010; Soule, 2009; Walker & Rea, 2014). Next we develop our hypotheses and 
establish how anti-smoking groups and Big Tobacco use conspicuous (e.g. protests) 
and inconspicuous (e.g. campaign contributions and lobbying) strategies in order to 
influence the likelihood of the enactment of tobacco control regulations.  
Protests   
Following prior research, protests are defined as manifestations or 
demonstrations by which actors voice their claims, convey their aims, and attract 
support to disrupt or maintain the status quo by promoting or resisting institutional 
change (Earl, Soule, & McCarthy, 2003; King & Soule, 2007). Research has 
traditionally considered the regulative pillar of institutions to be the central target of 
protests (Walker, Martin, & McCarthy, 2008).3 McAdam and Su (2002), for 
instance, assess the effects of protests on congressional voting. Luders (2006) 
                                                     
2 Although it should be noted that the group collations described above occur in an ad hoc 
basis, this grouping structure recognizes that the individual efforts of the actors on each side 
of the tobacco control debate focus on advancing a common cause, on defending a common 
interest, and on defeating a common opponent. That is, the actors on each side share the 
same claim and show high consensus because the issues that they represent are beyond the 
interests of a single actor (e.g. the right to breath clean air vs. smoking as a right), which 
facilitates the pursuit of a shared goal. Moreover, as actors come together around the issues 
they aim to advance, they display unity by taking identical positions on the smoking debate, 
and their unified interests are stronger than the influence of a single actor (Baumgartner et 
al., 2009). 
3 An exception is the work of Pescosolido, Grauerholz, and Milkie (1997), who study the 
normative pillar of institutions as target of protests by examining how the representation of 
African Americans in children’s books changes when racial images are challenged by, 
among others, protesting. 
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examines how protestors are successful in obtaining their legislative demands as a 
function of cultural norms and economic interests. Similarly, Olzak and Soule 
(2009) provide evidence for the influence of protests on congressional hearings. In 
sum, prior studies have found that protests have a role in changing the regulative 
pillar of institutions by making an issue more salient, by generating public support 
for the issue, and by putting it on the political agenda (Snow, Porta, Klandermans, & 
McAdam, 2013). Therefore, in this study, we categorized protests as a conspicuous 
constituency building strategy (Hillman & Hitt, 1999).  
In line with the tenants of political mediation theory, the ability of protests 
by activist organizations to achieve their goals comes not only from their visibility, 
but also from the public support these organizations receive and are able to mobilize. 
We posit that by being visible actions, protests by activist organizations have a 
significant potential to bring about institutional change, understood as changes in the 
regulative pillar of institutions. Protests are visible in that they allow actors to voice 
their claims, interests, and goals publicly, since they are not only performed on the 
streets but also covered by mass media. The visibility of protests means that they 
appeal simultaneously to policymakers and to the general public (King & Soule, 
2007; Olzak & Soule, 2009), and that they are a source of information for both 
audiences (Ingram, Yue, & Rao, 2010). In the context of this study, for instance, 
anti-smoking groups have used protests to mobilize and receive support to achieve 
legislative change by making visible the importance of regulating tobacco use. That 
is, these groups have used protests as a mechanism to communicate their health 
message and to disrupt the status quo by altering the perception of smoking. By 
doing so, anti-smoking groups have been essential in the formation and change of 
tobacco control regulations by developing, constructing, and reinforcing a set of 
expectations about smoking. This is perhaps the most important influence that 
activist organizations have when using protests, their ability to disrupt the status quo 
(Snow et al., 2013). Thus, protests constitute a visible strategy used by activist 
organizations to achieve legislative change by voicing and articulating societal 
19 
 
views about a certain issue (McAdam & Su, 2002) and by enlisting the support of 
policymakers (Snow et al., 2013). Therefore, we expect as a starting premise that 
protests are impactful in promoting the activist organizations’ agenda, and 
hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 1a: Protests by activist organizations increase the 
probability of institutional change.  
Although prior research has identified that protests by activist organizations 
foster and inspire corporate counter mobilization (Jasper & Poulsen, 1993), there are 
very few studies that explicitly consider the effects of the protests by movements 
and counter-movements (Walker & Rea, 2014). An exception being the work of 
Ingram and Rao (2004), who study the enactment of anti-chain-store legislation as 
being dependent on the actions of independent and chain stores, and that of 
Schneiberg et al. (Schneiberg, King, & Smith, 2008), who uncover how protest by 
social movements promote the formation of cooperatives. Despite these efforts, 
explaining how activist organizations provoke corporate mobilization remains an 
unexplored area of research (Walker & Rea, 2014).  
Some current work has posited that corporations that are highly scrutinized, 
and are large and visible, are more likely to counter-mobilize (de Bakker & den 
Hond, 2008). In line with these efforts, we posit that although both activist 
organizations and corporations use protests to promote the visibility of their claims 
and to win supporters who would mobilize for their cause, there are two 
fundamental differences between the protests of activist organizations and those of 
corporations. First, whereas activist organizations protest in an attempt to disrupt the 
status quo, corporations in contested industries protest to maintain the status quo. 
Therefore, the protests of corporations are more likely to occur when the issue at 
hand is already on the political agenda but before the law is enacted, mainly because 
once the law has been passed it is more difficult for corporations to influence 
policymakers to alter or overturn it (Amenta, Caren, & Olasky, 2005). Second, 
corporations in contested industries need to devise protests that offset the constant 
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threats to their legitimacy by, for instance, allying with groups whose claims are 
deemed as deserving of recognition and attention, and that are successful in 
attracting and mobilizing public support.  
In the context of study, protests by anti-smoking groups have encouraged 
the counter organization and resistance of Big Tobacco. At the same time, however, 
protests by anti-smoking groups have put Big Tobacco in a vulnerable position as 
they have pressed the industry to keep a low profile and to minimize its direct 
involvement in pro-tobacco protests. The ability of anti-smoking groups to 
invalidate Big Tobacco’s protests by highlighting the dangers associated with 
smoking has been crucial in forcing Big Tobacco to use Astroturf groups to deliver 
its messages (Derry & Waikar, 2008; Nathanson, 1999). These Astroturf groups 
mitigate the inherent lack of consonance between Big Tobacco’s interests and the 
public interest: “because opposition is most credible if it appears to come from 
independent sources, tobacco companies prefer to work through surrogates. They do 
this by mobilizing others whose interests are aligned with their own and by creating 
or co-opting ‘front groups’” (Blanke & da Costa e Silva, 2004: 135). For instance, 
Big Tobacco has used a myriad of concealed counter-mobilization efforts to stop the 
enactment of laws: from founding think thanks such as the Tobacco Institute, to 
funding advocacy groups like the National Smokers Alliance, or engaging in 
mobilization by for example facilitating own employees’ participation in protests 
against tobacco control regulations or supporting bars that resist smoking bans 
(Samuels & Glantz, 1991; Sweda & Daynard, 1996). The Astroturf efforts conceal 
Big Tobacco’s involvement in the movement against smoking bans (Cardador, 1995; 
Smith & Malone, 2007), in an effort to present their claims as appropriate and to 
increase their pool of supporters (Samuels & Glantz, 1991; Sweda & Daynard, 
1996).  
In view of the above, the occurrence of protests by activist organizations 
represents a challenge for corporations, as their protests indirectly affect the ability 
of corporations to gain and mobilize supporters (McDonnell & Werner, 2016). 
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Therefore, we posit that protests by activist organizations compel corporations to 
counter-mobilize in an effort to maintain the status quo, however, corporations in a 
contested industry are obliged to do so by mobilizing Astroturf groups on their 
behalf instead of engaging in it themselves. Nevertheless, protests, which advance 
the corporations’ positions, are a visible strategy that targets policymakers in an 
attempt to maintain the status quo through mobilizing constituent support. Thus, 
analogous to the prediction concerning activist organizations, as a baseline 
expectation we posit that:  
Hypothesis 1b: Protests by Astroturf groups that represent 
corporations and aim to maintain the status quo decrease the 
probability of institutional change. 
As mentioned before, protests involve interactions between movements and 
counter-movements around different claims (Earl, 2004), and constitute a strategy 
used to change institutions (Snow et al., 2013). Resource mobilization theory 
suggests that the efficiency of protests as a strategy to change institutions depends 
on the potential of the movement to gather and mobilize support (Amenta, Caren, & 
Olasky, 2005). However, in the case where both the social movement and the 
counter-movement use protests as a strategy to achieve institutional change, given 
that resources are limited, we expect the overall efficiency of protests to be 
diminished as the visibility and impact of the protests by each side lessens. In the 
context of this study, for example, anti-smoking groups emerged along with the 
perceived opportunity to enact laws given the assessment of smoking as a hazard to 
health (Nathanson, 1999). As anti-smoking groups have made their message more 
visible and have gained public support, they have hindered the ability of Big 
Tobacco to deter the advancement of laws that threaten the status quo, and have 
obliged Big Tobacco to use Astroturf groups to protest on their behalf. 
Simultaneously, though, the concealed participation of Big Tobacco in protests by 
relying on societal members whose claims are more in line with those of the general 
public (i.e. employees) or who appear to be more legitimate in the eyes of society 
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members (i.e. scientists) has helped Big Tobacco not only in its efforts to maintain 
the status quo, but also in visibly questioning the validity of the claims made by anti-
smoking groups. Hence, when both sides of the smoking debate protest, their 
individual ability to gain public support and to foster further mobilization diminishes 
due to the reduced visibility of each protest and to the mixed claims conveyed by the 
protestors. In other words, when the protests of the social movement make an issue 
visible, they result in protests on the part of the counter-movement that confront 
their message, which lowers the effectiveness of the single protest, and vice versa. 
Thus, we formulate: 
Hypothesis 2: The efficiency of protests by the social movement to 
influence institutional change is negatively moderated by the counter-
movement’s protests.  
Campaign Contributions 
Campaign contributions are an inconspicuous financial strategy linked to 
individual interests because through contributions actors articulate their demands in 
a more concealed or hidden form compared to protests. Campaign contributions 
have been identified as a financial strategy that targets policymakers through 
monetary incentives (de Figueiredo & Edwards, 2015). Therefore, we study 
campaign contributions as a strategy by which agents offer monetary incentives in 
an attempt to persuade policymakers to propose or (not) support a given policy 
(Baron, 2006). Research on the use of campaign contributions has looked at how 
corporations use financial incentives to influence legislators in diverse settings such 
as trade policy (Schuler, 1996), electric utilities (Bonardi, Holburn, & Vanden 
Bergh, 2006), and universities (Figueiredo & Silverman, 2006). Despite its 
importance, little attention has been paid to contributions by Big Tobacco, whereas 
Big Tobacco is known to expend substantial sums in offering monetary incentives to 
influence legislators.  
By using campaign contributions, activist organizations and corporations 
engage directly with policymakers in a clear effort to shape laws that sustain and 
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advance their interests (Keim & Zeithaml, 1986). Campaign contributions by activist 
organizations are aimed at disrupting the status quo and contribute to the likelihood 
of institutional change by performing several functions. First, campaign 
contributions provide activist organizations access to the policy making process: “at 
the very least, contributors are more likely to have their phone calls returned” (Hall 
& Deardorff, 2006: 80). Thus, monetary resources are expected to buy attention 
from legislators, which gives access to the policy making process. Second, campaign 
contributions align the incentives of legislators with those of activist organizations. 
This is because contributions can provide useful support to legislators on matters 
that the they care about, and by making a contribution, activist organizations assert 
their own interests on the same matter (Hillman & Hitt, 1999). Third, campaign 
contributions encourage policymakers to prioritize the claims of activist 
organizations over other antagonistic claims by recruiting the support of the 
policymaker (Baron, 2006). Thus, campaign contributions of anti-smoking groups 
have the potential to disrupt the status quo in order to influence the enactment of 
bans through financial incentives that persuade policymakers to support their claims. 
In other words, campaign contributions provide monetary incentives to 
policymakers to adopt the preferences or the claims of the anti-smoking groups. 
Based on the above, we expect as a starting premise that the more anti-smoking 
groups use campaign contributions, the more likely it is that legislators are sensitized 
to their claims, and hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 3a: Campaign contributions by activist organizations 
increase the probability of institutional change.  
Prior research has posited that policymakers are less willing to be associated 
with corporations that are targeted by activist organizations (McDonnell & Werner, 
2016) and are more likely to support the claims put forward by actors that are 
considered to be legitimate in the eyes of societal members (Amenta et al., 2005). 
Given the threats to the legitimacy of corporations in contested industries, 
policymakers may avoid contributions from corporations in contested industries in 
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order to minimize the negative repercussions elicited by sustaining the industry’s 
interests. In other words, policymakers may be less sympathetic to the campaign 
contributions of corporations in contested industries than to the contributions of 
activist organizations who are denouncing these corporations’ products and/or 
actions. In the tobacco industry, evidence of this is the “Free from Tobacco Money” 
award, which is given yearly by ASH (Action on Smoking and Health), a non-profit 
anti-smoking organization that recognizes politicians who have not accepted Big 
Tobacco’s contributions (ASH, 2014). Nevertheless, corporations remain a strong 
opponent for activist organizations in this respect, particularly because of having 
deep pockets that fund campaign contributions targeted at politicians that support the 
industry’s efforts and which are aimed at maintaining the status quo.  
Resource mobilization theory suggests that actors that have more resources 
at their disposal are those that are better able to achieve their goals and succeed 
(McCarthy & Zald, 1977). This, combined with the idea that resource imbalances 
affect an actor’s potential to influence institutional change, suggests that during an 
episode of contention, the actor that controls the most resources is more likely to 
affect institutional change in its favor (Baumgartner et al., 2009). Thus, even in the 
face of tireless pressure for change from activist organizations, corporations are able 
to maintain the status quo by continuously making substantial campaign 
contributions. The strong interest of corporations in undermining institutional 
change is primarily financial. In the case of the tobacco industry, the significant 
resources that Big Tobacco expends in campaign contributions reflect its concern 
with the negative impact of tobacco control regulations on smoking rates, and thus, 
with the potential reduction in its profits as a consequence of a decline in the usage 
of tobacco products (Smith, Savell, & Gilmore, 2013). Hence, Big Tobacco remains 
able to secure (some of) its influence in the policymaking process by using its 
knowledge and experience in influencing public policy, and its substantial financial 
resources (Jacobson, Wasserman, & Anderson, 1997). Therefore, we posit that 
corporations attempt to maintain the status quo via significant campaign 
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contributions against the enactment of laws that negatively affect their business. 
Analogous to the prediction concerning activist organizations, as a baseline 
expectation, we predict:  
Hypothesis 3b: Campaign contributions by corporations that aim to 
maintain the status quo decrease the probability of institutional change. 
As argued before, both activist organizations and corporations have resorted 
to the use of conspicuous and inconspicuous strategies to either disrupt or maintain 
the status quo, and their efforts do not occur in a vacuum. In the specific case of 
campaign contributions, the effectiveness of contributions by corporations is 
threatened by the fact that policymakers are more likely to enact laws that directly 
represent the interests of society members, instead of laws that protect the interests 
of corporations in contested industries and that may be detrimental to the society 
(Hojnackia et al., 2015). Hence, unlike industries in which the interest of 
policymakers and corporations may be aligned, in contested industries the disparities 
between their interests depend on deeply held societal attitudes and concerns. For 
instance, given the history of lies and deception of the tobacco industry (Proctor, 
2011), Big Tobacco’s contributions may be discredited by some policymakers. Still, 
Big Tobacco is not fighting a lost battle, as the sizable resources it commands allow 
it to deter the enactment of laws by means of continuous and generous contributions 
to its allies. Therefore, movements and counter-movements are more likely to 
contribute to legislators that support their individual interests (Hall & Deardorff, 
2006). However, when the campaign contributions made by a movement increase, 
the counter-movement may also attempt to contribute to legislators who have 
opposing interests to the movement’s positions. In this case, the ability of the 
movement to recruit legislators not only requires higher monetary incentives, but 
may also be at stake, as legislators may simultaneously receive contributions from 
the counter-movement, which reduces the effectiveness of the specific contribution 
(Baron, 2006). Therefore, we posit that in the case where both the social movement 
and the counter-movement use campaign contributions as a strategy to achieve 
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institutional change, the efficiency of their individual contributions is diminished. 
Thus, we formulate: 
Hypothesis 4: The efficiency of the campaign contributions by the 
social movement to influence institutional change is negatively 
moderated by the counter-movement’s campaign contributions.  
Lobbyists  
Lobbying is the activity by which individuals representing an 
organization (i.e. lobbyists) convey information to policymakers with the 
objective of influencing institutional change (Baron, 2006). The use of 
lobbyists, thus, is an important strategy by which activist organizations and 
corporations attempt to influence institutions (Hillman & Hitt, 1999). Unlike 
protests but like campaign contributions, hiring lobbyists is an inconspicuous 
information strategy linked to the pursuit of private goals. That is, lobbyists 
seek to provide specific information directly to policymakers about the 
preferences of the group of societal members they represent. Moreover, 
lobbyists are also involved in providing information to policymakers on the 
potential impact of proposed regulations to persuade them to support their 
clients’ claims. Although, lobbyists and campaign contributions are linked 
(Ansolabehere, Snyder, & Tripathi, 2002), by defining lobbyists independently 
from campaign contributions we are incorporating the distinct effects of 
information and financial strategies on institutional change (Hall & Deardorff, 
2006; Hillman & Hitt, 1999). In the case of the tobacco industry, for instance, 
anti-smoking groups and Big Tobacco tend to use both strategies 
simultaneously, as campaign contributions have granted them access to the 
policymaking process and employing lobbyists has granted them influence over 
the policymakers. Therefore, we analyze these strategies separately, in an effort 
to contribute to a more nuanced understanding of each strategy and following 
the idea that “the point at which access ends and influence begins is the point at 
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which legislators adjust their beliefs on the basis of lobbying information” 
(Wright, 1996: 81).   
Previous research has argued that lobbyists draw attention to how the goals 
of policymakers align with those of activist organizations, as such, hiring lobbyists 
is an attempt by activist organizations to benefit from the actions of like-minded 
policymakers that represent their claims (Roscoe & Jenkins, 2005). Prior research 
has shown lobbyists tend to concentrate their efforts on likeminded policymakers 
because lobbying is a relational strategy that involves reciprocity and trust (Hall & 
Deardorff, 2006). Thus, anti-smoking groups transmit information to policymakers 
about their claims by using lobbyists. That is, anti-smoking groups hire lobbyists to 
persuade policymakers to enact tobacco control regulations by highlighting the need 
to protect the public’s health and to reduce the burden of illness and deaths caused 
by tobacco use. As anti-smoking groups aim to reduce the risks associated with 
tobacco use, we expect anti-smoking groups to be able to persuade policymakers 
who are concerned with protecting public health of the need to enact tobacco control 
regulations. In fact, lobbying efforts related to health issues have been reported as a 
top priority for lobbyists, meaning that they are commonplace in the legislative 
system and more likely to resonate with policymakers (Baumgartner et al., 2009; 
Baumgartner & Leech, 2001). Moreover, the influence of the information 
transmitted by lobbyists about the consequences of a given policy has been found to 
be a strong predictor of enactment (Burstein, 2014). Hence, we argue that when the 
claims of lobbyists representing activist organizations are deemed as appropriate and 
consequential by policymakers, these lobbyist are more likely to be aided in their 
efforts by policymakers (RWJF, 2011). Hence, we expect as a starting premise that:  
Hypothesis 5a: The number of lobbyists representing activist 
organizations increases the probability of institutional change.  
Prior work has shown that lobbying efforts increase as the government’s 
activity on a specific issue intensifies (Leech et al., 2005). Hence, when the lobbyists 
representing activist organizations are raising an issue that is relevant for 
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corporations and for societal members, corporations are stimulated to defend their 
interests by means of employing lobbyists as well. Supported by the monetary 
resources they command, corporations have been known for dominating the 
lobbying landscape and for their ability to recruit lobbyists that become effective 
proponents of their claims (Kimball et al., 2012). This is especially so in the case of 
the tobacco industry, where Big Tobacco has hired numerous lobbyists to support 
their political allies to oppose the enactment of tobacco control regulations (ASH, 
2014). Big Tobacco’s lobbyists have transmitted a message focused on the rights 
and freedom arguments for smoking, and on the allegedly negative economic 
consequences to tobacco related businesses of the enactment of tobacco control 
regulations. In this sense, corporations are expected to use as much resources as 
possible in hiring lobbyists to persuade policymakers to oppose regulations that 
would negatively affect their business. In short, we posit that lobbyists that represent 
corporations potentially coax legislators not to enact a certain law by conveying 
information on the foreseeable negative impact of a law on business activities. 
Therefore, we hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 5b: The number of lobbyists representing corporations that 
aim to maintain the status quo decreases the probability of institutional 
change. 
Conflicting results on the effectiveness of lobbying efforts have been 
documented by prior research (Baumgartner et al., 2009). Although prior work 
has posited that on average actors who face no opposition are more likely to 
achieve their goals by lobbying (Hojnackia et al., 2015), it remains unclear who 
is more effective in the case when there is a dispute between the interests of 
corporations and activist organizations, and both rely on lobbyists. While 
corporations are perceived to be relatively more successful in their lobbying 
efforts, prior scholarly work has shown that corporations are more likely to be 
successful in the case where there is no opposition from other actors. However, 
in the face of opposition, corporations are less likely than activist organizations 
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to achieve their goals by lobbying (Hojnackia et al., 2015). This is because the 
conflict between activist organizations and corporations draws the public 
interest and attention, which then constrains the advantage of corporations in 
the policy making process by making the issue more salient and visible (Smith, 
2000). Thus, the efficiency of using this strategy to achieve institutional change 
is negatively affected for both sides when the lobbying efforts of the social 
movement are challenged by the lobbying efforts of the counter-movement. 
Thus, we formulate: 
Hypothesis 6: The efficiency of lobbyists representing the social 
movement to influence institutional change is negatively moderated by 
the counter-movement’s lobbyists. 
Contextual Influences 
As the previous discussions highlights, protests, campaign contributions, 
and hiring lobbyists are strategies used by activist organizations and corporations 
that play a critical role in disrupting or maintaining the status quo, and in bringing 
about or repelling institutional change. However, the effectiveness of a strategy can 
depend on the specific characteristics of the state in which the strategy is used. In the 
case of study, for example, anti-smoking groups’ success in persuading 
policymakers to enact tobacco control regulations has been closely tied to their 
ability to frame their claims in terms of the health cost of smoking. This is because 
smoking related health costs weigh heavily on the states’ healthcare systems: “of 
every $10 spent on healthcare in the U.S., almost 90 cents is due to smoking” (Xu, 
Bishop, Kennedy, Simpson, & Pechacek, 2016: 331). Hence, we posit that two 
framing strategies explain the ability of activist organizations to persuade 
policymakers to change the status quo: relevance and credibility. The former refers 
to the ability of activist organizations to effectively and strategically frame their 
claims by linking them to the economic benefits for the state. For example, 
relevance in the tobacco setting is evidenced by the fact that anti-smoking groups 
have framed their claims in relation to the substantial burden that smoking inflicts on 
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the state’s health care institutions, especially on those that are funded by public tax 
dollars (Xu et al., 2016). Thus, relevance has been a crucial framing strategy for 
anti-smoking groups to portray their goals as being worthy of recognition and 
attention since their aim is to stop the costly ‘tobacco epidemic’ (Derry & Waikar, 
2008; Nathanson, 1999). Credibility relates to the ability of activist organizations to 
gain public support from legitimate organizations that attests to the economic 
benefits of their claims. In the case of study, for instance, credibility is related to the 
ability of anti-smoking groups to gain public support not only from legitimate health 
organizations such as the American Lung Association or the American Cancer 
Society, but also from those societal members that are most impacted by and/or that 
are most aware of the health costs associated with smoking (e.g. medical 
professionals). These organizations reinforce the economic benefits related to the 
enactment of tobacco control regulations by emphasizing the ‘true’ costs of smoking 
as related to lost productivity and direct healthcare expenditures (ACS, 2015; SG, 
2014). Hence, we expect that the strategies used by activist organizations to change 
institutions result in a greater impact when they are capable of steering the attention 
of policymakers to their claims (and undermine the claims made by corporations), 
by framing their claims as having a relevant and credible impact on the economy of 
the state. Based on this argument, we predict:   
Hypothesis 7: The different strategies used by activist organizations 
will further increase the probability of institutional change for states in 
which the potential economic benefits of disrupting the status quo are 
higher.  
As mentioned before, corporate counter mobilization takes place through 
strategies similar to those utilized by activist organizations, the differences being 
that corporations in contested industries face threats to their legitimacy which 
challenge their ability to maintain the status quo. However, the ability of 
corporations in contested industries to deter institutional change is facilitated when 
their interest in maintaining the status quo is aligned with the goals of policymakers 
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and society members (Smith, 2000). That is, we posit that the perception of 
alignment between the preferences of corporations and those of society members is a 
necessary condition for the efforts of corporations to be effective in persuading 
policymakers to maintain the status quo for two reasons. First, policymakers that 
aim to be reelected rely on voters for their election, thus, they are more inclined to 
support laws that are supported by societal members and to avoid laws that may 
result in low public credibility (Keim & Zeithaml, 1986). For example, it has been 
recognized that disparities between tobacco control regulations across states partly 
depend on societal attitudes towards smoking, as regulations in tobacco growing 
states (e.g. Kentucky) are less strict or widespread than regulations in states where 
smoking is less socially accepted (e.g. California).4 Second, policymakers represent 
their constituents, which means that they are more likely to support policies that are 
linked to the preferences of these constituents (de Guia et al., 2003). Therefore, a 
more significant influence of Big Tobacco in the legislative process can be expected 
in states with higher smoking rates given the resonance of their claims among 
society members (McVeigh et al., 2004; Pedriana, 2006). In other words, we argue 
that when the states’ constituency supports the strategies of corporations to maintain 
the status quo, they favorably dispose policymakers towards the interests of 
corporations, which poses a significant threat to institutional change (Dhalla & 
Oliver, 2013; Oliver, 1991). Thus, we predict:  
Hypothesis 8: The different strategies used by corporations will further 
reduce the probability of institutional change for states in which 
constituencies support maintaining the status quo.   
Methods 
Data Sources and Measures 
We gathered state-level data from several data sources for the period 2000-
2012. Specifically, during this period the number of states with comprehensive 
                                                     




smoking bans increased from zero to 27 (see Figure 1). This period is especially 
relevant for our study because it allows us to minimize censoring problems in our 
models, as the first comprehensive smoking ban was enacted in 2002 and no 
comprehensive smoking ban has been enacted after 2012. Moreover, although 
during the period of study the tobacco industry in the US was operating under the 
conditions of the 1998 Master Settlement Agreement,5 the ‘tobacco wars’ in the U.S. 
are far from being over. In fact, contestation over the tobacco industry is still 
present, while some experts maintain that “America is still beholden to Big 
Tobacco” (Cohen, 2016), others contend that “investors and incorrigible puffers, are 
its last remaining friends” (Economist, 2014). 
We use the state level of analysis not only because in the US the 
decentralization of politics allows exploiting between state differences, but also 
because the strategies studied are known to be more powerful at the state-level 
(Marquis, Guthrie, & Almandoz, 2012). In fact, prior research has proven the 
usefulness of state-level analyses when examining the expansion of laws in the US 
(McCammon et al., 2001; Schneiberg & Bartley, 2001; Soule & Olzak, 2004). 
Moreover, in the US, state legislatures are important arenas for tobacco control 
because they have the power to enact laws related to tobacco taxes, youth access to 
tobacco, and smoking bans, and to pass preemption laws.6 State legislatures are, 
however, prohibited from taking legal action on cigarette advertising.    
Insert Figures 1 and 2 about here 
Dependent variable. A comprehensive smoking ban is one that prohibits 
smoking in all restaurants, bars, and workplaces - with no exceptions - because these 
are the major venues of exposure to secondhand smoke for non-smokers (CDC, 
                                                     
5 In a nutshell, the MSA consists of protection against lawsuits in exchange for tobacco 
companies agreeing “(1) to pay the states annually and in perpetuity billions of dollars; (2) 
to restrict permanently their advertising, promotion, and marketing of cigarettes; and (3) to 
contribute $1.5 billion to establish what has become the American Legacy Foundation, an 
entity dedicated to counter-advertising and public education against cigarette smoking” 
(National Association of Attorneys General, 2007). 
6 Preemption restricts the power of local governments to enact tobacco control regulations.  
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2012a). Comprehensive smoking bans have been recognized to be the most effective 
tobacco control regulations, as they make smoking less attractive and less visible 
(SG, 2014). We cannot observe a states’ probability of enacting a comprehensive 
smoking ban, instead, we only observe the actual enactment of a ban. Hence, we 
create a binary variable that takes the value of ‘1’ for a state in a given year if a 
comprehensive smoking ban is enacted, and ‘0’ otherwise. We collected data on the 
enactment of comprehensive smoking bans by US states from the State Tobacco 
Activities Tracking and Evaluation System and from the ANR Tobacco Control 
Laws Database (see Figure 2). Once a state enacts a comprehensive smoking ban it 
is excluded from the dataset. The sample consists of 540 state-year observations.   
Independent variables. We model the probability of the enactment of a 
comprehensive smoking ban as a function of time-varying independent and control 
variables.  
To test hypotheses 1a, 1b, and 2, we followed prior research that has 
commonly used the media as a source of protests event data (Earl, Martin, 
McCarthy, & Soule, 2004). We conducted a search for newspaper articles about 
tobacco related protests using Lexis-Nexis database and assembled the articles in 
2014. In order to avoid possible selection bias in the reporting of protests, we did not 
focus on a single national outlet (e.g. The New York Times) as has been commonly 
done, but instead included articles from both national and state sources (e.g. Daily 
News, San Jose Mercury News, The Atlanta Journal-Constitution, The Denver Post, 
The Oklahoman, The Philadelphia Inquirer, The Washington Post, USA Today, 
among others). The combination of national and state sources has been recognized to 
be a more credible source of protests data when studying state-level protests 
(McAdam & Su, 2002). This triangulation of data sources is likely to result in more 
protests being reported, as protests closer to the media source are more likely to be 
covered than those further away (Earl et al., 2004; Inclán, 2008; Oliver & Maney, 
2000). Moreover, using a combination of sources also attenuates description bias as 
it provides a more complete depiction of the protests (Earl et al., 2004; Soule, 
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2013).7 We operationalized protests as occurring when one of the following events 
took place: protests, strikes, riots, boycotts, marches, sit-ins, demonstrations, 
manifestations, attacks, rallies, vigils, occupations, campaigns, petitioning, or 
activism (Earl et al., 2003; King & Soule, 2007; Walker et al., 2008). An initial 
search on Lexis-Nexis using a combination of the search terms listed before and 
Boolean operators resulted in 909 newspaper articles. After similarity analysis to 
eliminate duplicated articles and after excluding articles that did not refer to public 
demonstrations or manifestations, the final sample resulted in 207 newspaper 
articles. All the retrieved articles were read to extract the relevant information on 
each protest (i.e. participants, state, year) and to validate that only protests that 
occurred before the enactment of a ban were included in the models. Each protest 
was coded as either anti-smoking or pro Big Tobacco based on the actors that 
initiated and participated in the protest and their claims (e.g. grievance or support). 
An anti-smoking protest includes, for instance, manifestations against smoking or 
calls to prevent tobacco use (see Figure 3). A protest by Big Tobacco is, for 
example, one in which demonstrators urge the defeat of a bill or light up cigarettes 
to campaign against laws that restrict their freedom of choice (see Figure 4). We 
utilize two state-level measures of protests in the analyses, the first measure is the 
count of anti-smoking protests and the second is the count of Big Tobacco’s 
protests.8 To assess inter-coder reliability, a second coder read all the newspaper 
articles and coded each protest as either anti-smoking or Big Tobacco, the rate of 
interrater agreement (90.53%) suggests almost perfect agreement (Landis & Koch, 
1977).9 
                                                     
7 Selection bias refers to the fact that not all protests are covered by a given source and what 
is covered may not be random. Description bias refers to how well the protests are described 
by a given source. 
8 It is not possible to know the size of the protests. About 30% of the coded articles provide 
an indication of the number of participants, and less than 20% provide an exact or estimated 
number of participants.  
9 As a rule-of-thumb, values greater than 75% represent excellent agreement beyond chance 
(Fleiss, Levin, & Cho-Paik, 2003). Disagreements occurred in the coding of 23 articles in 
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Insert Figures 3 and 4 about here  
The Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995 mandated corporations to disclose 
their federal lobbying practices. State legislatures followed suit and extensive data 
on lobbying activities at the state level are available from the National Institute on 
Money in State Politics (http://www.followthemoney.org/).10 We collected data on 
state-level campaign contributions and lobbyists from this institute by retrieving 
information listed under the tobacco, tobacco companies, and tobacco product sales 
categories. To test hypotheses 3a, 3b, and 4, we include a variable that captures 
campaign contributions at the state level (see Figure 5). Since this variable is highly 
skewed, we used the log-transformed measure in the analyses. To test hypotheses 5a, 
5b, and 6, we include a variable that captures the number of lobbyists for both sides 
at the state level (see Figure 6). For both variables, campaign contributions and 
lobbyists, we classified actions either as anti-smoking or Big Tobacco based on the 
information on the industry and recipient provided. Specifically, activities by 
tobacco control groups are classified as anti-smoking, whereas activities by tobacco 
companies or by organizations involved or individuals employed in the tobacco 
business were categorized as Big Tobacco. 
Insert Figures 5 and 6 about here  
To test hypothesis 7 we interact anti-smoking protests, campaign 
contributions, and lobbyists with health costs. The health costs variable measures 
the capital expenditures on health expenses as a percentage of the general 
expenditures of a given state. This variable accounts for the potential economic 
benefits related to a lower incidence of smoking in a given state since it captures the 
state’s expenditures on health costs associated with smoking. Data for this variable 
were gathered from the US Census Bureau. To test hypothesis 8 we interact Big 
                                                                                                                                         
which either protests from both sides or splits in support were reported. These coding 
discrepancies were resolved by discussion.   
10 Astroturf efforts – “in which the firm secretly subsidizes a group with similar views to 




Tobacco’s protests, campaign contributions, and lobbyists with smoking prevalence. 
This variable measures the yearly percentage of adults who are smokers in a state 
and indicates the size of the market for cigarettes. Hence, this variable reflects 
societal preferences towards smoking as it directly captures the extent to which 
smoking is (or is not) a widespread habit in a given state. Data on cigarette smoking 
come from the CDC Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System.  
Control variables. We include one-year lagged control variables in the 
models to better capture causality. First, we include the log of state tobacco related 
tax collections to capture the economic pressures against the enactment of laws 
derived from cigarette excise tax revenues. These data were obtained from the Tax 
Burden on Tobacco report (Orzechowski & Walter, 2014). Second, in order to 
control for the fact that the so-called “tobacco states” are less likely to enact 
smoking bans, we account for tobacco harvested area per state (acreage). Data for 
the tobacco crops variable were collected from the National Agricultural Statistics 
Service. Third, we control for the percentage of sales to minors in a given state. Data 
were obtained from the Annual Synar Report, a report that details trends in sales of 
tobacco to minors. Fourth, to capture the anticipation that liberal governments are 
more likely than conservative governments to support the enactment of 
comprehensive smoking bans (as the former tend to support the duty of government 
to intervene to protect public health, whereas the later believe in the right of 
individuals to make their own choices), we control for state ideology by using the 
measure developed by Berry et al. (1998). Data are available at: 
https://rcfording.wordpress.com/state-ideology-data/. We also control for the 
anticipation that democrats are more likely than republicans to support the 
enactment of comprehensive smoking bans by controlling for unified democratic 
gubernatorial and legislative control of state government. Data were gathered from 
the US Census Bureau. Fifth, we include the potential for mobilization represented 
by a count of the number of tobacco related social movements in a state for a given 
year. The existence of social movements has been recognized to be a necessary 
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condition for influence, as the circumstances that spur the formation of social 
movements and that promote mobilization are also necessary for movements to gain 
influence (Amenta et al., 2010). Data for this variable were collected using annual 
volumes of the Encyclopedia of Associations from 1998 to 2012; we consulted 
yearly volumes in order to avoid the measure to be shaped by entries and exits 
(Walker, 2009). Sixth, to capture regional diffusion effects we compute the number 
of geographically contiguous states that had previously enacted comprehensive 
smoking bans by including a neighboring effects variable. This variable counts the 
number of states surrounding the focal state that have enacted a comprehensive 
smoking ban. Moreover, to tap into the states that have already enacted a ban, we 
include a variable that captures the cumulative number of comprehensive smoking 
bans previously enacted. Finally, to control for the visibility of protests, we include 
media coverage, a variable that counts the number of newspapers reporting a given 
protest. The models also include the health costs and smoking prevalence variables 
as controls, and a time trend variable to control for the upward sloping path of the 
dependent variable. 
Model and Analyses 
We use a probit model to estimate the probability of state i enacting a 
comprehensive smoking ban at time t, as follows:  
𝑃(𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 1|𝑥𝑖𝑡) = Φ(𝑥′𝑖𝑡𝛽) (1) 
The probability of the enactment of a comprehensive smoking ban is given by 
equation 1, where β is the vector of coefficients to be estimated and 𝑥𝑖𝑡 is the vector 
of variables discussed in the previous section. As mentioned before, within this set 
of variables there are potentially endogenous variables. In particular, we identify 
protests as an endogenous variable given that protesting efforts, either by anti-
smoking groups or Big Tobacco, may be driven by the expectation that a ban may 
(or may not) be enacted (Oliver & Maney, 2000). Although event history or hazard 
models have traditionally been used to estimate the likelihood of occurrence of an 
event, estimating the models without correcting for endogeneity will most likely 
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result in biased coefficients (Alvarez & Glasgow, 1999). To solve for the potential 
endogenous nature of the protest variable, we use a two-stage residual inclusion 
(2SRI) estimation method (Hausman, 1978; Terza, Basu, & Rathouz, 2008; 
Wooldridge, 2015), also known as a control function approach (Heckman & Hotz, 
1989; Petrin & Train, 2010). The selection of the 2SRI estimation over traditional 
event history or hazard models is motivated by the possibility that some omitted 
variables that determine the probability of enacting a comprehensive smoking ban 
may be correlated with protests by anti-smoking groups or Big Tobacco.11  
The essential idea of the 2SRI estimation is that although there are some 
unobserved variables that may be correlated with protests by anti-smoking groups or 
Big Tobacco (e.g. the expectation of enactment of a ban), we can estimate these 
unobservables and thereby obtain consistent estimates for the probability of the 
enactment of a comprehensive smoking ban. To do so, the 2SRI estimation suggests 
a two-stage procedure: (i) estimate the endogenous variable(s) by regressing it on a 
set of independent variables that do not relate to the expectation of an enactment to 
obtain the residuals, and (ii) estimate the original regression with the inclusion of the 
residuals as additional explanatory variable(s) (Wooldridge, 2015). In short, to 
estimate the probit coefficients using 2SRI we first estimate the endogenous 
variable(s) (i.e. protests), then obtain the residuals from the first-stage regression, 
and add these residuals as an additional variable in the second-stage to estimate the 
probit equation. This two-step procedure allows for the estimation of unbiased 
coefficients using a nonlinear model (Terza et al., 2008). 
In the first-stage, we model the endogenous variables (i.e. protests by anti-
smoking groups -𝑦𝐴𝑆- and Big Tobacco -𝑦𝐵𝑇-), as follows:  
 𝑦𝐴𝑆 = 𝜏𝐴𝑆 + 𝑧′𝑖𝑡𝜋𝐴𝑆 + 𝑢𝐴𝑆 (2) 
                                                     
11 Handling endogeneity in time hazard models is an issue under development. In particular, 
the suitability of the 2SRI approach for duration/survival models remains an open question. 
The results from the estimation of the Extended Cox model with correction for endogeneity 
are available from the authors. However, these results should be interpreted with caution.   
39 
 
 𝑦𝐵𝑇 = 𝜏𝐵𝑇 + 𝑧′𝑖𝑡𝜋𝐵𝑇 + 𝑣𝐵𝑇 (3) 
where 𝑧𝑖𝑡 is a vector of exogenous variables that have been identified as 
determinants of public protests by prior research, namely: population, GDP per 
capita, poverty rate, unemployment rate, size, and number of state legislators 
(Lehman-Wilzig & Ungar, 1985; Meyer, 2004; Snow, Soule, & Cress, 2005; Soule, 
Mcadam, Mccarthy, & Su, 1999). State-level data for these variables were gathered 
from SAGE Stats. By running a regression for each of the two of the endogenous 
variables, 𝑦𝐴𝑆  and 𝑦𝐵𝑇 , on the aforementioned variables, 𝑧𝑖𝑡 , we explain the 
exogenous variation in these variables. Next, we can consistently estimate the 
residuals of equations 2 and 3. 
In the second-stage, we use the 2SRI estimator to correct for endogeneity by 
including the retained residuals (?̂?𝐴𝑆 and 𝑣𝐵𝑇) as additional variables with 
corresponding parameters to be estimated in equation 1, leading to:  
𝑃(𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 1|𝑥𝑖𝑡 , 𝑢𝐴𝑆, 𝑣𝐵𝑇) = Φ(𝑥
′
𝑖𝑡𝛽 + ?̂?′𝐴𝑆𝛿 + 𝑣′𝐵𝑇𝜃) (4) 
The inclusion of the residuals in equation 4 accounts for endogeneity, and equation 4 
results in unbiased and consistent estimates (Terza et al., 2008). We estimate the 
models using clustered standard errors to allow for correlation across observations 
within states.  
It is worth noting that for nonlinear models the 2SRI estimation offers a 
consistent alternative implementation of the two-stage instrumental variable 
estimation (2SLS).12 The 2SRI estimation is similar in spirit to the 2SLS estimation 
because not only does it consist of a two-stage procedure, but also because the first-
stage of the 2SRI estimation is identical to that of the 2SLS estimation. The 2SRI 
estimation differs from the 2SLS estimation, however, because in the second-stage 
of the 2SRI the actual observed values of the endogenous regressors are retained, 
                                                     
12 The 2SRI approach to control for the endogenous nature of explanatory variables has 
recently gained popularity, as more traditional approaches (i.e. instrumental variables) are 
limited in their applicability to nonlinear models. We refer the interested reader to 
Wooldridge (2015) for an excellent overview. 
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rather than their predicted counterpart, while the estimated residuals from the first-
stage are also included to control for the unobserved confounders (Terza et al., 
2008). Moreover, the 2SRI estimator does not necessitate an exogenous and relevant 
instrumental variable. As a result, the 2SRI estimation corrects for endogeneity in 
nonlinear models and produces consistent estimates by controlling for the variation 
in the unobserved factors that are not independent of the endogenous variable(s), so 
that the remaining variation in the endogenous variable(s) will be independent of the 
error (Petrin & Train, 2010).   
Results 
The descriptive statistics and correlations among the variables included in 
the analysis are shown in Tables 1 and 2. All correlations indicate that there are no 
multicollinearity problems in the data. As mentioned in the methods section, we use 
a 2SRI estimation procedure to test our hypotheses: the first-stage estimates protest 
by anti-smoking groups or Big Tobacco to recover the residuals entering in the 
second-stage probit model. 
Insert Tables 1 and 2 about here 
The first-stage estimates of the determinants of anti-smoking and Big 
Tobacco protests are reported in Table 3. From Table 3 we see that population size 
has the expected positive effect on protests by both groups (Lehman-Wilzig & 
Ungar, 1985). We also find that GDP per capita increases protests by anti-smoking 
groups. This result supports the central tenant of resource mobilization theory stating 
that resources facilitate protests (Snow et al., 2005), and for the specific case of 
study, provides evidence on the negative relationship between smoking and income 
(Humphreys, 2015). Moreover, we find that protests by Big Tobacco decrease with 
the size of the state and increase with the number of legislators. These findings 
suggest that the larger the state legislative structure, the greater the political 
opportunity for counter-mobilization by Big Tobacco (Soule et al., 1999). Lastly, we 
find no impact of the economic indicators included in the models (i.e. poverty and 
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unemployment rates). From these models, we obtain the residuals to be included in 
the main probit regression. 
Insert Tables 3 and 4 about here 
Table 4 reports the results of the probit estimates. The results are estimated 
using a 2SRI estimator where the residuals obtained from the first-stage regressions 
enter without transformation in the second-stage. When included, the residuals 
capture the endogenous part of the protests by both groups, or put differently, they 
capture the expectation that the respective actors have of the enactment of a 
comprehensive smoking ban. Models 1 to 12 present a series of nested models with 
the correction for endogeneity using the 2SRI estimator.13 Positive (negative) 
coefficients mean that the probability of the enactment of a smoking ban increases 
(decreases) with the focal variable. Marginal effects are evaluated by setting all 
other variables at their means (Hoetker, 2007).  
Model 1 is the baseline model as it only includes the control variables. Most 
of the results for the control variables are consistent across models. We find that the 
probability of enacting a comprehensive smoking ban significantly increases with 
the health costs associated with smoking. According to the US Surgeon General, 
smoking costs the US more than $300 billion a year, including $170 billion in direct 
health care expenditures and $156 billion in lost productivity (SG, 2014). Thus, the 
health care costs associated with smoking have an essential role in guiding 
governmental efforts to enact smoking bans. Moreover, the results suggest that the 
probability of enacting a comprehensive smoking ban decreases with smoking 
prevalence. This is because cigarette usage remains socially accepted in states with 
high smoking rates (e.g. Kentucky and West Virginia, 30.2% and 29.9% 
respectively in 2013), and thus, the public tends to oppose the enactment of bans; 
whereas in states with low smoking rates (e.g. Utah and California, 12.3% and 15% 
respectively in 2013), population attitudes toward cigarettes are more negative and 
                                                     
13 The results without correction are available from the authors; however, these results should 
not be used for interpretative purposes given the presence of endogeneity.  
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the public tends to favor the enactment of bans (RWJF, 2011). We also find that the 
probability of the enactment of a comprehensive smoking ban decreases with the 
production of tobacco, given the economic dependence of the focal state’s economy 
on this crop (e.g. Kentucky and North Carolina). Furthermore, the results show that 
the probability of the enactment of a comprehensive smoking ban increases as the 
government’s ideology moves from zero (the most conservative value) to one (the 
most liberal value). This finding is in line with the assumption that for conservative 
governments the ultimate responsibility for health lies with the individual, whereas 
liberal governments tend to regulate the behavior of individuals and organizations to 
protect and promote public health (Cohen et al., 2000). Finally, the results suggest 
that the scale of protests matters, as protests that are covered by several newspapers 
are more likely to foment institutional change.  
Model 2 tests hypotheses 1a and 1b. This model shows the effect of protests 
by activist organizations and corporations on the probability of enactment of a law. 
We find evidence to support both hypotheses. On the one hand, we find that protests 
by activist organizations increase the probability of a law being enacted; 
specifically, one anti-smoking protest increases the probability of enactment of a 
comprehensive smoking ban by 11.2%. As the claims by anti-smoking groups 
become more visible and salient, their claims are deemed as less challenging or 
contentious and they grow and gain supporters to change the status quo. On the other 
hand, we find that the probability of a law being enacted decreases with protests by 
corporations; that is, one protest by Big Tobacco decreases the probability of 
enactment of a comprehensive smoking ban by 15%. This result reveals that the 
organization of a counter-movement is a powerful deterrent for the enactment of a 
law. As most of the protests by corporations occur when the regulative discussions 
are taking place, this result shows that when there is a real threat of change, reactive 
protests by corporations have the power to maintain the status quo. The results 
presented in Model 3 do not support hypothesis 2, as the interaction coefficient for 
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protests is not statistically significant. However, further support for hypotheses 1a 
and 1b is provided, as the main effects of the protests variables remain significant.  
Model 4 introduces the campaign contributions by activist organizations and 
corporations to test their effect on the probability of a law being enacted. The results 
provide support for hypotheses 3a and 3b. They indicate that a 1% increase in 
campaign contributions by anti-smoking groups corresponds to an increase in the 
probability of enacting a ban by 0.3%, while a 1% increase in campaign 
contributions by Big Tobacco decreases the probability of enactment by 0.2%. These 
results suggest that anti-smoking groups are more efficient in their campaign 
contributions despite Big Tobacco’s significant financial resources (see Figure 5). 
The test for hypothesis 4, presented in Model 5, shows that the interaction for the 
campaign contributions variables is not significant. However, although in this model 
the main effects of campaign contributions remain positive and significant for 
activist organizations, the marginal effect of campaign contributions by corporations 
disappears; which suggest that when both actors attempt to influence the enactment 
of regulations by means of campaign contributions, anti-smoking groups are more 
effective than Big Tobacco given their access to complementary external resources 
(e.g. governmental allies and favorable public opinion). 
Models 6 introduces the number of lobbyists representing each side of the 
debate to tests hypotheses 5a and 5b. The results only provide support for hypothesis 
5a and suggest that for each extra lobbyist that represents activist organizations, the 
likelihood of enactment of a comprehensive smoking ban increases by 0.4%. These 
results indicate that even though corporations have been widely known for their 
strong lobbying efforts, lobbyists that represent activist organizations are more 
successful in increasing the likelihood of enactment of a comprehensive smoking 
ban because their position is compatible with the government’s mandate to protect 
public health. Model 7 presents the results of the interaction test for hypothesis 6. 
The interaction coefficient is negative and significant, which suggests that the 
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positive effect of anti-smoking lobbyists is reduced by 0.03% for each extra lobbyist 
working for Big Tobacco.  
Models 8 and 9 present the effects of the moderation analyses testing the 
effects of contextual variables. For ease of comparison, we have included all control 
variables, main effects, and interactions. Model 8 includes the interactions of anti-
smoking protests, campaign contributions, and lobbyists with the health costs 
variable. Model 9 includes the interactions of Big Tobacco’s protests, campaign 
contributions, and lobbyists with smoking prevalence. Hoetker (2007) suggests that 
the interpretation of interaction terms in nonlinear models cannot be evaluated by 
simply looking at the coefficients, as their magnitude, sign, and significance can 
change across observations. Instead, given that the interaction effects depend on all 
the covariates in the model, the best practice is to provide a graphical interpretation 
(Hoetker, 2007). Therefore, Figures 7 and 8 provide a graphical presentation of the 
moderation analyses, and Figures 9 and 10 provide histograms that show the 
distribution of the moderator variables.  
Figure 7 illustrates the moderation effects of health costs for anti-smoking 
protests, campaign contributions, and lobbyists. The first plot shows that the positive 
moderation effect of protests by anti-smoking groups on the probability of 
enactment of a comprehensive smoking ban is present in states where the health care 
costs of smoking are less than 5.5% of the state’s general expenditures. Similarly, 
the second plot shows that health costs positively moderate the relationship between 
anti-smoking campaign contributions and the probability of enactment of a 
comprehensive smoking ban when health costs are between 1% and 4.5% of the 
state’s general expenditures. In contrast, the third plot shows that health costs do not 
moderate the effect of lobbyists on the enactment of a law. Overall, Figure 7 
provides support for the positive moderation effect of health costs stated in 
hypothesis 7 for the case of anti-smoking protests and campaign contributions. 
Given that in most states the health costs associated with smoking represent more 
than 1% and less than 6% of the state’s general expenditures (see Figure 9), the 
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results suggest that the health care costs associated with smoking weigh heavily on 
the ability of anti-smoking groups to disrupt the status quo. These results are in line 
with empirical evidence showing that during the period of study, anti-smoking 
groups have made visible and salient the potential economic benefits (in terms of 
taxpayer dollars) of reducing smoking and exposure to second hand smoke (savings 
in health care costs for the state) by means of the enactment of smoking bans (CAN, 
2011).  
Figure 8 illustrates the moderation effects of smoking prevalence for Big 
Tobacco’s protests, campaign contributions, and lobbyists. The first plot shows that 
smoking prevalence moderates the relationship between Big Tobacco’s protests and 
the probability of enactment of a comprehensive smoking ban when the state’s 
smoking rate is between 1% and 25%. Similarly, the second plot illustrates that 
smoking prevalence moderates the effect of Big Tobacco’s campaign contributions 
on the probability of enactment of a comprehensive smoking ban for states where 
the smoking rate is lower than 25%. In contrast, the third plot shows that smoking 
prevalence does not moderate the effect of lobbyists on the enactment of a law. 
Given that most states have smoking rates lower than 25% (see Figure 10), the 
results suggest that societal smoking habits are important determinants of Big 
Tobacco’s ability to maintain the status quo. Overall, these results provide support 
for hypothesis 8, which suggests that Big Tobacco’s strategies are effective in 
deterring legislative change in states where constituencies support smoking. 
Models 10 and 11 further test the simultaneous effects of protests, campaign 
contributions, and lobbyists by activist organizations and corporations. Model 10 
presents the case in which each actor uses the strategy that is expected or associated 
with its traditional tactics to change institutions; namely, it presents the results when 
activist organizations use protests, and corporations use campaign contributions and 
lobbyists. Surprisingly, the results of this model are not significant. Therefore, the 
results of this model suggest that for actors aiming at either disrupting or 
maintaining the status quo, employing their traditional strategies does not prove to 
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be effective in fomenting institutional change. The results of model 11, which 
presents the results when activist organizations use campaign contributions and 
lobbyists, and corporations use protests, are statistically significant. Specifically, the 
results indicate that campaign contributions and lobbyists are effective strategies for 
activist organizations to encourage legislative change, and that protests are an 
effective strategy for corporations to discourage the enactment of laws. This 
unexpected finding suggests that actors are effective in fomenting institutional 
change when they adopt the strategy that has been traditionally used by its 
counterpart. Taken together, the results of models 10 and 11 suggest not only that it 
is important for actors that aim to change institutions to be able to use a wide range 
of strategies (including those in which their counterpart traditionally has had an 
advantage), but specifically, that if corporations are to maintain the status quo, 
constituency building strategies are more effective in deterring institutional change 
than financial or information strategies. These results are in line with Smith (2000), 
who argues that policymakers are more responsive to the preferences of society 
members when corporations show unity of claims or seem to have the same 
objective. This means that activist organizations are better able to influence 
policymaking when corporations show unity in their preferences, and in such 
instance, the capacity of corporations to exert an influence over policymaking 
through the use constituency building strategies is more effective in shaping 
institutional change than the use of other means of influence like financial or 
information strategies.   
Model 12 presents the results of the full model. The results remain 
remarkably similar when compared to those of the nested models, although 
campaign contributions by Big Tobacco is no longer significant. Overall, the results 
provide substantial evidence that activist organizations and corporations use 
different strategies to change institutions. Specifically, they show that Big Tobacco’s 
power to inconspicuously thwart the enactment of comprehensive smoking bans has 
decreased along with the changing societal perception of tobacco products, which 
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has led to Big Tobacco’s dependence on the use of conspicuous means of influence. 
In contrast, anti-smoking groups have gained visibility and public support, which 
has strengthened both their conspicuous and inconspicuous impact on the legislative 
process. In other words, as knowledge about the health risks of smoking spreads, 
and as anti-smoking groups have gained ground to advance tobacco control 
regulations, Big Tobacco’s influence on the legislative process has waned. Overall, 
the results illustrate how corporations counter-mobilize by imitating and adopting 
the strategies of activist organizations that are successful in changing institutions.  
Robustness Checks 
Insert Table 5 about here 
In order to test for sensitivity of our results due to model choice, we 
performed several tests which are reported in Table 5. First, we re-estimated 
equation 4 including an interaction term between the residuals of equations 2 and 3 
(ûAS* v̂BT), as reported in model 1, Table 5. This interaction term allows for a joint 
effect of the residuals, which takes into account that either they may influence each 
other, or be driven by a common unobserved latent factor that may also influence the 
probability of the enactment (Wooldridge, 2015). Analogous to Petrin and Train 
(2010), we interpret the sign and significance of residuals. The residuals are 
significant and with the expected signs across models. In particular, the positive 
coefficient of the residual for protests by corporations (β= 12.123, p-value: 0.000) 
suggests that if corporations protest increase, it is more likely that the enactment of a 
law is to be expected. In contrast, the residual for activist organizations is negative 
(β = -7.927; p-value: 0.007), which suggests that these groups would protest less 
when there is a higher likelihood of enactment. We observe that our findings are 
robust to the inclusion of the interaction term between the residuals.14 
                                                     
14 We note that equations 2 and 3 do not allow for any cross-over effects, but given that we 
use the same set of regressors, the estimation of Zellner's seemingly unrelated regression or 
of a bivariate probit model would not yield different coefficients. Thus, including the 
correlation in the first stage of the model is not relevant.  
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Second, we checked whether the results would still hold with a different 
specification of the ideology variable. For this purpose, we used Berry et al. (2010) 
alternative nominate measure of government ideology which the authors argue is an 
improved measure of state ideology. The results reported in model 2, Table 5, are 
similar to those reported in model 12, Table 4. This implies that our analysis is not 
sensitive to changes in the measurement of ideology, which rules out the option that 
the specification of this variable influences the results.   
Third, in an effort to further assess the interaction between activist 
organizations and corporations and their simultaneous actions to change institutions, 
we ran the full model including the deltas of protests (i.e. anti-smoking protests – 
Big Tobacco protests), campaign contributions (i.e. Big Tobacco contributions – 
anti-smoking contributions), and lobbyists (i.e. Big Tobacco lobbyists – anti-
smoking lobbyists) instead of the level. The results are reported in model 3, Table 5. 
The results for protests shows that an increase in the gap of protest in favor of anti-
smoking groups raises the probability of enactment of a comprehensive smoking ban 
by 10.4%, whereas an increase in the gap of campaign contributions in favor of Big 
Tobacco decreases the probability of enactment of a comprehensive smoking ban by 
0.1%. A change in the gap of lobbyists has no effect. The results provide further 
support for the interaction between strategies and actors in the case of protests and 
campaign contributions.15   
Fourth we test ran our moderation analyses with a different specification of 
the moderator variables. Model 4, table 5, presents the results of an alternative 
moderator variable for hypothesis 7. Instead of using health costs to measure the 
potential economic benefits of a smoking ban, we use Medicaid expenses. Data on 
total Medicaid spending were retrieved from the Henry J. Kaiser family foundation. 
Although Medicaid as a program mainly targets low income individuals, this 
measure directly relates to the state’s expenses on smoking related diseases because 
                                                     
15 Alternatively, we tested the restriction of equality for the coefficients of these variables 
(Model 10). The results suggest that the coefficients are not equal (Protests: Prob > χ2 = 
0.000. Contributions: Prob > χ2 = 0.008. Lobbyists: Prob > χ2 = 0.060).  
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of the negative correlation between smoking and income (Goszkowski, 2008). The 
results of the moderation analysis suggest that Medicaid expenses positively 
moderate both, anti-smoking protests and campaign expenditures, in states where the 
expenses are lower than 12.000 million per year (in our data, only California, 
Florida, and Texas have expenses higher than this figure). Model 5, table 5, presents 
the results of an alternative moderator variable for hypothesis 8. Instead of using 
smoking prevalence to capture tobacco’s constituency influence, we use the yearly 
change of the Gross State Product (GSP) from tobacco-related businesses. Data on 
the GSP by industry were gathered from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis. The 
results of the moderation analysis suggest that the percentage GSP change 
negatively moderates the impact of both, anti-smoking protests and campaign 
expenditures, on the probability of enactment of a comprehensive smoking ban; such 
that the efficiency of Big Tobacco’s strategies increases as the industry’s economic 
impact on a given state increases. Consequently, these results strengthen our 
confidence in the robustness of the chosen measures for the moderator variables. 
Finally, we estimate our full model using a logit specification (Petrin & 
Train, 2010). Conventional wisdom suggests that probit and logit models give 
essentially similar results. The results obtained are presented in model 6, Table 5. 
The analysis yielded substantively similar results; all the coefficients have the same 
sign and significance levels, though some of the magnitudes slightly change because 
of expected scale differences. Thus, the results indicate that our model choice to 
analyze the enactments of a comprehensive smoking ban does not provide 
substantially different outcomes in comparison to other candidate models.  
Discussion 
Our study disentangles the impact of activist organizations and corporations 
as participants and actors of institutional change. It shows that both activist 
organizations and corporations shape the enactment of laws, and uncovers the 
strategies used by these movements and counter-movements to influence 
institutional change. The results show that activist organizations and corporations 
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shape institutions through conspicuous (e.g. protests) and inconspicuous (e.g. 
campaign contributions and lobbyists) strategies. Specifically, the results suggest 
that whereas both actors use conspicuous and inconspicuous strategies to influence 
institutional change, activist organizations are successful in their use of both 
strategies to disrupt the status quo. In contrast, given the threats to their legitimacy, 
corporations in contested industries are mainly successful in maintaining the status 
quo when using conspicuous strategies. Therefore, the study shows that actors use 
multiple strategies to change institutions, and as such, the influence of actors cannot 
be captured through examining a single strategy (Raaijmakers, Vermeulen, Meeus, 
& Zietsma, 2015). Furthermore, the results provide evidence that although 
constituency building has been considered the main strategy by which activist 
organizations aim to change institutions, and financial and/or information strategies 
have traditionally been linked with the attempts of corporations to influence 
institutions, in the face of changing societal expectations, the proven 
(in)effectiveness of these respective ‘traditional’ strategies for each actor does not 
support this belief anymore.  
In the case of protests, the results highlight how the ability to mobilize and 
to receive public support is crucial for activist organizations and corporations to 
successfully protest. Specifically, the results show that anti-smoking groups have 
been successful in disrupting the status quo and have effectively persuaded 
policymakers to enact tobacco control regulations. Simultaneously, Big Tobacco’s 
reactive protests by Astroturf groups that mobilize on its behalf have been effective 
in thwarting the enactment of laws. However, given the threats to Big Tobacco’s 
legitimacy, Big Tobacco is forced to conceal its involvement in protests that 
confront the anti-smoking message. Therefore, the capacity of Big Tobacco’s 
protests to maintain the status quo is significantly dependent on the acquisition of 
allies that legitimize their claims and on gaining public support. Hence, the results 
shed light on the effectiveness of constituency building strategies to change 
institutions, especially for counter-movements that face a successful movement. In 
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other words, the results provide preliminary evidence for a life-cycle of protests, 
suggesting that for nascent movements protests are a successful strategy to disrupt 
the status quo, and that once the movement’s claims gain visibility and public 
support, the efficiency of protests by the counter-movement to maintain the status 
quo increases.       
With respect to campaign contributions, the results show that controlling 
resources is not a sufficient condition for actors to be able to influence institutions, 
and provide evidence that financial strategies are not as effective when the actor that 
controls the monetary resources faces threats to its legitimacy (Marquis & Qian, 
2014; Walker & Rea, 2014). Specifically, the results show that when actors aim to 
advance a claim that goes against prevailing societal expectations, money is not 
enough to influence policymakers. In the tobacco industry, even though Big 
Tobacco commands more financial resources than anti-smoking groups, the latter 
are rooted in cultural and social structures that support their goals in the legislative 
process. Thus, we find limited support for the efficacy of Big Tobacco’s campaign 
contributions. Hence, we posit that as a social movement gains prominence because 
of the alignment between its goals and the goals of policymakers, the relative power 
of the counter-movement is reduced, and thus, while it is still more powerful in 
terms of financial resources, its influence through campaign contributions 
diminishes.  
Concerning lobbying, the results suggest that the influence of lobbyists on 
institutional change is dependent on having interests that are aligned with those of 
policymakers, as is the case for activist organizations. Put differently, the results 
show that in the face of legitimacy threats, lobbyists that represent corporations in a 
contested industry are less influential than those that represent activist organizations 
whose claims are deemed as socially acceptable and aligned with the interests of 
policymakers. In the tobacco industry, anti-smoking groups have been successful in 
hiring lobbyists that frame their claims as being compatible with the preferences of 
societal members, and thus, their claims resonate with policymakers. In contrast, for 
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corporations, the ability to align their claims with the priorities of policymakers is 
paramount, but Big Tobacco has been unable to do so given the increasing negative 
societal perception of the industry. These results are in line with work that has found 
little impact of corporate lobbying efforts on institutional change (Baumgartner et 
al., 2014). 
A preliminary insight into the adjusted efficiency of protests, campaign 
contributions, and lobbyists by the social movement conditional upon the level of 
each of these tactics by the counter-movement yields no apparent conclusion. This, 
though, does not exclude more complex and intricate forms of dependency of the 
efficiency of the use of each strategy by the social movement based on the use of the 
same strategy by the counter-movement. In other words, the preliminary results for 
the adjusted efficiency of each strategy do not exclude that the efforts of activist 
organizations are contingent upon the efforts of corporations and vice versa. 
Nevertheless, as the moderation analyses suggest, societal preferences are important 
determinants of corporations’ ability to maintain the status quo, while the ability of 
activist organizations to disrupt the status quo is deeply linked to the use of framing 
strategies that highlight the relevance and credibility of their claims by linking them 
to economic benefits for the state. That is, given that often times the interests of 
corporations are opposed to those of activist organizations, their parallel actions 
result in a contested field were activist organizations aim to challenge the status quo, 
while corporations seek to preserve the status quo. In this fragmented system, 
policymakers tend to be more responsive to the preferences of activist organizations, 
whilst the preferences of corporations are less likely to prevail (Smith, 2000).  
Together, the results raise awareness of the interconnectedness of actors and 
strategies engaged in institutional change. That is, our results illustrate that the 
actions of corporations aiming to change institutions take place within industries 
alongside the efforts of activist organizations (Edelman et al., 2010; Weber & King, 
2013), and that the characteristics of the environment in which these actors operate 
shape their potential to change institutions. Moreover, our results contribute to the 
53 
 
literature by illustrating that actors use conspicuous strategies like constituency 
building (e.g. protests), and inconspicuous strategies such as financial (e.g. 
campaign contributions) and information (e.g. lobbyists) tactics to influence 
institutional change in their favor (Hillman & Hitt, 1999). Interestingly, our results 
show that money and lobbyists are not as effective in bringing about or deterring 
institutional change as constituency building is, which leads us to believe that the 
ability of actors to influence institutional change in their favor comes more so from 
being able to attract and mobilize public support, and less so from having deep 
pockets or from controlling an army of lobbyists.  
Limitations and Future Research 
The dependent variable is the enactment of a comprehensive smoking ban, 
thus, the models explain the final outcome of the legislative process. However, 
future research could divide the legislative process into different phases (i.e. agenda 
setting, passage, enactment, and possible repeal) in order to shed light on how the 
identified actors and strategies affect each phase separately and possibly 
differentially (Soule & King, 2006). Furthermore, our data collection efforts end in 
2012; although no comprehensive smoking ban has been passed since then, it could 
be interesting for future research to study the states in which protests, campaign 
contributions, and/or lobbyists have not resulted in the enactment of comprehensive 
smoking bans.  
Our level of analysis is the state. Although the state is a relevant level of 
analysis for the reasons mentioned above, future research could disaggregate the 
influence of each actor and strategy at a more local level, since in states where there 
is no preemption there may be a difference between city, county, and state laws 
(Vasi, Walker, Johnson, & Tan, 2015). Using the city or the county as the level of 
analysis may also allow researchers to uncover the local conditions or configurations 
that alter the rate at which states pass anti-smoking laws. Moreover, the change of 
level of analysis could also shed light on the differential effectiveness of various 
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strategies in the enactment of local bans and possibly enhance our understanding of 
the micro processes of institutional change.  
As mentioned before, in our analysis we defined two main sides (i.e. anti-
smoking groups and Big Tobacco), each of which is comprised by various 
independent actors. Although we identify substantial different stances on tobacco 
control regulations between these groups, future research may disentangle variations 
within these groups to identify how differences in legitimacy, power, or resources, or 
the use of intra-coalition strategies, lead to different outcomes, as some actors within 
each group may be more efficient than others in bringing about institutional change.  
There has been little research connecting institutional change to the 
simultaneous actions of activist organizations and corporations. This is partly 
because institutional change may result from a multitude of causes. Although we 
control for several factors that may have an effect on institutional change, we may 
have not fully considered all possible influences on the probability of enacting laws, 
as actors can certainly use other parallel strategies in order to change institutions, 
such as CSR and litigation. These strategies also target institutions but we do not 
include them in our study for two reasons. First, in the tobacco industry CSR 
contributions can also be understood as tax deductible expenses which result in 
disclosure issues because corporations are not obliged to report charitable 
contributions (Tesler & Malone, 2008). Thus, CSR contributions are potentially 
problematic in the context of study since big Tobacco is known for using creative 
ways to disguise their efforts and to exert influence out of the public sight. Second, 
as Polleta (2000) posits, it is hard to uncover the role of litigation in relation to the 
efforts of activist organizations and corporations because litigation is primarily used 
after the enactment of laws has taken place (Amenta et al., 2010). Nonetheless, 
future efforts that uncover the influence of actors in advancing or hindering 
institutional change by relational strategies that directly engage policymakers to 
discuss and craft legislation or to influence their voting, along with the differential 
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impact of these and other non-market strategies such as CSR or litigation on 
institutional change, would be beneficial.     
Finally, despite the fact that the tobacco industry displays a number of 
unique features that make it different from other non-contested industries, its 
structure is relatively similar to that of other contested industries that exhibit 
increased concentration, face extensive regulations, and exert political influence 
through extensive lobbying efforts mainly by the largest actors in the industry. Thus, 
our results are mainly generalizable to other contested industries such as weapons 
and arms, alcohol, or gambling, etc. The results could also be generalizable to 
contentious issues where there are two sides: on one side, a rich corporation aiming 
to preserve the status quo or to manipulate institutions in its favor, and on the other 
side, society members aiming to disrupt the status quo and urging for institutional 
change. Furthermore, the results are generalizable to situations where regulators 
have the capacity to legislate and face opposite demands; on the one hand, a 
corporate actor that may be harmed by a change in the status quo, and on the other 
hand, a social movement interested in bringing about institutional change. The 
results have limited generalizability, though, to issues where society members fight 
against the government, since in that case there is no clear counter-movement led or 
funded by corporations. Moreover, the results have limited generalizability to 
industries that do not operate across borders, as in the case of study, the tobacco 
industry was allegedly able to alleviate some of the national pressures by partly 
shifting its efforts abroad. Overall, although our study of the tobacco industry may 
be somewhat of a “polar type” when compared to other industries, the mechanisms 
that we uncovered have implications for scholars whose interests center on 
contestation, social movements, and non-market strategies. In addition, though we 
believe that the tobacco industry is particularly suited for exploring the strategies 
used by different actors to influence institutions, given the particular features of this 
industry, the generalizability of our findings to other non-contested industries needs 
to be established by future research. Lastly, besides the issue of generalizability, we 
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believe that there is value in studying the tobacco industry in its own right given its 
considerable size, global presence and reach, as well as the health and other 
consequences of its products. That has been hardly done in management scholarship.  
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Figure 1: State-level comprehensive smoking bans enacted by year  
 
Source: ImpacTeen Database. 





Figure 3: Anti-smoking protests by state between 2000 and 2012 
 
Source: own calculations17 
 
 
Figure 4: Big Tobacco protests by state between 2000 and 2012 
 
Source: own calculations18 
 
                                                     
17 In each, Alaska and Hawaii, there was only one protest by activist organizations.  
18 Neither in Alaska nor in Hawaii were there protests by corporations.  
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Figure 5: Total tobacco-related campaign contributions by state between 2000 
and 2012 
 





































































































































































































































BT Lobbyists AS Lobbyists 
60 
 








































































































































































































Figure 9: Health costs histogram 
 
 








































Table 1: Descriptive Statistics  
 
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Protest Anti-Smoking 540 0.119 0.356 0 2 
Protests Big Tobacco 540 0.080 0.389 0 6 
Contributions Anti-
Smoking 
540 1.025 2.810 0 12.892 
Contributions Big Tobacco 540 6.122 5.616 0 18.045 
Lobbyists Anti-Smoking 540 1.156 2.357 0 19 
Lobbyists Big Tobacco 540 3.270 6.942 0 48 
Health Costs 489 0.031 0.012 0.012 0.102 
Smoking Prevalence 489 21.682 3.481 9.3 32.6 
Tax Collections 489 18.382 2.491 0 21.166 
Tobacco Crops 489 2.696 4.286 0 12.086 
Sales to Minors 489 14.924 7.977 1.6 55.8 
State Ideology 482 46.509 27.525 0 97.5 
Democrats 489 0.552 0.498 0 1 
Social Movements 489 1.851 2.304 0 18 
Neighboring Effects 489 0.149 0.425 0 3 
Cumulative Bans 489 7.959 8.763 0 26 
Media Coverage 489 0.078 0.477 0 6 
Population 540 0.593 0.682 0.049 3.804 
GDP per Capita 540 10.708 0.232 10.277 12.068 
Poverty Rate 540 0.123 0.033 0.055 0.222 
Unemployment Rate 540 5.617 2.062 2.3 14.7 
Size 540 0.008 0.01 0 0.067 
Number of Legislators 540 148 63 0 424 
 
Table 2: Correlations 
 
 
Note: * correlations are significant at the .05 level 
 
 




























   
Observations 540 540 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.  




Table 4: Second-stage results. Drivers of enacting a comprehensive smoking 
ban 
 
Clustered robust standard errors in parentheses.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
 
 
Clustered robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
 
Table 5: Robustness Checks 
 
Clustered robust standard errors in parentheses.  








CLEARING THE SMOKE: COERCIVE PRESSURES, 






This study investigates the relationship among coercive pressures, legitimacy, and 
performance. Using data from a contested industry yielded four major findings. 
First, the results show that coercive pressures decrease performance. Second, the 
results indicate that coercive pressures negatively impact legitimacy. Third, the 
results suggest that legitimacy is positively related to performance. Finally, the 
results show that legitimacy mediates the effect of coercive pressures on 
performance, but only when coercive pressures are also a source of normative 
pressures. All together, the results of this study extend our understanding on how 
coercive pressures influence legitimacy and in turn impact the performance of the 
industry. This paper's contribution to the theory is three-fold. First, we revisit the 
concepts of coercive pressures and legitimacy, and suggest that an undifferentiated 
usage of these concepts limits both their theoretical as well as their empirical 
usefulness. Second, we empirically test a core argument from institutional theory, 
namely, the profound influence that coercive pressures and legitimacy have on 
industry performance. Third, we contribute to the conceptualization of the 
legitimacy of contested industries, which has been inadequately studied up to date. 
                                                     
a This chapter is the result of joint work with Tal Simons. 
 
Introduction 
Ever since the publication of the 1964 and 1986 US Surgeon General reports 
on smoking and health, a significant number of states in the US have enacted 
tobacco control regulations that represent a major change in the institutional 
environment of Tobacco Companies (hereafter TCs). The changes in the institutional 
environment in which TCs operate have been brought about not only by coercive 
pressures in the form of tobacco control regulations, but also by threats to TCs’ 
legitimacy owing mainly to the awareness of smoking and health issues such as the 
addictive and disease causing nature of cigarettes. While the institutional 
environment has grown increasingly hostile to TCs’ business, cigarette sales have 
declined (Jones, 1997). In this context, we aim to examine the relation between 
coercive pressures, legitimacy, and performance by answering the following 
question: how do increasing coercive pressures affect legitimacy, and how does that 
in turn influence industry performance?  
To answer this question we draw on the institutional theory literature. A 
core claim of institutional theory is that organizations need legitimacy if they are to 
thrive. This, together with the claim on the profound influence that coercive 
pressures have on legitimacy, suggests that legitimacy mediates the relationship 
between coercive pressures and performance (Scott, 2008). However, this mediated 
relationship has been ignored in prior research, as most prior work has focused on 
the direct effect of each of these concepts on performance (Heugens & Lander, 
2009). We attempt to shed light on this relationship by theoretically distinguishing 
apart the concepts of coercive pressures and legitimacy, and by empirically 
disentangling their effects on performance. Thus, our work advances prior research 
that has conceptually examined the relationship between these concepts (e.g. Aldrich 
& Fiol, 1994; Bitektine, 2011; Deephouse & Suchman, 2008; Hayes, 2009; Miller, 
Glick, & Washburn, 2013; Scott, 2008; Suchman, 1995; Zimmerman & Zeitz, 
2002), by providing much needed theoretical clarity and empirical support.  
In this paper, we examine coercive pressures, legitimacy, and performance, 
and evidence the mediation of legitimacy on the relationship coercive pressures and 
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performance, in a contested industry. Contested industries are those whose social 
credibility and acceptability are highly variable, and thus, confront societal 
disagreements over their right to exist and periods of variation in societal approval. 
In other words, contested industries face recurring challenges and questions to their 
legitimacy (Galvin et al., 2005). The study of contested industries like tobacco (Hsu 
& Grodal, 2015; Simons et al., 2016), arms (Durand & Vergne, 2015; Vergne, 
2012), and gambling (Galvin et al., 2005), is particularly interesting given the fact 
that contestation endangers the legitimacy of the industry as a whole (Galvin et al., 
2005). For instance, with the increasing enactment of tobacco control regulations 
that portray smoking as a risky or undesirable activity, the legitimacy of the tobacco 
industry has been questioned or challenged, and the performance of the industry has 
also been threatened, as illustrated in the following quote: “most smokers want to 
quit, (…) they are extremely ambivalent about their habit” (Spinney, 2007: 1508). In 
this study, therefore, we contribute to the conceptualization of contested industry 
legitimacy by identifying legitimacy as the mechanism by which coercive pressures 
have an impact on performance, and by demonstrating that legitimacy protects 
performance from the financial penalties of illegitimacy (Zuckerman, 1999) and 
from the influence of coercive pressures (Scott, 2008).  
Empirically we study the US tobacco industry, which we argue is a 
contested industry mainly for three reasons. First, the strategies used by TCs to get 
people to smoke have been openly and recurrently questioned (WHO, 2007). 
Second, there is an increasing societal support for tobacco control regulations, which 
has “helped transform the idea of regulation from controversial to common sense” 
(Layton, 2009). Third, the enactment of tobacco control regulations along with the 
negative societal perception of the products TCs’ produce, market, and sell, has led 
to a downward trend of smoking prevalence (see Figure 1). However, even though 
smoking is less accepted by some societal members than it used to be, smoking is a 
right and a matter of personal freedom for some other societal members (Nathanson, 
1999). Hence, the tobacco industry is of interest not only because during the last 
decades it has been challenged by the multiplicity of values and beliefs that surround 
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it, but also because it is an established industry with a history of deception, lies, and 
manipulation (Proctor, 2011). Moreover, tobacco plays an important role in the 
economy of the US, the world’s leader tobacco producer (CDC, 2012b), as tobacco 
taxes represent a significant source of income for the government (in 2010 the US 
government collected $17.3 billion in tobacco taxes (Orzechowski & Walter, 2014)). 
Despite the fact that the tobacco industry has faced recurrent and substantial 
legitimacy threats and that its economic importance is undeniable, it remains 
understudied. Consequently, the tobacco industry provides a suitable setting to test 
some of the fundamental premises of institutional theory in an established contested 
industry.   
Insert Figure 1 about here 
Our contribution to the literature encompasses theoretical as well as 
empirical aspects. First, we revisit the concept of coercive pressures and suggest that 
an undifferentiated usage of this concept limits both its theoretical as well as its 
empirical usefulness. In this study, therefore, we contribute to the literature by 
including a fine-grained look at coercive pressures. Second, we focus our efforts on 
disentangling and separating the effects of coercive pressures and legitimacy. Hence, 
we expand institutional theory research by showing the importance of conceptually 
and empirically telling apart these concepts. Third, we empirically test a core 
argument from institutional theory, namely, the important influence that coercive 
pressures and legitimacy have in controlling and constraining performance. That is, 
we contribute to the theoretical conceptualization of contested industry legitimacy, 
which has been inadequately investigated to date, and we also extend previous work 
by testing the performance consequences of legitimacy in an established contested 
industry (Galvin et al., 2005).  
Theory and Hypotheses 
Empirical Setting 
As mentioned before, the empirical setting for our study is the US tobacco 
industry, which we argue is a contested industry. The contested nature of this 
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industry relates to the fact that tobacco has been characterized as an epidemic by the 
WHO (2009). This classification corresponds to smoking being the leading cause of 
preventable death (tobacco kills up to half of its users) and the second major cause 
of mortality worldwide (tobacco use is associated with the death of about one in ten 
adults) (WHO, 2013). As a result, the fight against smoking has been a top public 
health priority for governments. In the US, however, significant anti-smoking 
legislation was not enacted until after the late 20th century. In fact, during the first 
half of the 20th century, “the ever increasing number of cigarette smokers took the 
habit because it was pleasurable, a pleasure aided by its cheapness and convenience” 
(Gately, 2001: 211). Although the popularity of smoking was challenged during the 
second half of the 20th century with the publication of the 1964 Surgeon General 
report on smoking and health, and the 1986 Surgeon General report on the health 
consequences of involuntary smoking, most state governments only introduced 
tobacco control regulations in the 21st century. These tobacco control regulations 
were aimed at protecting nonsmokers, particularly children, from the consequences 
of involuntary exposure to second hand smoke, and simultaneously, to reduce 
tobacco consumption amongst smokers by discouraging smoking in public places. 
That is, different states in the US enacted regulations to increase control of smoking 
by stressing the dangers of smoking for smokers and non-smokers alike. At the same 
time, tobacco control regulations influenced the social acceptability of smoking by 
portraying it as a hazard and by shifting “control from the smoker to the nonsmoker, 
and placing the burden of showing that smoking is permitted on the smoker” 
(Jacobson et al., 1997: 90). Nevertheless, many states still resist the enactment of 
tobacco control regulations because of attitudes about individual freedom to smoke 
prevailing over validating society’s freedom from secondhand smoke, or because of 
concerns that their actions might have harmful economic consequences (Andersen et 
al., 2006).  
A significant turning point for the US tobacco industry occurred in 1998 
when the four largest TCs at the time (i.e. Philip Morris Inc., R. J. Reynolds, Brown 
& Williamson and Lorillard) signed the Master Settlement Agreement (MSA) along 
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with the Attorneys General of 46 states. In a nutshell, the MSA consists of 
protection against lawsuits in exchange for the TCs agreeing “(1) to pay the states 
annually and in perpetuity billions of dollars; (2) to restrict permanently their 
advertising, promotion, and marketing of cigarettes; and (3) to contribute $1.5 
billion to establish what has become the American Legacy Foundation, an entity 
dedicated to counter-advertising and public education against cigarette smoking” 
(National Association of Attorneys General, 2007). In spite of the benefits accrued 
to the industry through entering the MSA, the major shifts in the regulatory 
environment along with the increasing negative societal perception of the TCs due to 
their conspiracy to deny the hazards of tobacco (Proctor, 2011), have obliged TCs to 
use a wide number of strategies to maintain their performance. Some tactics used by 
the TCs to counter the increasingly hostile domestic environment have been to 
diversify by marketing their products heavily in low and middle income countries 
that are not well prepared to tackle tobacco control or whose governments are more 
willing to endorse the TCs (Brandt, 2007). Moreover, after intense unrelated 
diversification efforts during the last decades of the 20th century, TCs have 
undergone intensive divestments of their non-cigarette products in order to de-
emphasize the association of those businesses with tobacco. For instance, in 1999 
Nabisco divested its holdings in R.J. Reynolds Tobacco and in 2007 Philip Morris 
spun-off Kraft Foods. Before the spun-off, in 2003, Philip Morris had changed its 
name to Altria Group in order to distance itself from its cigarette maker label, and in 
2008 Altria spun-off its international division (Philip Morris International) to have 
freedom from the constraints of the US environment. These fundamental 
transformations of the tobacco industry illustrate that the industry has responded to 
the increasing pressures it faces using a wide range of tactics in order to maintain the 
demand for its products (Jones, 1997). However, the central problem that still 
confronts the tobacco industry is the effect of increasing coercive pressures and 




In this paper, we study whether some of the basic premises of institutional 
theory hold in the face of contestation and empirically test some of the core concepts 
of the theory in a contested industry. Specifically, we aim to shed light on how 
coercive pressures and legitimacy simultaneously influence performance. We do so 
by defining coercive pressures as an antecedent of legitimacy, which in turn is a 
precursor of performance. Since our interest is in contributing to the 
conceptualization of contested industries, the relevant level of analysis is the 
industry.1 The concepts of study operate at the industry level not only because 
coercive pressures are “filtered, framed and enforced” within industries 
(Greenwood, Raynard, Kodeih, Micelotta, & Lounsbury, 2011: 322), but also 
because industries are bounded by shared and evolving threats to their legitimacy 
(Scott, 2008). Put differently, the collection of organizations that operate in the same 
industry face identical coercive pressures and legitimacy threats (Scott & Meyer, 
1991). Therefore, we assess the relationship between coercive pressures, legitimacy, 
and performance at the level of the industry. Before developing the hypotheses, we 
define each of these concepts. 
Institutional pressures are “the pressures for change in practices exerted on 
industry members by the industry’s external stakeholders” (Dhalla & Oliver, 2013: 
1). Within institutional pressures, regulative, normative, and cultural-cognitive 
pressures have been identified (Scott, 2008). Although regulative, normative, and 
cultural-cognitive pressures can be mutually reinforcing (Scott, 2008; Thornton & 
Ocasio, 1999), we focus on examining the differential effect of coercive pressures 
on performance. We do so because of the predominance of regulatory processes in 
contested industries in general, and because of the increasing coercive pressures in 
our empirical setting in particular. By doing so, we follow the characterization 
proposed by Oliver (1991), according to whom institutional pressures are exerted on 
industries either by legal coercion or enforcement, or by voluntary diffusion. In the 
                                                     
1 From an institutional theory perspective, we study the organizational field, which is defined 
as “those organizations that, in the aggregate, constitute a recognized area of institutional 
life” (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983: 148).  
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latter case, institutional pressures occur by means of voluntary spread through the 
industry (Oliver, 1991). In the former case, which is the focus of this study, coercive 
pressures emanate from the government, and are embodied in regulations 
(Goodstein, 1994) that are the result of nationwide cultural processes (Meyer, Boli, 
Thomas, & Ramirez, 1997) and of imitation processes (Dobbin, Simmons, & 
Garrett, 2007). In the tobacco industry, for example, the similarity across the 
tobacco control regulations enacted by different US states stems from the fact that 
these regulations emerged primarily from actions impelled by social movements and 
counter-movements across different states, and were diffused by imitation of the 
tobacco control regulations enacted by other states. For instance, after Delaware 
(2002) introduced a workplace smoking ban, New York (2003), Massachusetts 
(2004), and Washington (2005) adopted similar bans (Song, 2011). Hence, by 
studying increasing coercive pressures we aim to uncover the specific outcomes in 
terms of legitimacy and performance associated with these pressures (Oliver, 1991).  
From an institutional theory perspective, legitimacy is defined as “a 
generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, 
proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, 
beliefs, and definitions” (Suchman, 1995). According to institutional theory, 
legitimacy matters for the success and survival of organizations (Tolbert & Zucker, 
1983). Prior research on legitimacy has mainly studied how organizations acquire or 
gain legitimacy (Baum & Oliver, 1992; Dobrev, Ozdemir, & Teo, 2006; Elsbach & 
Sutton, 1992; Human & Provan, 2000; Li, Yang, & Yue, 2007; Petkova, Rindova, & 
Gupta, 2012; Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005; Volberda, van der Weerdt, Verwaal, 
Stienstra, & Verdu, 2012; Wry, Lounsbury, & Glynn, 2011; Zott & Huy, 2007), 
maintain or preserve their legitimacy (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994; Desai, 2011; Durand & 
McGuire, 2005; Elsbach, 1994; Lamin & Zaheer, 2012; Marcel & Cowen, 2013; 
Pfarrer, Decelles, Smith, & Taylor, 2008; Ruef & Scott, 1998; Suchman, 1995), 
develop their legitimacy (Haveman, Habinek, & Goodman, 2012; Sine, David, & 
Mitsuhashi, 2007; Sine, Haveman, & Tolbert, 2005), or lose their legitimacy 
(Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990; Jonsson, Greve, & Fujiwara-Greve, 2009). Despite 
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previous efforts to understand how new organizations gain legitimacy (Überbacher, 
2014; Zimmerman & Zeitz, 2002) and how legitimacy protects organizations from 
failure (Singh, Tucker, & House, 1986), the effect of coercive pressures on 
legitimacy has been overlooked (Scott, 2008) and little work has explored 
legitimacy dynamics in established contested industries (Galvin et al., 2005). 
Therefore, we provide evidence on how changes in societal evaluations of 
appropriateness resulting from coercive pressures can significantly affect 
performance. 
Although the concept of performance is central to strategy research by being 
the “ultimate measure of success” (King & Walker, 2014), the critical importance of 
coercive pressures and legitimacy to performance has thus far received little research 
attention. We note that research in the intersection of institutional theory and 
strategy can contribute to the understanding of the institutional determinants of 
performance by conceptualizing industries as subject to coercive pressures and 
legitimacy threats (Martin, 2014). Hence, we take a broader view of strategy by 
taking into account the institutional forces that influence performance, and we shed 
light on how industries ought to understand the effect of coercive pressures and 
legitimacy threats if they are to maintain their performance (Vaara & Durand, 2012). 
Next, we develop our hypotheses and establish how legitimacy mediates the 
relationship between coercive pressures and performance in established contested 
industries.    
Coercive Pressures  
Coercive pressures structure the behavior of organizations and their 
interactions within a given industry; as a result, they have the power to alter an 
industry’s legitimacy and performance. Coercive pressures impact organizations by 
“setting rules, monitoring compliance, and sanctioning behavior”(Heugens & 
Lander, 2009). According to North (1990: 9), coercive pressures are “always a 
mixed bag of those that induce productivity increase and those that reduce 
productivity”; that is to say, coercive pressures can either enable or constrain the 
organizations in a given industry. Those that enable organizations create 
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opportunities or facilitate actions. In contrast, those that constrain organizations 
control and limit the realm or scope of their activities by defining legally available 
actions. Although all industries reflect a combination of enabling and constraining 
pressures, in terms of the total pressures that contested industries are subject to, 
those that constrain behaviors account for a larger portion of the total than those that 
enable their actions. In contrast, in other industries, a larger portion of the total 
pressures tends to favor their activities. Therefore, in this study we look primarily at 
the effect of increasing coercive pressures on contested industries in order to 
develop a clear understanding of how the accumulation of these pressures exerts 
both a direct and an indirect effect on performance. Specifically, we posit that 
increasing coercive pressures indirectly impact performance by creating widely 
shared beliefs about what is deemed legitimate (Wade, Swaminathan, & Saxon, 
1998). Simultaneously, the accumulation of these pressures exerts a direct effect by 
defining how the industry should function. For example, tobacco control regulations 
directly harm TCs’ performance by limiting TCs’ strategies, either by restricting 
their potential target market (e.g. youth access laws) or by delimiting the occasions 
of consumption of cigarettes (e.g. smoking bans).  
The direct impact of increasing coercive pressures on the performance of 
contested industries is different than the effect of pressures aimed at protecting 
industries from competition or at maintaining the stability of a given industry, 
because in the latter two cases the pressures implicitly support the industry, which is 
not so in the case of contested industries. Thus, given that in contested industries 
increasing coercive pressures control or restrict the availability of resources and 
limit the strategies available for the participants, the accumulation of these pressures 
has a direct negative effect on performance (Oliver, 1991). In the case of study, for 
example, TCs’ performance has been threatened by the accumulation of tobacco 
control regulations that make salient the risks associated with smoking (Miles, 
1982). Hence, tobacco control regulations have the power to affect TCs’ 
performance since they result from the awareness of smoking as a risk factor, and 
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from the assessment of smoking as a social problem because of the negative 
externalities that it generates (e.g. second hand smoke).  
In sum, in the specific case of contested industries, increasing coercive 
pressures represent a threat to their autonomy and efficiency (Oliver, 1997). 
Specifically, increasing coercive pressures can severely influence performance as 
they attempt to further restrict the range of strategies available for a given industry 
(Dowling & Pfeffer, 1975), which interferes with the industry’s ability to operate 
effectively (Deephouse & Carter, 2005). In the tobacco industry, for instance, 
tobacco control regulations directly affect TCs’ performance by regulating the use of 
tobacco products and what TCs are to do (Alamar & Glantz, 2006). Therefore, we 
expect increasing coercive pressures to have a significant negative impact on 
performance (Edelman et al., 2010). This leads to the first hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: Increasing coercive pressures are negatively related to 
industry performance. 
Legitimacy 
As mentioned before, increasing coercive pressures create widely shared 
beliefs about what is deemed legitimate (Wade et al., 1998). Previous research has 
found that, in general, industries that are more visible and dependent on external 
resources suffer greatly from the legitimacy threats derived from accumulating 
coercive pressures (Dowling & Pfeffer, 1975; Edelman, 1990). This is because 
legitimacy is a necessary condition for visible industries to secure access to scarce 
resources (Dowling & Pfeffer, 1975). Both factors, visibility and dependence on 
external resources, make contested industries especially vulnerable to legitimacy 
threats derived from increasing coercive pressures. In the specific case of the 
tobacco industry, for instance, TCs’ visibility emanates from two sources: i) their 
size (“in 2010 the combined profits of the six leading tobacco companies was $35.1 
billion, equal to the combined profits of Coca-Cola, Microsoft, and McDonald’s” 
(Eriksen, Ross, & Mackay, 2012: 57)); and, ii) the product they sell, which attracts 
public attention because of its addictive nature and the risks associated with its use 
(in 2010 smoking related diseases resulted in $96 billion in health care costs (CDC, 
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2010)). Apart from that, TCs’ dependence on external resources is related to their 
heavy dependence on societal support and political influence to block or impede the 
adoption of tobacco control regulations. Therefore, given their large visibility and 
dependence on external resources, contested industries largely need to be recognized 
as legitimate in order to protect their businesses from increasing coercive pressures. 
We focus on the case of contested industries in order to disentangle how 
increasing coercive pressures represent threats to their legitimacy by recognizing 
“the law and the legal environment as important normative influences” (Edelman, 
1990: 1403). Specifically, given that coercive pressures are comprised of intertwined 
coercive and normative elements, we recognize that in contested industries these 
pressures not only directly control what the organizations are to do, but more 
importantly, set forth and shape societal expectations (Edelman, 1990). In fact, 
Edelman (1990: 1402) posits that coercive pressures shape societal expectations 
since the “law creates, and helps to constitute, a normative environment”. In the 
tobacco industry, for example, tobacco control regulations influence TCs’ legitimacy 
by portraying TCs’ actions as undesirable, improper, or inappropriate, and cigarettes 
as offensive, harmful, or addictive. In other words, the growing enactment of 
tobacco control regulations lowers the social acceptability of smoking, which 
negatively affects TCs’ legitimacy. Hence, we posit that increasing coercive 
pressures have an impact on the legitimacy of the industry by shaping societal 
expectations about what is deemed appropriate or acceptable (Sanders & Tuschke, 
2007). 
It is well established in the institutional theory literature that organizations 
gain legitimacy via acquiescence to coercive pressures (Scott, 2008). However, we 
argue that for contested industries abiding by the law is a difficult task because these 
industries face increasing coercive pressures that threaten their legitimacy, as they 
make salient the lack of consonance between the industries’ actions and societal 
welfare (Greenwood et al., 2011). For instance, in the case of TCs, tobacco control 
regulations harm TCs’ legitimacy by making evident the negative externalities of 
smoking, or by conveying the message that TCs’ core business is neither socially 
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acceptable nor pursued in an appropriate way. Therefore, conformance to increasing 
coercive pressures may not be enough to maintain TCs’ legitimacy, as their actions 
may be legal, but at the same time, may be perceived as misaligned with societal 
interests (Chiu & Sharfman, 2011). This leads us to posit that legitimacy threats in 
contested industries come from increasing coercive pressures that are highly 
demanding and hostile.  
In sum, increasing coercive pressures threaten contested industries’ 
legitimacy by making visible and salient the misalignment between the industries’ 
strategies and collective interests. As coercive pressures diffuse across the industry, 
they make evident the conflict between the industry’s economic interests and 
societal welfare. Moreover, given that coercive pressures diffuse across geographies, 
the legitimacy of contested industries is broadly at risk (Hannan, Carroll, Dundon, & 
Torres, 1995). In the tobacco industry, for example, tobacco control regulations have 
been increasingly enacted across states to “express the government’s public policy 
concern that tobacco use is dangerous to health, contribute to a social climate that 
discourages smoking in public places, and legitimize attempts to bring additional 
public pressure to reduce cigarette consumption” (Jacobson & Zapawa, 2001: 233). 
Thus, we posit that the legitimacy of contested industries is threatened by the 
accumulation of coercive pressures that shape societal expectations since they 
provide “normative and cognitive guidance” (Edelman & Suchman, 1997: 482). 
Building on this we hypothesize:  
Hypothesis 2: Increasing coercive pressures are negatively related to 
industry legitimacy. 
Performance 
From an institutional theory perspective, some studies have examined the 
influence of legitimacy on performance (Heugens & Lander, 2009). Nevertheless, 
most studies on the relationship between these concepts draw on population ecology 
and focus on the impact of legitimacy on survival (Baum & Oliver, 1991, 1992; 
Dobrev & Gotsopoulos, 2010; Dobrev et al., 2006; Lu & Xu, 2006; Ruef & Scott, 
1998; Singh, 1993), or on entry and failure rates (Hannan et al., 1995; Haveman, 
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1993; Ingram & Torfason, 2010; Kuilman & Li, 2009; Li et al., 2007; Singh et al., 
1986). In this study, we respond to the call by Drees and Heugens (2013) to test the 
performance implications of legitimacy in an established contested industry.   
Despite the theoretical importance of the concept of legitimacy, most studies 
testing the impact of legitimacy on performance have found no clear effect or 
produced inconclusive results (Drees & Heugens, 2013; Heugens & Lander, 2009). 
For instance, Geletkanycz and Hambrick (1997) show that strategic conformity has a 
positive effect on organizational performance, particularly so in industries with high 
uncertainty, because of the legitimacy benefits that conformity accords. Similarly, 
Deephouse (1999) demonstrates that the legitimacy gained from strategic conformity 
improves performance in the context of commercial banks, as it facilitates resource 
acquisition and protects against threatening challenges or questions. Staw and 
Epstein (2000), find scant positive effects of the legitimacy gained by the use of 
popular management techniques on the performance of large US financial and 
industrial corporations. In another study, Bansal and Clelland (2004a) illustrate that 
organizations with environmental legitimacy experience lower unsystematic risk 
because legitimate firms not only enhance their access to resources but also isolate 
themselves from scrutiny. More recently, Doh, Howton, Howton, and Siegel (2009), 
reveal that the market reaction to the legitimacy conferred by being listed on a CSR 
index is greater in the case of removal of endorsement (i.e. delisting) than in the case 
of positive endorsement (i.e. listing). Finally, a small stream of research has focused 
on evaluating the effects of legitimacy on initial public offerings’ (IPOs) 
performance, and has found that firms undertaking IPOs show a good performance 
record when they are considered to be legitimate for legitimacy reduces the 
likelihood of IPOs’ failure (Certo, 2003; Cohen & Dean, 2005; Gulati & Higgins, 
2003; Pollock & Rindova, 2003). In short, previous research has provided scant 
empirical support for the positive effect of legitimacy on performance (Heugens & 
Lander, 2009), so that the effect of legitimacy on performance remains to be 
empirically established (Drees & Heugens, 2013). 
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Although according to institutional theory maintaining legitimacy is a 
motivation in its own right, a fundamental premise of this theory is that legitimacy 
leads to superior performance via access to scarce resources (Suchman, 1995). 
Specifically, institutional theorists posit that legitimate industries are better able to 
attract the resources needed to achieve superior performance via: (i) positive societal 
evaluations (Deephouse, 1999), (ii) public endorsement (Scott, 2008), (iii) and 
support from resource providers (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). In short, it has been 
posited that legitimacy favors access to the tangible and intangible resources that are 
needed to perform well (Deephouse, 1999), such as access to capital markets 
(Aldrich & Fiol, 1994). That is, legitimacy increases performance because of its 
effect on the flow of resources to the industry and because it provides protection 
from costly social scrutiny. In the specific case of TCs, “it has been clear for many 
years that tobacco companies, which monitor factors that are known to affect their 
sales, rate the public acceptability of the smoking habit as the most crucial factor 
affecting sales in the long term” (Simpson & Lee, 2003: 238). This leads to the third 
hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 3: Legitimacy is positively related to industry performance. 
Coercive Pressures, Legitimacy, and Performance 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
The central arguments of the previous discussion highlight that increasing 
coercive pressures impact the legitimacy and performance of the industry, and that 
legitimacy also has a direct impact on performance (Scott, 2008). Thus, the ideas 
presented thus far provide a base for understating the mediating role played by 
legitimacy in the effect of increasing coercive pressures on performance (see Figure 
2). Legitimacy serves as a mediator for the reason that it explains how and why 
increasing coercive pressures have an effect on performance (Baron & Kenny, 
1986). In other words, the effect of increasing coercive pressures on performance is 
transmitted through changes in legitimacy, which reflects the idea that these 
pressures “consist not only of law and the sanctions that are built into law, but also 
of societal norms and culture associated with the law” (Edelman, 1992: 1534). 
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Specifically, this influence takes place in a sequence where firstly increasing 
coercive pressures have an impact on legitimacy, and then, legitimacy has an impact 
on the performance of the industry (see Figure 2). For instance, through the growing 
enactment of tobacco control regulations, state governments aim to control the 
behavior of current smokers, to protect non-smokers, and to discourage potential 
users of cigarettes. As the growing enactment of these regulations shapes the social 
acceptability of tobacco by highlight the dangers of smoking for smokers and non-
smokers alike, the accumulation of these regulations has the potential to reduce TCs’ 
performance. Therefore, by shaping the social acceptability of a given industry, 
increasing coercive pressures pose a significant threat to industry’s performance 
(Dhalla & Oliver, 2013; Oliver, 1991). Based on the above discussion we expect the 
mediation effect of legitimacy to be salient in contested industries where coercive 
pressures represent a growing and persistent threat to legitimacy and performance 
(Galvin et al., 2005). Although, in general, we presume that this effect illustrates that 
the relationship between increasing coercive pressures and performance is not only 
direct, but that it is also mediated by societal evaluations of appropriateness. 
Building on this we formulate the mediating role for legitimacy: 
Hypothesis 4: Legitimacy mediates the relationship between increasing 
coercive pressures and industry performance. 
Methods 
Data Sources and Measures 
The geographical scope of this study is confined to the US and states are the 
geographical unit of analysis. For our purposes, the state-level of analysis is 
appropriate because states have the sovereignty to enact tobacco control regulations 
that are preempted neither by the US Constitution nor by the Federal law.2 
Moreover, the differences in the enactment of tobacco control regulations across 
states are of interest, as they resemble cross-country differences. However, as 
                                                     
2 US state governments can enact both smoking bans and youth access laws, but the Federal 
Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act (1965) restricts their power to regulate tobacco 
advertising (ANR, 2004). 
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opposed to cross-country data, state-level observations allow for the comparison of 
more homogenous units of analysis. Finally, by selecting the state as the 
geographical unit of analysis we follow previous research that has successfully 
studied US regulations at the state-level (Rao, Yue, & Ingram, 2011; Soule & King, 
2006). 
The period spans the years between 1994 and 2010. In May 1994 
Mississippi became the first state to sue TCs in an attempt to hold them accountable 
for the health care costs of smoking (Janofsky, 1994). This lawsuit marked a 
watershed event for the TCs, as 45 states followed suit and commenced litigations 
against TCs. Moreover, the end date is appropriate because no state passed a smoke-
free law in 2011 (SLATI, 2011). The models include monthly data covering the 
period of January 1994 through December 2010. Below we describe the variables 
included in the analysis.  
Dependent variable. TCs’ performance is measured using state tax-paid 
cigarette sales that represent the number of cigarette tax stamps purchased by 
wholesalers for each state; that is, the monthly number of cigarette packages taxed 
per state. This is a pertinent measure of the performance of the tobacco industry 
because states require cigarette distributors to pay tobacco taxes before the sale of 
cigarettes by purchasing tax stamps that are affixed to each pack of cigarettes, 
thereby reflecting that the appropriate taxes have been paid. In addition, as 
unstamped cigarettes are considered to be illegal, state tax-paid sales represent the 
best available measure of the performance of the total industry at the state-level. 
Monthly data on state tax-paid cigarette sales were obtained from Orzechowski and 
Walker, the consultancy firm that compiles cigarette taxes in the US and creates the 
Tax Burden on Tobacco, a historical compilation of tobacco statistics (Orzechowski 
& Walter, 2014). In order to eliminate the confounding effect of state size, tax-paid 
cigarette sales are adjusted by population per state. 
Independent variables. We include a fine-grained characterization of 
increasing coercive pressures by measuring tobacco control regulations using two 
variables that together represent the different efforts of states to control smoking.  
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The first variable is youth access laws. Youth access laws represent the 
obligation of the government to protect the health of children from the substantial 
danger caused by smoking. Youth access laws increasingly restrict TCs from 
reaching potential new smokers at a vulnerable age (“more than 80% of adult 
smokers begin smoking before 18 years of age” (CDC, 2009)) and from starting 
young people on the path of nicotine addiction (“people who start smoking before 
age 21 have the hardest time quitting” (Parsons, 2009)). This variable is measured 
with the Alciati score, an increasing index that captures the extensiveness of state 
laws on youth access to tobacco (Alciati et al., 1998). Table 1 lists the items 
included in the Alciati score (Alciati et al., 1998). In order to construct the youth 
access laws variable, the items listed in table 1 were coded for each state. The codes 
were assigned according to the definition given by Alciati et al. (1998). The 
accumulated Alciati score for each state is calculated by adding the monthly codes 
per state.  
Insert Table 1 about here 
The second variable, smoking bans, represents the accumulated enactment 
of smoking bans in the following locations: government buildings, private 
workplaces, childcare centers, health care facilities, restaurants, bars, schools, 
recreational and cultural facilities, public transit, malls, and hotels. In order to 
construct the smoking bans variable, the enactment of a smoking ban on a certain 
location in a given state was coded following the ImpacTeen coding scheme, which 
takes into account not only the increasing adoption of new regulations but also the 
strength of those regulations (ImpacTeen, 2009). For a given state, a month in which 
there were no smoking bans enacted was coded as 0, if/when a smoking ban was 
enacted the code was either 1, 2 or 3, depending on the exemptions or exceptions it 
included,3 or 4 if it was a total ban. The individual monthly scores assigned to each 
location in each state were aggregated to obtain the monthly value for each state.  
                                                     
3 1: “Restrict smoking to designated smoking areas or require separate ventilation with 
exemptions for locations of a certain size”. 2: “Restrict smoking to separately ventilated 
areas or a ban with exemptions for certain locations where only a restriction applies”. 3: 
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For both independent variables, state-level data for 1993-2007 were 
obtained from the ImpacTeen State Level Tobacco Control Policy and Prevalence 
Database. State-level data for 2008-2010 were retrieved from the State Cancer 
Legislative Database Program, and were coded by one of the authors using the 
Alciati and ImpacTeen coding schemes (Alciati et al., 1998; ImpacTeen, 2009). To 
assess intercoder reliability, another researcher coded both variables for the six 
states that enacted both smoking bans and youth access laws between 2008 and 
2010. The percentage of agreement (93.18%) suggests almost perfect agreement. In 
sum, the models include two variables that are essential for the analysis because they 
represent two different types of increasing coercive pressures, as smoking bans 
restrict when/where smokers can light up whereas youth access laws restrict young 
people’s access to tobacco. In the regression models both independent variables 
were lagged by two years to account for the causal effect of coercive pressures on 
legitimacy, and because previous research suggests the use of a two-year lag to 
allow enough time when examining the impact of tobacco control regulations 
(Botello-Harbaum et al., 2009). Moreover, this lag corrects for the possible 
endogeneity between increasing coercive pressures and legitimacy (Schneiberg & 
Bartley, 2001).  
Mediator variable. Following previous research (Bansal & Clelland, 2004a; 
Deephouse & Carter, 2005; Deephouse, 1996; Pollock & Rindova, 2003), the 
models include a media-based measure of legitimacy which rests on the assumption 
that the media reflect generalized perceptions of organizations (Vaara, Tienari, & 
Laurila, 2006). That is, the discursive nature of legitimacy is reflected in that 
“organizations described in legitimated vocabularies are assumed to be oriented to 
collectively defined, and often collectively mandated, ends” (Meyer & Rowan, 
1977: 349).  
In contrast to previous studies that measure legitimacy from a purposive 
sample of (mostly national) newspapers, this study includes multiple national and 
                                                                                                                                         
“Ban in areas accessible to the general public, but smoking is allowed in separately 
ventilated or designated areas where the public is not allowed” (ImpacTeen, 2009: 16).   
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local newspapers. The advantage of using multiple newspapers lies in giving weight 
to different sources when evaluating legitimacy (Andrews & Caren, 2010); thus, 
using a wide sample of newspapers better reflects the incompatible perceptions of 
legitimacy and captures broader legitimacy assessments across states (Vergne, 
2011). Moreover, an extensive sample better represents legitimation since it captures 
the process as occurring across state boundaries. Newspaper articles from both 
national and state newspapers were retrieved from LexisNexis database using a 
combination of the terms smok!, cigarette, tobacco compan!, ban, law, regulation, 
legislation, and US. Exclamation marks (!) were included to find multiple variations 
of a term (e.g. smok! finds documents containing the terms smoker, smoking, 
smoke). The results were filtered to include articles between 1993 and 2010. After 
similarity analysis and deleting duplicated articles, the final sample resulted in 890 
articles.  
Legitimacy for the months of the study was computed not at the state-level 
but at the national level because, as previously argued, legitimation is not a state-
level but a national-level process (Hannan et al., 1995). One of the authors read and 
coded all the 890 newspaper articles. The legitimacy score for each month was 
obtained by coding each article into one of three categories: positive (1), neutral (0), 
or negative (-1). A positive article is one that endorses or is favorable to TCs. For 
example, an article is coded as 1 when it praises TCs’ actions by emphasizing the 
positive aspects of TCs’ activities (e.g. Corporate Social Responsibility), or when it 
is advantageous to TCs (e.g. it indicates a possible increase in TCs’ value or market 
growth). A negative article is one that challenges or is unfavorable to TCs. For 
instance, an article that criticizes or questions TCs’ actions (e.g. indicates that TCs’ 
lied about the dangers of smoking) is coded as -1. A neutral article has either no 
impact on TCs’ (e.g. a report or description of the companies’ activities) or a 
balanced number of endorsing and challenging reports (Deephouse, 1996). To assess 
intercoder reliability, four research assistants coded a subset of the newspaper 
articles, such that all the articles were coded by a second coder (i.e. each research 
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assistant coded 25% of the total articles). The percentage of agreement (89.97%) 
suggests substantial levels of intercoder reliability (Landis & Koch, 1977).  
Legitimacy scores were obtained using the Janis–Fadner coefficient of 
imbalance: 
 
where e is the number of endorsing articles, c is the number of challenging articles, 
and t is the total number of articles (Janis & Fadner, 1965). Legitimacy scores range 
from -1 to 1; the former represents a high presence of challenging articles, whereas 
the latter represents a high number of endorsing articles. In the analyses, legitimacy 
is lagged by one year to allow time for any threats to legitimacy to be reflected in the 
media (Fiss, Kennedy, & Davis, 2012; Ingram et al., 2010).  
Control variables. Cigarette taxes controls for the economic dependence in 
tobacco taxes of a state and is measured with the change of the tax rate as a 
percentage of retail price. The 2011 Tax Burden on Tobacco provided state tax data. 
Democrats controls for the idea that democrats are more likely than republicans to 
support the enactment of comprehensive smoking bans. Democrats is measured as 
the percentage of democrats in the upper and lower houses of state legislatures using 
data from the US Census Bureau. FDA is a dummy variable that takes the value of 
one for all observations after June 2009 to represent the signing into law of the 
Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act. This federal act gives the 
Food and Drug Administration authority to regulate the manufacture, distribution, 
and marketing of tobacco products. Smoking prevalence represents the percentage of 
adults that are smokers per state as well as the size of the market for cigarettes. Data 
were obtained from the CDC Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System. To 
control for time-variant state specific characteristics we include two variables, GDP 
per capita and percentage of adults per state. Data for these variables come from the 
Bureau of Economic Analysis and the US Census Bureau, respectively. Finally, in 
order to control for the upward sloping time path of the dependent variable and for 
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possible seasonality, the models include state specific time trends and calendar 
month dummies, respectively. 
Model and Analyses 
There are two main different approaches to test mediation. The standard approach 
for testing mediation, used by the vast majority of previous studies (Aguinis, 
Edwards, & Bradley, 2016), suggests the use of three OLS regressions (Baron & 
Kenny, 1986). However, using OLS regressions when testing for mediation may 
lead to incorrect results when the mediator is endogenous. A more recent approach, 
proposed by Shaver (2005), allows to test for mediation in the presence of 
endogeneity by using an instrumental variable estimation. The instrumental variable 
estimation replaces the endogenous variable with an instrument that is uncorrelated 
with the dependent variable (i.e. exogenous) but correlated with the endogenous 
variable (i.e. relevant). In the context of study endogeneity may be a problem 
because of the simultaneity between performance and legitimacy (Miller et al., 
2013). Thus, this study pays especial attention to the problem of endogeneity by 
using the method recommended by Shaver (2005) to test for mediation; as such, this 
study differs from prior mediation analyses that have mainly used Baron and 
Kenny’s methodology (DeVaro, 2011; Wood, Goodman, Beckmann, & Cook, 
2007).4   
The method proposed by Shaver (2005) is similar to that of Baron and 
Kenny (1986) in that it consists of three regressions. The first regression is used to 
test whether the independent variable predicts the dependent variable (i.e. first 
condition). The second regression is used to test the impact that the mediator has on 
the dependent variable (i.e. second condition). The third regression is used to test for 
mediation effects by evaluating whether the impact of the mediator on the dependent 
variable is statistically significant when controlling for the independent variable (i.e. 
third condition). The strength of the mediation effect whenever the mediator is 
significant in the third regression depends on the coefficient of the independent 
                                                     
4 The results using Baron and Kenny’s method are available from the authors upon request.  
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variable: if it is statistically significant there is partial mediation, if it is not 
statistically significant there is full mediation.  
The instrumental variable method proposed by Shaver (2005) differs from 
Baron and Kenny’s (1986) OLS method in that the second and third regressions are 
estimated simultaneously using an estimator such as 2SLS or GMM. The procedure 
to estimate the second and third regressions as a system consists of two-stages. The 
first stage (i.e. second regression) regresses the endogenous variable on the 
instrument and the exogenous variables in order to obtain the predicted values for 
the endogenous variable. The second stage (i.e. third regression) regresses the 
dependent variable on the predicted values of the endogenous variable and the other 
regressors. 5  
The instrument for legitimacy is the rate of lung cancer deaths per 100,000 
people. A number of reasons support the selection of lung cancer deaths as an 
instrument for legitimacy. First, in the US cigarette smoking causes approximately 
90% of lung cancer cases; but the effect of smoking on lung cancer is not 
instantaneous, instead the disease develops over time, so that lung cancer deaths in t 
are a consequence of cigarettes smoked in the distant past, not in the present time 
(SG, 2004; WHO, 2013). Second, about half of the smokers diagnosed with lung 
cancer stop smoking after receiving the diagnosis because quitting smoking reduces 
the risk of dying from lung cancer (BMJ, 2010). Therefore, the number of deaths in t 
does not have a significant relation with the reduction in cigarettes sold, as “there is 
a lag of several years between when people start using tobacco and when their health 
suffers” (WHO, 2013). In other words, the previous two arguments suggest that the 
number of lung cancer deaths in t should not be correlated with the cigarette sales in 
t, as the lost sales resulting from lung cancer deaths occur at some point before the 
smoker dies from lung cancer, and are somehow counterbalanced with “more than 
3,600 young people who start smoking daily” (FDA, 2009). Therefore, lung cancer 
                                                     
5 Several other methods exists for conducting mediation analysis, such as Sobel (1982) test 
and bootstrapping (Hayes, 2013). Although these methods have been used by prior studies 
(see for example Paolella and Durand (2016)), the presence of endogeneity in our models 
suggests the use of Shaver’s (2005) instrumental variable estimation to test for mediation.  
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deaths are exogenous to performance and should only affect it through their effect 
on TCs’ legitimacy. Specifically, lung cancer deaths have an effect on TCs’ 
legitimacy because by linking smoking with lung cancer, TCs’ actions are depicted 
as socially unacceptable since their products not only cause addiction but also kill 
their consumers when use as intended (Brandt, 1998). Moreover, powerful 
information campaigns supported by health associations and link smoking to lung 
cancer, which is the leading cancer killer in the US (accounting for 27% of all 
cancer deaths), have further endangered the social acceptability of tobacco (ALA, 
2016). The previous arguments are summarized in the following quote: “while a 
century ago lung cancer was so rare that medical residents were called into the 
operating room to ‘see a condition you'll probably never see again,’ thanks to 
tobacco companies it has reached epidemic proportions” (Siegel-Itzkovich, 2012). 
Data on lung cancer deaths were obtained from the National Cancer Institute. 
Results 
Tables 2 and 3 present the descriptive statistics and correlations between the 
variables included in the analysis. Table 4 reports the results of the analyses. Model 
(1) presents the results with the control variables only. The results for the control 
variables are consistent across models. Models (2), (3) and (4) present the 
instrumental variable mediation results. Given the panel structure of our data, we 
implement both the Hausman and the overidentifying restrictions tests in order to 
compare the consistency of the fixed vs. random effects estimators.6 The results 
suggest the use of the fixed-effects estimator. Thus, model (2) is estimated as a panel 
data fixed-effects model, and models (3) and (4) are estimated using a panel 
extension of the instrumental variables estimation with fixed-effects.  
Insert Tables 2 and 3 about here 
Model (2) shows the main effect of increasing coercive pressures 
represented by different tobacco control regulations on performance. The results 
                                                     
6 Ho: individual effects are random. Hausman χ2=24.75 (p-value=0.000). Sargan-Hansen 
statistic: 27.53 (p-value=0.001). 
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provide support for hypothesis 1, in the case of youth access laws but not for 
smoking bans. Youth access laws -regulations aimed at protecting children and 
young people-, are broadly accepted among US citizens because of the  “widespread 
public agreement that youth should not smoke” (Brainard, 2007: 2) and because of 
the “general agreement that these products [cigarettes] and activities [smoking] are 
not for children” (Davidson, 2003). Hence, the results suggest that these regulations 
effectively harm TCs’ performance by limiting the number of potential smokers they 
can attract. Moreover, youth access laws are not openly questioned by society 
members but instead show good implementation and compliance rates (SG, 2012), 
which effectively reduce cigarette consumption. Regarding smoking bans, the results 
suggest that these bans do not affect TCs’ performance. In the case of the US, the 
average state has mild smoking bans, in the sense that most states restrict smoking to 
designated or separated areas (CDC, 2011). This is related to the fact that the 
acceptance of smoking bans has increased and yet, it is not universal, mainly 
because of freedom concerns that make it hard to balance the right of smokers to use 
a legal product with the government’s mandate to limit the use of a hazardous 
product (Jacobson & Wasserman, 1997). Given the disputes surrounding the 
enactment of smoking bans, a significant number of states have not adopted 
meaningful bans and have accepted accommodation or tolerance measures that 
reduce the incentive for smokers to quit and hardly harm TCs’ performance (WHO, 
2009). This was recognized by Philip Morris in an internal report: “Total prohibition 
of smoking in the workplace strongly affects industry volume. (…) Milder 
workplace restrictions, such as smoking only in designated areas, have much less 
impact on quitting rates and very little effect on consumption” (WHO, 2009: 38). 
Thus, the results satisfy the first condition for mediation to hold, but only in the case 
of youth access laws.  
Insert Table 4 about here 
Models (3) and (4) present the results of the GMM instrumental variable 
estimation. We test for the relevance of lung cancer deaths as an instrument with the 
first stage F-statistic (F=390.69, p-value=0.000), which suggests that the instrument 
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is strong given the thresholds recommended by Stock and Yogo (2004).7 The 
exogeneity of lung cancer deaths as an instrument cannot be tested because the 
model is just-identified. In spite of this, the arguments presented in the previous 
section provide a compelling and intuitive background of the instrument’s 
exogeneity (Semadeni, Withers, & Certo, 2013), because, as mentioned before, “a 
steep rise in lung cancer – a disease virtually unknown at the turn of the twentieth 
century – had ominously followed in the wake of the rise of the cigarette. In the 
early 1950s, the relationship of these two trends would be explicitly and 
scientifically linked” (Brandt, 2007: 3).  
The estimates from the first stage are reported in model (3). The results in 
this model provide support for hypothesis 2 in the case of youth access laws but not 
for smoking bans. The results indicate that the enactment of youth access laws 
threatens the legitimacy of the TCs insofar as these laws make visible and salient the 
social risks associated with, and the unacceptability of, youth smoking. Essentially, 
youth access laws protect children from the actions of TCs’ to entice youth smoking, 
and simultaneously, uncover the strategies used by TCs to target youth, both of 
which have a negative impact on TCs’ legitimacy. In contrast, smoking bans have no 
impact on TCs’ legitimacy. This seems to be the case as attitudes about individual 
freedom -a deeply held value in the US- limit the rights of the government to control 
the occasions of consumption of cigarettes. Therefore, personal freedom and right to 
choose issues protect TCs’ legitimacy from being undermined by the enactment of 
smoking bans. In fact, the enactment of smoking bans does not necessarily lead to 
smoking disapproval as smoking may be considered as acceptable, even if not 
desirable, under certain circumstances. Thus, this result satisfies the second 
condition for mediation, but only in the case of youth access laws.  
Model (4) tests for mediation and presents the estimates from the second 
stage. This model provides evidence of the positive impact of legitimacy on 
performance, which supports hypothesis 3. The results suggest that TCs’ need to 
                                                     
7 Stock and Yogo’s (2004) rule-of-thumb states that the first stage F-statistic should have a 
value higher than 10.  
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protect their legitimacy to maintain cigarette consumption since smoking is a social 
practice that depends on cigarettes being accepted and considered as attractive 
(Alamar & Glantz, 2006). Therefore, the results suggest that contested industries 
ought to be concerned with being considered as legitimate given the critical 
importance of legitimacy to performance. In other words, the results provide support 
for legitimacy as being a critical element for performance. These results satisfy the 
third condition for mediation.  
Combined, given that the three conditions for mediation were satisfied in the 
case of youth access laws, the results of models (2), (3), and (4) suggest that 
hypothesis 4 is supported as well for this variable. Hypothesis 4 suggests that 
legitimacy mediates the relationship between increasing coercive pressures and 
performance, such that coercive pressures predict the level of social acceptability of 
an industry, and this, in turn, affects the industry’s performance. Therefore, it can be 
concluded that legitimacy mediates the relation between tobacco control regulations 
and TCs’ performance in the case where tobacco control regulations are accepted 
and operate as a normative influence (i.e. youth access laws). The results also show 
that restrictions that are mainly aimed at modifying the behavior of current smokers 
with a set of incentives and sanctions (i.e. smoking bans) did not have a significant 
impact, neither on the legitimacy nor on the performance of TCs. This result is 
supported by the addictive nature of nicotine, which makes the current consumption 
of cigarettes dependent on past consumption. Hence, the results indicate that given 
the addictive nature of smoking, there is a differential impact on consumption of 
regulations that enable or discourage the use of cigarettes (i.e. youth access laws) 
compared to regulations aimed at changing the behavior of current smokers (i.e. 
smoking bans), and that this effect is mediated by TCs’ legitimacy. In other words, 
the results suggest that by having different targets, coercive pressures have 
differential effects. On the one hand, youth access laws are regulations that aim to 
reduce the number of people that are at risk of picking up the habit. On the other 
hand, smoking bans directly target the protection of non-smokers from exposure to 
second hand smoke. Therefore, the mediation effect suggests that to the extent that 
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TCs’ legitimacy is at play, the impact of coercive pressures on cigarette 
consumption is transferred through changes in legitimacy that make smoking less 
attractive to potential smokers, and therefore have the power to reduce TCs’ 
performance (Wolfson, 2001). 
Robustness Checks 
In supplementary analyses separate models were estimated using LIML and 
FULL estimators (Bascle, 2008; DeVaro, 2011). The advantage of using these 
estimators is that the former is unbiased and the latter performs well in models with 
few instruments. The results are presented in table 5. As can be seen, the results 
reported in models (5) and (6) are similar to those of model (4), which suggest that 
the findings are not sensitive to the estimator used.8  
Insert Table 5 about here 
 In order to assess the sensitivity of our findings to the model specification, 
we used two alternative measures of legitimacy. The first measure, proposed by 
Vergne (2011), is the raw legitimacy vector (RLV). The RLV is an appropriate 
measure in the context of the tobacco industry since it accounts for the fact that 
newspaper articles are mainly negative about the TCs and corrects for media 
visibility patterns. To compute the RLV we coded only the legitimacy-challenging 
articles in our sample. The RLV score is computed by adding the number of 
negative articles per month (Vergne, 2011). The second measure is the mean value 
of the Janis–Fadner coefficient of imbalance, which dampens the fluctuations in this 
variable. The results of the analyses are presented in table 5. Model (7) shows the 
results using the RLV and model (8) those of the mean value of the Janis–Fadner 
coefficient of imbalance. The estimates differ little from those obtained when using 
the Janis–Fadner coefficient of imbalance, which suggests that the findings are not 
sensitive to the measure of legitimacy used. Finally, in order to account for the fact 
that legitimacy represents taken-for-grantedness, and as such, it changes slowly 
                                                     
8 Table 5 only reports the 2nd stage results for the LIML and FULL estimators. As the model 
is exactly identified the first stage results for both estimators are equal to those obtained with 
the GMM estimator (model 3).  
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through a lengthy process, we include the lagged value of legitimacy as a control. 
Model (9) presents the results of the analysis and shows that the results remain 
unchanged when controlling for the lagged value of legitimacy.  
Discussion  
Most past research has ignored the concurrent effects of coercive pressures 
and legitimacy on performance, and has not explored the possibility of a mediated 
effect of legitimacy in the relationship between increasing coercive pressures and 
performance. This study therefore extends understanding on how increasing 
coercive pressures influence legitimacy and in turn affect the performance of the 
industry. Using data from a contested industry yielded four major findings that 
support the mediating role of legitimacy in the relationship between increasing 
coercive pressures and performance. The arguments below are structured to discuss 
each of these results.  
First, the results show that the negative effect of increasing coercive 
pressures on performance (and therefore the mediation effect of legitimacy) is only 
present when coercive pressures operate as a cultural and normative influence, as in 
the case of youth access laws. Moreover, the results show that in contested industries 
the effect of increasing coercive pressures is weaker in the presence of laws that 
transfer a set of incentives and sanctions, as in the case of smoking bans (Vasudeva, 
2013). Specifically, in the case of study, the difference in the results reflects the idea 
that even though tobacco control regulations serve the overall purpose of reducing 
the demand for tobacco, different laws differ in that they target different societal 
groups and, most importantly, receive different support from society members. 
Moreover, different laws differently restrict TCs’ ability to operate. Whereas youth 
access laws have a strong impact on TCs’ performance because they limit TCs’ 
target market and the range of strategies these companies can use to reach their 
potential consumers, smoking bans only change the occasions of consumption of 
cigarettes but do not restrict the strategies used by TCs to keep their current 
consumers. Hence, tobacco control regulations that constrain the industry’s ability to 
98 
 
reach its goals by imposing restrictions on the way in which TCs are able to handle 
their business, significantly harm the industry’s performance. Moreover, the results 
indicate that regulations form attitudes towards risk and their acceptance, in the 
sense that by enacting smoking bans (instead of outlawing tobacco), governments 
transmit the message that under certain circumstances smoking may be considered 
an accepted risk (whose responsibility lies with the smoker’s voluntary decision to 
smoke). In contrast, by enacting youth access laws, governments constraint children 
from smoking because of the high risks associated it. Thus, the performance 
consequences of coercive pressures are stronger when coercive pressures directly 
constrain the range of strategies available to an industry by shaping risk perceptions.    
Second, the results indicate that increasing coercive pressures have a 
negative impact on legitimacy, which is understood as “an organization’s right to 
exist and conduct operations” (Metzlet, 2001: 322). This result illustrates that the 
legitimacy of contested industries is threatened for the two main sources that bestow 
legitimacy, regulators and society (Deephouse, 1996), openly challenged their 
business by enacting laws (Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990). For instance, with the 
increasing enactment of tobacco control regulations, TCs’ legitimacy is threatened 
because these regulations make the dangers associated with smoking visible and 
salient (Jones, 1997). On the one hand, youth access laws align different sectors of 
the society towards a common and deeply engrained goal, which is to protect 
children and young people from growing up with a deadly habit (UNICEF, 2009): 
“As society we recognize that these products represent some risk to our physical, 
emotional, or psychological health, and we decree that they are adult products and 
activities. (…) There is general agreement that these products and activities are not 
for children” (Davidson, 2003: 4). Thus, youth access laws reinforce the deeply held 
and universal norm of protecting children and youth from a harmful and addictive 
product, and also recognize that it is the government’s duty to protect children (UN, 
1989). On the other hand, societal members show fragmented support for smoking 
bans because of the different assessments of the role of government and its 
interference with individual freedom, which in this case refers to the individual’s 
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choice to smoke. Therefore, in the case of contested industries, increasing coercive 
pressures are an important precursor of contests or struggles over societal 
evaluations of appropriateness, especially so when societal members subscribe to the 
underlying values represented by these pressures.  
Third, the results provide direct evidence to support a recurring and central 
argument in institutional theory, namely that legitimacy has a positive effect on 
performance as it facilitates the flow of resources to the industry (Dowling & 
Pfeffer, 1975). In the same way, performance decreases when legitimacy is lost or 
threatened because of the limited access to the resources needed for survival (Scott 
& Meyer, 1991). This effect is not specific to the case of contested industries; in 
fact, it can be generalized to other industries because legitimacy reflects social 
acceptance and support, which should result in a good performance record. Thus, 
this result shows that legitimacy is a catalyst for superior industry performance, as 
such, it is in line with the study of illegitimacy in mediated markets by Zuckerman 
(1999). Zuckerman (1999) argues that illegitimacy is costly because financial 
analysts choose to follow only those firms that they perceive as distinctly belonging 
to a given category. He finds that firms that are covered by financial analysts are 
more successful than non-covered firms which are subject to the ‘illegitimacy 
discount’. Our results also support the negative effect of illegitimacy on 
performance in the case of contested industries that are labeled as ‘shunned’ or ‘sin’. 
In fact, organizations in contested industries are often excluded from financial 
indexes, such as the Dow Jones Sustainability Indices or the MSCI Global Socially 
Responsible Indices, on the grounds of them being “engaged in particular 
'undesirable' businesses” (DJSI, 1999) or with the premise of excluding “companies 
with involvement in specific business activities that investors may wish to avoid” 
(MSCI, 1990). 
Lastly, the results of this study support the mediating role of legitimacy in 
the relation between increasing coercive pressures and performance. The results 
show that the mediation effect of legitimacy is related to whether the law acts as a 
source of normative pressures. In the case of smoking bans, the diversity and 
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inconsistency of societal expectations with respect to freedom issues result in that, 
on the one hand, supporters of smoking bans plead for the enactment of stringent 
bans, while, on the other hand, smokers’ rights groups oppose the enactment of such 
bans. At the same time, supporters of smoking bans encourage compliance once the 
ban is enacted, whereas those who oppose the ban may try either to abolish or to 
influence/change it in their favor (Simons et al., 2016). Thus, in the presence of a 
conflict in societal expectations, the mediating role of legitimacy is weaker than in 
the absence of such conflict, which is the case for youth access laws. This leads us to 
conclude that the mediating role of legitimacy is present when the law operates as a 
normative influence instead of when it only transfers a set of incentives and 
sanctions, because of the diversity and inconsistency of the coercive pressures 
exerted in the latter vis-à-vis the former case (Greenwood et al., 2011; Meyer & 
Scott, 1983). Hence, this study points to the need to take a fine-grained look when 
studying increasing coercive pressures seeing that a simplified characterization of 
such pressures may be misleading, specially so in the case of contested industries.  
Taken together, the results of this study are a first step in empirically 
disentangling the complex relationship between coercive pressures, legitimacy, and 
performance in a contested industry. The results highlight the profound influence 
that increasing coercive pressures have in shaping the legitimacy and performance of 
the industry. Specifically, in the case of study, the results show that coercive 
pressures have the power to threaten TCs’ legitimacy and to harm TCs’ performance 
more by limiting the potential target market for cigarettes (e.g. youth access laws), 
than by determining the occasions of consumption of cigarettes (e.g. smoking bans). 
Overall, the results indicate that enacting tobacco control regulations that reduce the 
social acceptability of smoking is a highly effective tool in reducing cigarette 
consumption. Thus, given that up to date empirical work testing some of the basic 
premises or assumptions of institutional theory has remained scarce, this study 
contributes to the literature by: i) conceptually and empirically distinguishing the 
concepts of coercive pressures and legitimacy; ii) using a fine-grained 
characterization of the concept of coercive pressures; and, iii) directly testing some 
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of the core claims of institutional theory while paying special attention to the issue 
of endogeneity.   
Limitations and Future Research 
Despite its contribution to the literature, this study has some limitations that 
represent opportunities for future research. First, the generalizability of the results is 
most relevant to contested industries such as gambling, weapons, and alcohol. 
Although the tobacco industry has some particularities that make it different to non-
contested industries, other contested industries face legitimacy disputes similar to 
the ones faced by TCs because of the conflicting judgment and evaluations of these 
industries by different societal segments (Metzlet, 2001). In other words, in 
contested industries there is a conflict concerning what is considered to be 
legitimate. Such conflict provides no clear guidelines as to how organizations should 
respond to the accumulation of conflicting or fragmented coercive pressures, which 
amplifies the difficulties associated with maintaining legitimacy and performance 
(Greenwood et al., 2011). Thus, the results can be primarily generalized to contested 
industries because the dynamics of these industries are similar to the ones observed 
in the case of TCs. However, though we expect our findings to mainly generalize to 
industries characterized by contestation and legitimacy threats, as mentioned in the 
discussion, some of our findings may remain valid for non-contested industries.  
Second, the study presents a deterministic orientation in which TCs are not 
proactive in creating or influencing institutions. This has not always been the case; 
in fact, TCs are known for employing certain tactics in order to shape societal 
perceptions of smoking. For example, TCs have used direct tactics, such as hiring 
scientists to discredit research on the harmful effects of both smoking and second 
hand smoke, or distancing themselves from their ‘cigarette maker’ label through the 
creation of an image untainted by cigarettes (e.g. Philip Morris changed its corporate 
name to Altria Group on January, 2003). At the same time, TCs have also used 
indirect tactics, like promoting ventilation systems in enclosed public spaces, 
endorsing “courtesy of choice” programs to spread the idea that smokers and 
nonsmokers can be both accommodated if mutual tolerance exists, or supporting 
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social movements that oppose the adoption of smoking bans (WHO, 2007). Future 
research can overcome this limitation by studying how organizations in contested 
industries respond to or shape their institutional environments (Berrone, Cruz, 
Gomez-Mejia, & Larraza-Kintana, 2010; Edelman, 1992; Oliver, 1991), and by 
contributing to the nascent stream of research on how organizations in the face of 
legitimacy threats defend their legitimacy (Lamin & Zaheer, 2012), restore their 
legitimacy (Pfarrer et al., 2008), or maintain their legitimacy (Desai, 2011). 
Moreover, given the limited availability of individual level data on the TCs, we 
could not further explore the implications of the mediated effect for individual 
organizations. However, future research could uncover the specific strategies that 
different organizations in the US tobacco industry have used to respond to an 
increasingly hostile and coercive business environment (Durand & Vergne, 2015). 
Furthermore, using the organization level of analysis will allow researchers to 
theorize and test firm level effects in relation to contestation, which we suggest is a 
promising area of inquiry. 
Third, the extent to which regulations are implemented and enforced is not 
addressed, and the study focuses on state-level regulations that may differ from 
county regulations in states where there is no preemption. The dynamics at the state-
level are extremely relevant to study as TCs’ influence on the policymaking process 
is considered to be greater at the state-level since TCs’ commit more resources to 
fight state or federal laws than to fight county regulations (ANR, 2004). However, 
future research could benefit from studying tobacco control regulations at the county 
level, as county level bans may have an important impact on TCs’ legitimacy and 
performance because they closely reflect local citizens’ societal expectations. 
Overall, comparing the micro and macro levels of analysis could lead to a better 
understanding of the relationship between the concepts of study.  
Finally, our study focuses on disentangling the dynamics of the US tobacco 
industry, which is a particular industry for several reasons. First, in the US the 
availability of other tobacco products such as smokeless tobacco or e-cigarettes will 
likely affect the overall consumption among cigarette consumers. However, given 
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that the market for smokeless tobacco experienced strong growth after 2011 and e-
cigarettes greatly expanded after 2012, we do not consider snus or vaping to be 
substitutes for smoking during the period of study (Euromonitor, 2012). 
Nevertheless, future research could benefit from uncovering the dynamics associated 
with the migration to other tobacco products. Second, the recent FDA regulatory 
authority over the US tobacco industry creates the potential for further regulations 
on tobacco advertising and manufacturing. As mentioned before, the regulatory 
oversight of the state and federal governments with respect to tobacco does not 
overlap. Nevertheless, future work exploring the attempts of the FDA to exercise its 
authority could shed light on how the process of regulation tobacco unfolds in 
parallel (or not) across the state and federal levels. Lastly, since the number of 
tobacco control regulations enacted by US states increased, TCs have actively 
pursued international markets and the sales of cigarettes made outside the US make 
a large percentage of their profits. Future research, therefore, could benefit from a 
multi-country-analysis that sheds light on whether the dynamics uncovered in this 




Figure 1: Smoking prevalence US nationwide 
 
Source: CDC (2012) 
 
 








Table 1: Youth Access Laws – Alciati Score 
Item Target 
Minimum age 
Prohibits the sale or distribution of any tobacco 
products to persons under 18 years of age. 
Packaging 
Prohibits all cigarette sales other than in a sealed 
package conforming to federal labeling requirements. 
Clerk intervention 
Prohibits access to or purchase of tobacco products 
without the intervention of a sales clerk. 
Photo identification 
Requires merchants to request photographic 
identification for customers who appear to be under 21 
years of age. 
Vending machines 
Total ban on sale of all tobacco products through 
vending machines in all locations. 
Free distribution 
Total ban on distribution of free tobacco samples, 
coupons for free samples, or rebates. 
Graduated penalties 
Establishes a system of graduated penalties or fines 
applicable to all youth access laws, to be levied within 
three years, plus possibility of suspension or 
revocation of a required tobacco retail license for 
repeated sales to minors. 
Random inspections 
Establishes random, unannounced inspections of 
retailers as part of the enforcement mechanism, using 
underage buyers for the purpose of identifying 
violators, and does not prohibit other use of minors to 
test compliance. 
Statewide enforcement 
Establishes a clearly designated statewide enforcement 
authority for sales. 





Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
 Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Tax-paid sales 10402 64.548 26.9 3.716 280.791 
Youth access laws 9180 15.142 6.211 0 31 
Smoking bans 9180 16.27 12.65 0 51 
Legitimacy 9792 -0.704 0.391 -1 1 
Taxes 10353 0.049 1.284 -8.7 22.5 
Democrats 10404 0.497 0.179 0 0.9 
FDA 10404 0.093 0.291 0 1 
Smoking prevalence 9744 21.660 3.6 9.1 32.6 
GDP per capita 10404 0.038 0.016 0.019 0.175 
Adults 10404 0.754 0.024 0.65 0.88 
 
Table 3: Correlations 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1. Youth access laws 1         
2. Smoking bans 0.146* 1        
3. Legitimacy -0.041* -0.007 1       
4. Taxes 0.032* 0.038* -0.062* 1      
5. Democrats 0.096* 0.082* 0.007 0.005 1     
6. FDA 0.129* 0.353* -0.042* 0.092* 0.058* 1    
7. Smoking prevalence -0.212* -0.577* 0.025* -0.043* 0.072* -0.325* 1   
8. GDP per capita 0.062* 0.256* -0.039* 0.035* -0.292* 0.191* -0.365* 1  
9. Adults 0.087* 0.101* -0.050* 0.026* 0.065* 0.108* -0.027* 0.389* 1 
Note: * correlations are significant at the .05 level 
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 1st Stage 
Model 4 
 2nd Stage 
Dependent variable Performance Performance Legitimacy Performance 
     
Youth access laws  -0.642** -0.004* 0.103 
  (0.226) (0.002) (0.131) 
Smoking bans  -0.044 0.001 0.039 
  (0.057) (0.001) (0.035) 
Legitimacy    11.823* 
    (5.830) 
Lung cancer deaths   -0.116***  
   (0.006)  
Democrats -0.465 -2.931 0.254* -44.715** 
 (10.992) (10.934) (0.124) (17.184) 
Taxes 0.012 0.020 -0.011*** 0.202 
 (0.209) (0.208) (0.001) (0.201) 
FDA -6.023*** -5.389** -0.170*** 0.022 
 (1.596) (1.689) (0.007) (1.110) 
Smoking prevalence 2.184*** 2.174*** -0.013*** 0.142 
 (0.461) (0.304) (0.004) (0.195) 
GDP per capita -566.330* -341.368+ 10.796*** 557.499** 
 (247.557) (173.143) (2.285) (212.752) 
Adults -18.393 -1.226 -0.655 34.015* 
 (39.915) (33.127) (0.338) (17.209) 
Constant 53.199+ 42.720   
 (30.234) (27.469)   
     
Month dummies   Included Included 
State time trends   Included Included 
Fixed effects Included Included Included Included 
Observations 9,744 9,156 9,156 9,156 
Number of stateid  51 51 51 51 
Robust standard errors clustered by state in parentheses. 




Table 5: Robustness Checks 
 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
Dependent variable Performance Performance Legitimacy Performance Legitimacy Performance Legitimacy Performance 
Youth access laws 0.103 0.099 -0.003* 0.086 -0.003** 0.089 -0.004* 0.094 
(0.131) (0.131) (0.001) (0.130)  0.008  (0.131) (0.002) (0.131) 
Smoking bans 0.039 0.041 0.001 0.043 0.001 0.044 0.001 0.042 
(0.035) (0.035) (0.001) (0.035) (0.001) (0.033) (0.001) (0.034) 
Legitimacy 11.823* 11.099*  11.686*  10.153* -0.131*** 9.204* 
(5.830) (5.498)  (5.784)  (5.056) (0.001) (4.570) 
Legitimacy lagged        1.223+ 
        (0.626) 
Lung cancer deaths   -0.117***  -0.135***  -0.148***  
  (0.004)  (0.005)  (0.006)  
Democrats -44.715** -44.375** 0.178+ -43.785* 0.120 -42.932* 0.289* -44.376** 
(17.184) (17.169) (0.101) (17.167) (0.083) (17.082) (0.128) (17.134) 
Taxes 0.202 0.193 -0.007*** 0.154 0.001 0.061 -0.012*** 0.180 
(0.201) (0.199) (0.001) (0.192) (0.001) (0.186) (0.003) (0.196) 
FDA 0.022 -0.019 -0.200*** 0.354 -0.185*** -0.105 -0.184*** -0.289 
(1.110) (1.096) (0.005) (1.251) (0.007) (1.064) (0.007) (1.002) 
Smoking prevalence 0.142 0.132 -0.008** 0.080 -0.014*** 0.128 -0.013** 0.105 
(0.195) (0.193) (0.003) (0.185) (0.004) (0.190) (0.003) (0.189) 
GDP per capita 557.499** 564.339** 6.604*** 607.978** 12.276*** 560.504** 11.652*** 577.766** 
(212.752) (211.236) (1.768) (204.420) (2.056) (211.495) (2.325) (207.848) 
Adults 34.015* 33.387+ -0.433 31.326+ -0.187 28.168+ -0.666+ 32.399+ 
(17.209) (17.081) (0.276) (16.598) (0.278) (16.671) (0.333) (16.743) 
Observations 9,156 9,156 9,156 9,156 9,156 9,156 9,156 9,156 
Number of stateid 51 51 51 51 51 51 51 51 
All models include month dummies, state time trends, and fixed effects. 
Robust standard errors clustered by state in parentheses.  







PERFORMING BY ADHERING? A REVIEW AND META-
ANALYSIS OF LEGITIMACYa 
 
Abstract 
This study synthesizes research that uses the construct of legitimacy in the 
organization and management literature. The first part of this study presents an 
integrative review that proposes a classification framework of the legitimacy 
literature depending on whether legitimacy is categorized as an antecedent, outcome, 
moderator, or mechanism. This review: i) identifies, organizes, and summarizes 
existing empirical and conceptual research on legitimacy, ii) disentangles legitimacy 
from cognate concepts, iii) provides a coherent framework for understanding 
legitimacy; and, iv) proposes a future research agenda. The second part of this study 
uses meta-analysis techniques in order to uncover the strength of the relationship 
between legitimacy and performance. By doing so, this study specifically focuses on 
testing whether legitimacy differentially contributes to financial performance. The 
results reveal that the bivariate correlation between legitimacy and performance is 
on average positive but small, and indicate the presence of unobserved moderator 
variables in this relationship. Based on these results, and building on our review of 
the legitimacy literature, we propose a coherent framework that provides guidance 
for advancing research using the concept of legitimacy, and identify a future 
research agenda. Overall, this study contributes to the literature by synthesizing 
existing research that has tackled the construct of legitimacy, by examining the 
performance consequences of legitimacy, by proposing a framework to understand 
this concept, and by identifying a number of important issues that merit further 
scholarly research. 
                                                     




In recent years, the concept of legitimacy has received considerable 
attention and a prominent place in the organization and management scholarship. 
While legitimacy has been a central concept in political science (e.g. Locke) and 
sociology (e.g. Weber) for a long time, it only gained traction in the organization 
and management literature with the publication of the seminal articles by Meyer and 
Rowan (1977), and DiMaggio and Powell (1983), and has been increasingly central 
since then. In spite of the prevalence and widespread interest in legitimacy, 
surprisingly there is no systematic review of this significant and important concept 
that specifically targets organization and management scholarship. In fact, most 
efforts to advance the concept of legitimacy remain at the conceptual level 
(Bitektine & Haack, 2015; Bitektine, 2011; Deephouse & Suchman, 2008; Johnson, 
Dowd, & Ridgeway, 2006; Suchman, 1995; Tost, 2011), and there has been no 
attempt to provide a broad and thorough review of theoretical and empirical research 
on legitimacy in organization and management scholarship.  
The diversity and fragmentation of research using the concept of legitimacy, 
lead us to believe that the time is ripe for a review that synthesizes both conceptual 
and empirical literature using the concept of legitimacy in organization and 
management research. Although research using the concept of legitimacy has 
surged, and despite apparent consensus on legitimacy being understood as an 
organization’s right to exist and conduct operations (Metzler, 2001), a lack of 
consensus exists on three key issues regarding legitimacy. First, scholars have 
identified a myriad of determinants of legitimacy, but are divided regarding the role 
of different means to achieve legitimacy. Second, uncertainty exists regarding the 
use of legitimacy as either a moderator or a mediator in the relationship between 
different concepts of interest for organization and management scholars. Third, 
although several studies have examined the performance consequences of 
legitimacy, the evidence concerning this relationship remains inconclusive. The 
substantial but inconclusive evidence from prior research on the implications of 
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legitimacy, especially in relation to the performance consequences of legitimacy, 
results in a scarce understanding of the concept of legitimacy as well as the 
outcomes of legitimacy. Thus, the purpose of this study is to shed light on these 
areas by conducting a review of theoretical and empirical literature using the 
concept of legitimacy, and by studying the effect of legitimacy on performance 
using meta-analysis techniques.  
The first part of this study presents an integrative review of the legitimacy 
literature. We first address the question of what legitimacy is and disentangle 
legitimacy from the cognate concepts of reputation and status. We then propose a 
classification framework for the literature depending on whether legitimacy is used 
as an antecedent, outcome, moderator, or mechanism. Next, we provide a 
description of the theoretical foundations and an overview of existing empirical 
evidence on the construct of legitimacy. Given that research studying the outcomes 
of legitimacy has mainly focused on the performance consequences of legitimacy, 
the second part of this study presents the results of a meta-analysis on the 
relationship between legitimacy and performance. We chose to focus on this 
particular relationship because of the prevalence of studies that examine 
performance as an outcome of legitimacy. Our results show that the correlation 
between legitimacy and performance is positive but small, and we find that 
unobserved moderators matter given that the correlation varies more than expected 
across studies. Based on these results and on the insights gained from the review of 
the literature, we propose a coherent framework that advances the concept of 
legitimacy. Lastly, we highlight and identify underdeveloped issues and propose a 
research agenda that can be addressed by future research efforts. In sum, our study 
not only synthesizes existing research using the construct of legitimacy in the 
organization and management literature, and links legitimacy and performance using 




The contribution of this study is threefold. First, we shed light on the use of 
legitimacy by organization and management scholars. We do so by undertaking a 
comprehensive and encompassing review of conceptual and empirical literature that 
uses the legitimacy construct. Second, through a meta-analysis, we assess evidence 
on the relationship between legitimacy and performance more comprehensively than 
prior work has done. Lastly, we organize and synthetize prior research in an 
overarching theoretical framework and provide directions for future research. 
Overall, our goal is to provide organization and management researchers with a 
timely review that analyzes and details the current state of the literature on the 
construct of legitimacy, as well as with a meta-analysis that synthetizes existing 
evidence on the relationship between legitimacy and performance. 
Part I: A Review of Legitimacy in Organization and Management Research 
To gain an encompassing perspective on the legitimacy literature, we 
identified all articles published since 1960 until 2015, with the explicit mention of 
the word legitimacy in the abstract or keywords. We focused our search on the 
following journals: Academy of Management Journal, Academy of Management 
Review, Administrative Science Quarterly, Journal of International Business 
Studies, Journal of Management, Journal of Management Studies, Management 
Science, Organization Science, Organization Studies, Strategic Management 
Journal, and Strategic Organization. To identify the relevant studies to be included 
in the review, we read the abstracts of all the 236 articles retrieved from these 
journals and dropped articles that use legitimacy in an everyday or nonacademic 
manner. To validate our sample, in a second phase we ran another search searching 
for the word legit* (to also retrieve studies on legitimation, legitimate, etc.) in the 
abstract or keywords, which expanded our search to capture a broader sample of 
articles and lead us to examine seven additional studies.1 This two-step procedure 
resulted in 127 studies.  
                                                     
1 See a more detailed description under Part II.  
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We included in our review theoretical articles that made a significant 
theoretical contribution to legitimacy research, as well as empirical articles that used 
legitimacy as one of the main concepts of study or that included a theoretical 
argument concerning legitimacy. In conducting our review, we followed prior 
review studies and coded each article along several dimensions of interest: i) level of 
analysis; ii) theoretical perspective; iii) measures of legitimacy (e.g. adoption, 
organizational linkages, or media perception); and iv) antecedents (i.e. predictors of 
legitimacy), outcomes (i.e. consequences of legitimacy), or legitimacy as a 
moderator/mechanism. We classified studies as antecedents when legitimacy is the 
dependent variable of analysis. Outcomes are those studies where legitimacy is an 
independent variable. For papers that use the concept of legitimacy as the 
mechanism by which one variable has an effect on another variable, we differentiate 
between those that include a theoretical argument on legitimacy but no empirical 
measures (i.e. mechanism), from those that operationalize the concept of legitimacy 
(i.e. moderator or mediator). Classifying studies as either antecedents, moderators, 
mechanisms, or outcomes of legitimacy is important because, to some extent, 
theoretical perspectives and measures employed in studies using legitimacy tend to 
vary across organization and management research. Additionally, this classification 
helped us to summarize existing work and to identify promising avenues for future 
research.  
What is Legitimacy? 
While the concept of legitimacy has been central to the organization and 
management scholarship, its use in empirical research remains controversial 
(Bitektine, 2011). In its most basic definition, legitimacy refers to the societal 
acceptance of an organization based on its conformance with relevant rules, norms 
and values, and cultural cognitive frameworks. Although multiple definitions of 
legitimacy have emerged (see Figure 1), the majority of authors use the definition 
given by Suchman (1995: 574): “a generalized perception or assumption that the 
actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially 
constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions”. In contrast, the 
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growing number of empirical studies using the construct of legitimacy has not lead 
to a broad agreement on the operationalization of this construct (Vergne, 2011). 
Within the wide range of proposed measures of legitimacy, the three most common 
are: adoption of codes or certificates (Bansal & Hunter, 2003), media perception (i.e. 
Janis-Fadner coefficient of imbalance (Deephouse, 1996, 1999)), and organizational 
linkages (Baum & Oliver, 1992; Ruef & Scott, 1998; Singh et al., 1986).  
Insert Figure 1 about here 
Despite being widely used, the definition of legitimacy provided by 
Suchman (1995) only partially captures the intricate nature of the legitimacy 
construct. In fact, Suchman (1995) identifies three broad types of legitimacy, each of 
which is aligned with his definition of legitimacy but rests on a different pillar. The 
first type, pragmatic legitimacy, is bestowed to the organization by its stakeholders 
in terms of the benefit or value that the focal organization generates for them. The 
second type, moral legitimacy (also referred to as normative legitimacy), entails a 
positive evaluation of the organization and its activities based on whether these are 
“the right things to do”. Cognitive legitimacy, the third type, is based on taken-for-
grantedness and comprehensibility of the organization. The intricate nature of 
legitimacy was identified prior to the work of Suchman (1995), as Aldrich and Fiol 
(1994) already distinguished between cognitive and sociopolitical legitimacy in their 
study of the legitimacy processes surrounding industry creation. They define 
cognitive legitimacy in terms of taken-for-grantedness, and sociopolitical legitimacy 
in terms of “the extent of conformance to recognized principles or accepted rules 
and standards” (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994: 646). Scott (2008) also identified three types 
of legitimacy: regulative, normative, and cultural-cognitive. The types of legitimacy 
proposed by Scott (2008) are to a certain degree in line with Suchman (1995): the 
regulative emphasizes conformity to rules, the normative is morally governed and 
associated with norms and values, and the cultural-cognitive stresses shared 
understandings and points to taken-for-grantedness. Hence, although broad and 
widely used, the definition of legitimacy provided by Suchman (1995) does not refer 
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to one specific type of legitimacy, as it rather captures the construct in its most 
overarching meaning. This is a double-edged sword: on the one hand, the 
convergence on a definition of legitimacy is positive because it indicates the 
development of the field; but on the other hand, this convergence gives rise to 
studies that either overlook the different types of legitimacy or do not specify the 
type of legitimacy that is being examined.   
Building on the work of Aldrich and Fiol (1994), Suchman (1995), and 
Scott (2008), a number of scholars have attempted to tackle the complex nature of 
this concept by identifying different dimensions of legitimacy or by building on the 
types proposed by the aforementioned scholars. Examples of research that builds on 
the types of legitimacy identified by early scholars are the study by Barron (1998) 
on moral and pragmatic legitimacy, Zimmerman and Zeitz’s (2002) study on 
sociopolitical and regulative legitimacy, and the research by Golant and Sillince 
(2007) on cognitive and sociopolitical legitimacy. Similarly, research that suggests 
new dimensions of legitimacy is somewhat aligned with the work of early scholars. 
For instance, Deephouse (1996), proposes media legitimacy along with regulatory 
legitimacy to differentiate legitimacy in the eyes of the general public from that 
bestowed by regulators; however, his conceptualization of these dimensions remains 
closely aligned to that of normative and regulative legitimacy. Other scholars have 
used the aforementioned dimensions of legitimacy but have also differentiated 
across levels of analysis. For example, Ruef and Scott (1998) identify managerial 
and technical legitimacy as related to the technical and managerial levels within 
organizations. Similarly,  Kostova and coauthors (2002; 1999), differentiate between 
internal and external legitimacy. Moreover, scholars have recently developed other 
dimensions of legitimacy to better fit new empirical settings or phenomena that are 
being studied, such as corporate environmental legitimacy (Bansal & Clelland, 
2004b), cultural legitimacy (Archibald, 2004), alliance legitimacy (Dacin, Oliver, & 
Roy, 2007), and professional legitimacy (Deephouse & Suchman, 2008). Therefore, 
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the evolution of research on the concept of legitimacy has resulted in a myriad of 
legitimacy dimensions or types, as listed in Table 1.  
Insert Table 1 about here 
When putting together the various types of legitimacy identified in the 
previous paragraph, we find that the different typologies proposed are quite similar. 
The highest level of agreement between authors is on the concept of cognitive 
legitimacy being based on taken-for-grantedness, which suggests agreement on 
legitimacy evoking a “second order of meaning” (Berger & Luckmann, 1966). With 
respect to the concept of normative legitimacy, besides some disagreement on the 
name (i.e. it has also been called moral or media legitimacy) researchers seem to 
agree that this type of legitimacy is based on societal norms and values, which 
further supports the idea of legitimacy reflecting perceived consonance with a moral 
system that grants social acceptability and credibility. Therefore, there is consensus 
on the definitions of normative and cognitive types of legitimacy, even if there is 
some variation on the labels. However, prior studies differ in their definition of other 
types of legitimacy; whereas for Aldrich & Fiol (1994), Deephouse (1996), and 
Scott (2008) the regulative emphasis is on conformance to rules and thus linked to 
the notion of legitimacy introduced by Weber, for Suchman (1995) the concept of 
pragmatic legitimacy rests on the self-interest of the audience that bestows 
legitimacy. Thus, the notion of pragmatic legitimacy proposed by Suchman (1995) is 
related to the differential audiences identified by Ruef and Scott (1998) and Kostova 
and coauthors (2002; 1999). Nevertheless, we argue that it is possible and desirable 
to reconcile the types of legitimacy identified by prior research, because doing so 
provides a greater degree of conceptual clarity on the concept of legitimacy. 
Together, prior scholarship attests to the need of identifying the audience that 
confers legitimacy (i.e. internal vs. external), and simultaneously suggest the 
existence of four different basic types of legitimacy: pragmatic, regulative, 
normative/moral, and cultural-cognitive. On a continuum of types, we suggest that 
cultural-cognitive legitimacy is the deepest, and therefore the hardest to first obtain 
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and instill, and second to manipulate, and that pragmatic legitimacy is the most 
concrete and attainable. Although, in most cases, there is no explicit 
operationalization mentioned in association with these different dimensions of 
legitimacy, Table 1 provides a selected sample of measures that have been used by 
prior literature. 
What Legitimacy is not.  
Over the past few decades, scholars have used cognate concepts such as 
reputation and status when conceptualizing legitimacy. While there have been recent 
efforts to disentangle these potentially overlapping social evaluations of 
organizations (Bitektine, 2011; Deephouse & Suchman, 2008; Devers, Dewett, 
Mishina, & Belsito, 2009), it remains that studies tend to conflate legitimacy with 
the aforementioned concepts. Moreover, even though reviews of the literature for 
these cognate concepts exist (see Lange, Lee, and Dai (2011) on reputation, and 
Piazza and Castellucci (2013) on status), there is no review that specifically focuses 
on the construct of legitimacy, which is striking given how ubiquitously it is used. 
Thus, we deem it vital to disentangle the various concepts from one another while 
our focus is on specifically reviewing the concept of legitimacy.  
Recent studies define reputation as the recognition accorded to an 
organization’s activities and outputs on the basis of its prior performance (Jensen & 
Roy, 2008; Pollock, Lee, Jin, & Lashley, 2015). While reputation is used by 
stakeholders as a signal of an organization’s future behavior or unobserved 
characteristics based on its past behavior and observable characteristics (Lange et 
al., 2011), legitimacy is the assumption that an organization conforms to the relevant 
norms, values, and cultural-cognitive frameworks. Moreover, legitimacy is a multi-
dimensional construct limited to the types presented previously, whereas reputation 
can be assessed concerning virtually any organizational attribute (Deephouse & 
Carter, 2005). Hence, while legitimacy emphasizes social acceptance resulting from 
adherence to social norms and expectations, reputation alludes to relative 
comparisons among organizations on various attributes (Deephouse & Suchman, 
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2008). However, as is the case for legitimacy, despite previous efforts a great deal of 
diversity in the conceptualization and measurement of reputation remains (Barnett & 
Pollock, 2012; Walker, 2010). 
Although a plethora of definitions of organizational status exist in extant 
literature (Piazza & Castellucci, 2013), status is generally defined as a position in 
social system, primarily derived from accumulated acts of deference (Jensen & Roy, 
2008; Sauder, Lynn, & Podolny, 2012). In other words, status is based on the 
socially agreed-upon rank of the organization relative to other organizations in its 
environment (Washington & Zajac, 2005), whereas legitimacy is a form of 
evaluation that emphasizes the social acceptance of the organization which is gained 
by complying with socially constructed expectations. The fundamental difference 
between status and legitimacy is that whereas legitimacy emphasizes similarity 
across organizations, status focuses on differentiating organizations by rank ordering 
them (Piazza & Castellucci, 2013).  
Other cognate concepts to the concept of legitimacy, such as organizational 
identity and organizational image, are more distinct, and so less often conflated with 
legitimacy in the extant literature. Organizational identity is the perception of an 
organization’s central, distinctive, and enduring features in the eyes of its members 
(Albert & Whetten, 1985). Similarly, organizational image refers to organizational 
members’ perception of how an organization is judged by outsiders (Dutton & 
Dukerich, 1991). Therefore, though organizational identity has been conceptualized 
as a signal of organizational legitimacy (Smith, 2011), the most salient difference 
between legitimacy and the constructs of organizational identity and image is that 
while identity and image are evaluations by insiders, legitimacy is an evaluation 
made by outsiders.     
The previous discussion led us to believe that the theoretical intersection 
between legitimacy and other related concepts could provide an interesting avenue 
for future research. Although scholarship has made progress in defining the 
similarities and differences of legitimacy and cognate concepts, it remains necessary 
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to disentangle how each of these concepts differ from legitimacy. In specific, a 
question that emerges is the possible fundamental difference between the 
determinants and consequences of legitimacy and its related concepts (i.e. 
reputation, status, etc.). Moreover, the prevalence of studies that examine the 
relationships between legitimacy, reputation, and/or status has not resulted in a clear 
understanding of their dynamics. For instance, whereas Rindova and coauthors 
(2005) identify status to be an antecedent of reputation, Rao (1994) argues that 
reputation is the outcome of the process of legitimation. Hence, research that not 
only compares the different effects of the aforementioned societal evaluations on 
performance, but that also captures the missing links in connection to these 
relationships can advance our understanding of each of these concepts. Overall, 
research that compares these cognate concepts will further advance the precision and 
depth with which the concept of legitimacy is used by organization and management 
scholarship.  
Organizational Legitimacy 
One of the principal differences in how the concept of legitimacy is 
employed in organization and management research is the level of analysis at which 
it is operationalized. We identified three levels at which legitimacy is used: macro 
(i.e. field / industry / population); meso (i.e. organization); and, micro (i.e. 
individual). Given that our interest is in organization and management research, 
studies that explore legitimacy at the micro-level (e.g. individual-level legitimacy) 
are outside the scope of this review.2  
At the macro-level, researchers have studied legitimacy dynamics in 
organizational fields or organizational populations. With respect to the antecedents 
of legitimacy, macro-level studies have identified how organizational (Desai, 2011; 
Lee & Pennings, 2002) and industry actions (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994), as well as 
individual efforts (Anteby, 2010; Foreman & Whetten, 2002) and national processes 
                                                     




(Judge, Douglas, & Kutan, 2008) are fundamental to the construction of a field’s 
legitimacy. In relation to macro-level outcomes, besides the long-established 
research that explains the survival of populations (Dobrev & Gotsopoulos, 2010; 
Dobrev et al., 2006; Shane & Foo, 1999) and widespread adoption rates (Delmestri 
& Wezel, 2011; Hannan et al., 1995; Haveman, 1993; Li et al., 2007); scholars have 
used legitimacy to examine more specific outcomes such as market entry decisions 
(Chan, Makino, & Isobe, 2013) and network endurance (Human & Provan, 2000).  
Aside from the importance of the concepts of organizational field for 
institutional theory and of population for organizational ecology, the main level of 
analysis that is often times employed in organization and management research is 
that of the organization. Given that multilevel studies are uncommon in legitimacy 
research, we focused our efforts in reviewing studies at the meso level. Below we 
review the most relevant studies on the antecedents, moderators, mechanisms, and 
outcomes of legitimacy at the organizational (i.e. meso) level. 
Antecedents of Legitimacy 
In this section, we identify the different antecedents proposed by prior 
research as fundamental to the construction of legitimacy. An important caveat is 
that besides studies on how new ventures acquire legitimacy (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994; 
Gulati & Higgins, 2003; Lounsbury & Glynn, 2001; Zimmerman & Zeitz, 2002; 
Zott & Huy, 2007), prior research has hardly empirically tested legitimacy as a 
dependent variable and has instead looked at the different antecedents in the process 
of acquisition of legitimacy from a theoretical perspective.  
The classical work of Meyer and Rowan (1977) suggests that conformity to 
the institutional environment in which an organization operates is an important 
antecedent of legitimacy. According to DiMaggio and Powell (1983), conformity 
results in isomorphism, which refers to the similarity of an organization’s 
characteristics (e.g. structure, strategies, and processes) to those of other relevant 
organizations in its environment. A central tenet of institutional theory is that 
isomorphism results in organizational legitimacy by making organizations more 
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similar as they acquire taken-for-granted structures and strategies. Empirical support 
for this premise was first provided by the classical study of Tolbert and Zucker 
(1983) on the diffusion of civil service reform. In their study, the authors posit that 
for early adopters the adoption of an innovation is driven by performance motives, 
whereas for late adopters it is driven by legitimacy concerns. In the context of 
commercial banks, Deephouse (1996) provides evidence that isomorphism results in 
regulative legitimacy, but finds no effect on normative legitimacy. By contrast, 
Glynn and Abzug (2002) find that isomorphism has a positive effect on legitimacy 
as it increases the public’s ability to comprehend the organizations in question. 
Overall, previous research has suggested that isomorphism is an antecedent of 
legitimacy as it demonstrates “the organization's worthiness and acceptability" 
(Oliver, 1991: 158).  
Another mean to achieve legitimacy that is somewhat related to conformity 
is decoupling. According to Meyer and Rowan (1977), organizations have to comply 
with institutional pressures that may reduce their efficiency; therefore, in order to 
mitigate these negative effects, organizations may choose to decouple their practices 
from their structure when complying with institutional pressures. However, 
decoupling has an unintended consequence for organizational legitimacy, as 
demonstrated by MacLean and Behnam (2010) in their study of a large insurance 
company. These authors show that, in the long run, decoupling may become a threat 
to organizational legitimacy when related to conformance with regulative forces. 
Ashforth and Gibbs (1990) also recognize the risks associated with decoupling, as 
they posit that this practice may result in a series of vicious circles that ultimately 
decrease organizational legitimacy. Recent research has also identified a differential 
effect of decoupling on legitimacy dependent on the role of significant audiences 
that are more knowledgeable about a given field -and therefore are more likely to 
identify decoupling practices-, and that have different orientations towards what is 
legitimate (Lamin & Zaheer, 2012).  
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A current stream of research challenges the prevailing view on conformity 
by suggesting that more active strategies than conformance and decoupling may also 
result in organizational legitimacy. In a recent study, Benner and Ranganathan 
(2012) capture how the use of an active legitimacy enhancing activity (i.e. share 
repurchase announcements that signal alignment with shareholders’ interests), 
offsets the threats to legitimacy caused by negative analyst’s recommendations. 
More recently, the use of other active strategies such as using political ties (Guo, Xu, 
& Jacobs, 2014) or engaging in social media strategies (Castello, Etter, & Nielsen, 
2015), have also been found to be antecedents of legitimacy. Notwithstanding, the 
effects of active strategies (e.g. manipulation techniques) on legitimacy have been 
studied since the early work of Elsbach and Sutton (1992). These authors show the 
usefulness of impression management tactics for organizations who seek legitimacy. 
Their argument is that organizations require more than passive support, as they also 
need to gain active support and endorsement from the critical audiences that bestow 
legitimacy. Therefore, according to Elsbach and Sutton (1992), an organization can 
use impression management tactics to gain the visibility or attention needed to 
become legitimate.  
Elsbach (1994) further developed the use of active strategies by focusing on 
discourse as a tactic to manage organizational legitimacy. The role of discourse was 
also studied by Vaara and coauthors who examine discursive legitimation strategies 
in and through the media (2006), and specifically the use of these strategies in 
legitimating multinational corporations (2008). Similarly, Phillips and coauthors 
(2004) develop a discursive model of institutionalization that highlights the 
production of texts for legitimacy and/or sense-making purposes, while Etzion and 
Ferraro (2010) study the role of analogies to existing institutions in providing 
legitimacy during institutionalization processes. Lastly, Suddaby and Greenwood 
(2005) describe the role of rhetoric in legitimating institutional change. Although 
these studies identify a myriad of active strategies to gain legitimacy by means of 
discourse, they posit a general idea that departs from a passive view of organizations 
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as recipients of societal evaluations and depicts organizations as active participants 
that shape societal perceptions in their quest for legitimacy.   
A different perspective, Resource Dependence Theory, suggests that an 
important antecedent of legitimacy is an organizations’ engagement in inter-
organizational arrangements such as board interlocks, alliances, joint ventures, in-
sourcing, and mergers and acquisitions (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Drees and 
Heugens (2013), outline three mechanisms that enable organizations to become 
legitimate through the formation of publicly validated or endorsed inter-
organizational arrangements. First, inter-organizational arrangements enable 
organizations to learn and adopt legitimate practices and structures (Haunschild, 
1993). Second, organizations can increase their legitimacy by associating with 
members of legitimated categories (Zuckerman, 1999). Third, linkages or ties with 
other organizations that are already legitimate result in legitimacy by association 
(Baum & Oliver, 1991). This last mechanism was further explored by Dacin, Oliver, 
and Roy (2007) who identified the conditions under which different types of 
legitimacy may be an outcome of strategic alliances. These authors identify alliance 
formation as an antecedent of legitimacy, and define different types of legitimacy 
that are sought when entering into an alliance (e.g. market, relational, social, 
investment, and alliance). In sum, inter-organizational arrangements are an 
antecedent of legitimacy for they provide the visibility necessary to the 
characteristics, practices, and associations that award legitimacy to the focal 
organization because of their social, symbolic, and signaling characteristics.   
All in all, prior work has provided support to the core argument of 
institutional theory stating that the institutional environment in which organizations 
operate has a profound influence on their legitimacy (Deephouse, 1996; Glynn & 
Abzug, 2002; Westphal, Gulati, & Shortell, 1997). Research on the antecedents of 
legitimacy has shown that legitimacy arises from a wide range of sources such as 
linkages (Pollock & Gulati, 2007), certification (Sine et al., 2007), mimicry (Khaire, 
2010), and discourse (Lounsbury & Glynn, 2001). The ways in which organizations 
124 
 
actively acquire legitimacy have also been revealed; from the influence of 
impression management tactics (Elsbach, 1994) and social media (Castello et al., 
2015), to that of inter-organizational arrangements such as board interlocks, 
alliances, joint ventures, in-sourcing, and mergers and acquisitions (Drees & 
Heugens, 2013). Lastly, a few studies have explored how organizational legitimacy 
is generated from unexpected sources such as illegitimate actions (Elsbach & Sutton, 
1992) and threatened by other sources such as decoupling (MacLean & Behnam, 
2010); which has given rise to research that investigates  the strategies used by 
organizations to defend (Lamin & Zaheer, 2012), repair (Arthaud-Day, Certo, 
Dalton, & Dalton, 2006), or maintain (Benner & Ranganathan, 2012) their 
legitimacy. Nevertheless, opportunities to uncover unexplored sources remain, 
especially in relation to the micro foundations of legitimacy (Bitektine & Haack, 
2015) and to the role of legitimacy in networks (Cattani, Ferriani, Negro, & Perretti, 
2008; Human & Provan, 2000). Moreover, based on the idea that possibly the 
antecedents of deeper legitimacy types (i.e. cultural-cognitive or normative) differ 
from those of more superficial, specific ones such as pragmatic or alliance 
legitimacy, opportunities exist to uncover the different antecedents of the several 
types of legitimacy listed in Table 1. 
Legitimacy as a Mechanism 
 Several studies use legitimacy as a theoretical mechanism that mediates the 
relationship between two other variables. In these studies, authors theorize that 
legitimacy is the mechanism by which a certain predictor results in a given 
consequence, but do not operationalize or measure legitimacy directly. For instance, 
Ozcan, Shukla, and Tyler (1997) explore the determinants of organizational 
effectiveness and efficiency in a study of community mental health centers. In line 
with Fennell and Alexander (1987) and Smith (2011), these authors conclude that 
the legitimacy gained by conforming to institutional pressures does not necessarily 
enhance organizational efficiency, which following Tolbert and Zucker (1983), leads 
them to argue that legitimacy and efficiency are independent concepts, even though 
no direct measure of legitimacy is included in their study. Similarly, Chan and 
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Makino (2007) argue that foreign subsidiary ownership serves a legitimating 
function, as it allows MNC to simultaneously gain legitimacy externally and manage 
it internally, but do not empirically test this mediated effect. In a qualitative study, 
Zott and Huy (2007) identify how entrepreneurial symbolic actions such as 
conveying the entrepreneur’s personal credibility, professional organizing, 
organizational achievement, and the quality of stakeholder relationships, create the 
legitimacy used by nascent organizations to facilitate resource acquisition, but 
provide no empirical support for their argument. Recently, Qian and Wang (2011) 
suggest that sociopolitical legitimacy mediates the relationship between corporate 
social performance (hereafter CSP) and financial performance, as it elicits positive 
responses from stakeholders and access to political support, but their argument 
remains to be empirically tested. Thus, most studies do not measure legitimacy 
directly but have used other variables as proxies or have assumed that legitimacy has 
an effect.  
Hence, our review suggests that several studies have used the construct of 
legitimacy as an explanatory mechanism for the relationship between two variables, 
rather than as a variable in hypotheses testing. This ‘taken-for-grantedness’ of the 
concept of legitimacy provides opportunities for future research to focus efforts on a 
complete and careful operationalization of this construct as a mechanism. 
Specifically, a first step in order to further advance our understanding of the role of 
legitimacy as a mechanism is to operationalize legitimacy as a mediator when 
studying a multivariate unidirectional relationship between concepts. In other words, 
when legitimacy is identified as the mechanism that underlies a causal relationship 
between two variables (i.e. the effect of one variable on another is theorized to exist 
due to legitimacy), mediating effects need to be tested in order to show that 
legitimacy is indeed the explanatory link or the intermediate variable between the 
concepts of interest. Thus, the operationalization of legitimacy as a mediator will 
permit a refined understanding of the role of legitimacy as a mechanism. The 
challenge associated with empirically testing the mediating role of legitimacy is that 
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doing so requires careful attention to possible endogeneity issues, most likely due to 
the presence of simultaneity or reverse causality (Bascle, 2008).       
Legitimacy as a Moderator 
 Scholars have rarely examined the role of legitimacy as a moderator, and 
those that have done so, have mainly used legitimacy as a moderator in studies 
where the outcome is a measure of performance.  For instance, Koh, Qian, and 
Wang (2013) study the different role of pragmatic and moral legitimacy in the 
relationship between corporate social performance (CSP) and firm value. Their 
argument being that pragmatic and moral legitimacy are essential if CSP is to be 
beneficial; in other words, these authors find that the benefits from CSP depend on 
stakeholder’s acceptance and support (i.e. legitimacy). In a similar vein, Petkova, 
Rindova, and Gupta (2012) show that media legitimation moderates the relationship 
between sensegiving activities and the level of funding obtained by venture capital 
investors. These authors also propose that the attention by different types of media 
(i.e. specialized vs general) has a differential effect on the venture’s perceived value. 
Similarly, Bell, Filatotchev, and Aguilera (2014) study how the effect of IPO’s 
governance mechanisms on investor value perceptions is contingent on regulative 
and normative legitimacy. They find that “nested” legitimacy – firm level normative 
legitimacy and country level regulative legitimacy - explains variations in the effect 
of IPO governance mechanisms on investor’s value perceptions. Recently, Cordeiro 
and Tewari (2015) propose that market legitimacy moderates the relationship 
between environmental disclosure and investors’ reaction, for the stock market 
reacts positively to environmental investments by firms that are deemed as 
legitimate. In a somewhat different work, Desai (2008) studies the moderating effect 
of normative legitimacy on the relationship between risk taking and organizational 
performance. Desai (2008) proposes that for organizations performing below 
aspiration levels, legitimacy gives the confidence necessary to take risks that result 
in above aspiration performance. Overall, the moderating role of legitimacy has 
hardly been tested, although some isolated progress has been done by different 
streams of research, such as CSR, corporate governance, risk taking, and 
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sensegiving. Whereas this section identified the moderated effect of legitimacy on 
performance, the following section is oriented towards understanding whether 
legitimacy alone may be adequate to determine organizational performance.  
Outcomes of Legitimacy 
 Legitimacy has been used across various theoretical perspectives to explain 
a wide range of phenomena, such as entrepreneurship (Lounsbury & Glynn, 2001; 
Maguire, Hardy, & Lawrence, 2004; Sine et al., 2007), stakeholders success (Agle, 
Mitchell, & Sonnenfeld, 2012; Eesley & Lenox, 2006), innovation (Rao, Chandy, & 
Prabhu, 2008), multinational enterprises (Bhanji & Oxley, 2013; Hillman & Wan, 
2013; Kostova & Zaheer, 1999), and institutionalization processes (Sherer & Lee, 
2002). However, the original argument by Meyer and Rowan (1977) relates to the 
survival benefits of legitimacy. Meyer and Rowan (1977) argue that legitimacy 
considerations are independent from efficiency concerns as organizational survival 
also depends on gaining legitimacy. Empirical support for this basic premise has 
been found by studies focusing on the impact of legitimacy on organizational 
survival (Deephouse & Suchman, 2008). For instance, Baum and Oliver (1991), 
show that institutional attachments contribute to organizational survival when 
investigating the influence of organizational linkages in Toronto childcare services. 
Ruef and Scott (1998) find as well that US hospitals considered to be legitimate 
enhance their probability of survival. Similarly, Singh, Tucker, and House (1986) 
found that organizational legitimacy decreases organizational death rates. Therefore, 
prior research has empirically supported the basic premise of organizations need to 
be deemed legitimate in order to survive.  
Although traditionally institutional theory literature has argued that an 
organization’s quest for legitimacy is not driven by the enhancement of efficiency or 
effectiveness (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 1977), research has 
departed from this early argument with the premise that legitimacy matters for 
performance (Oliver, 1991; Suddaby, Foster, & Trank, 2010). Particularly, scholars 
have presumed that legitimacy benefits go beyond explaining organizational survival 
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as legitimacy also has an impact on financial performance. Hence, in this section we 
focus on uncovering the performance consequences of legitimacy in an attempt to 
contribute to research that has strived to understand and explain the sources of 
variation in organizational performance (March and Sutton, 1997).  
There are conflicting perspectives on whether legitimacy can be translated 
into a performance advantage (Heugens & Lander, 2009). Some scholars find 
support for the idea that the quest for legitimacy limits or conflicts with 
organizational performance, as legitimacy results in greater industry rivalry, 
increases competition for scarce resources, and lowers the potential for 
differentiation (Deephouse, 1999). In line with these arguments, Westphal, Gulati, 
and Shortell (1997: 388) find that adoption of Total Quality Management (TQM) 
legitimates the organization at the cost of its performance, since “later adopters trade 
organizational efficiency benefits for legitimacy benefits by conforming to 
isomorphic pressures”. Similarly, Barreto and Baden-Fuller (2006) study Portuguese 
banks branching decisions and find that location decisions driven by legitimacy 
concerns (i.e. the decision to locate a bank branch with reference to the branching 
behavior of legitimate rivals) negatively impact performance. Moreover, David and 
coauthors (2007) find evidence of the legitimacy gained from symbolic responses 
(i.e. decoupling) being negatively associated with CSP. Esteban-Lloret et al. (2014), 
also find a significant negative influence of legitimacy on the financial performance 
of organizations when studying management training. Hence, these studies posit that 
the quest for legitimacy may not simultaneously contribute to performance, and find 
support for the trade-off between legitimacy and performance (Heugens & Lander, 
2009).  
In contrast, researchers currently subscribe to the idea that legitimacy 
positively affects performance (Scott, 2008). According to Suchman (1995), social 
audiences are most likely to supply valuable resources and external support to 
legitimate organizations, both of which are necessary for the organization to perform 
well. Legitimacy, thus, enhances performance by portraying the organization as 
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meaningful, predictable, and trustworthy for relevant audiences (Aldrich & Fiol, 
1994; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Suchman, 1995), which results in support (Hiatt & 
Park, 2013), attention (Madsen & Rodgers, 2015), and access to scarce resources 
(Dowling & Pfeffer, 1975). Prior research has found evidence to support a positive 
effect of legitimacy on financial performance. For example, Oliver (1997), in the 
context of the Canadian construction industry, shows that compliance increases 
organizational profitability and productivity when institutional pressures are strong. 
Along the same lines, Bansal and Clelland (2004) use a different measure of 
financial performance, unsystematic risk, and find support for their hypothesis that 
organizations with legitimacy experience lower unsystematic risk. Similarly, 
Pollack, Rutherford, and Nagy (2012), study new venture pitches to equity 
financiers, and find that those pitchers that established legitimacy for their venture 
received a larger amount of funding. Moreover, Eapen and Krishnan (2009) find that 
the legitimacy gained from conformity benefits the performance of the focal 
organization, and that these performance benefits are greater for small than for large 
firms. In sum, the main performance benefits associated with legitimacy are: i) 
legitimacy enhances not only access to scarce resources and competences, but also 
to new geographical and product markets; ii) legitimacy increases the organization’s 
ability to attract the best partners, which reduces transaction costs and increases 
efficiency; and iii) legitimacy neutralizes opposition or contestation (Dacin et al., 
2007). All in all, several studies have found a positive relationship between 
legitimacy and performance (Deephouse, 1999), and have shown that legitimacy is 
not independent of performance (Lien & Klein, 2012). 
A small stream of research has focused on evaluating the positive effects of 
legitimacy on IPOs’ performance. In a conceptual paper, Certo (2003) suggests that 
organizational legitimacy, signaled by board prestige, positively influences IPOs’ 
stock performance since it reduces the likelihood of failure for firms undertaking 
IPOs by allowing managers to raise more capital. In an empirical paper, Pollock and 
Rindova (2003) find that media coverage, which reflects the legitimacy of an IPO, 
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decreases underpricing by affecting the perceived value and the salience of new 
public firms. Similarly, Gulati and Higgins (2003) show that legitimacy positively 
affects a young firm’s initial IPO by attracting prestigious investment banks as 
underwriters. Lastly, Cohen and Dean (2005) demonstrate that the legitimacy of an 
IPO’s top management team reduces information asymmetries between the firm and 
potential investors, which results in lower levels of underpricing. In sum, most work 
evaluating the role of legitimacy on IPOs has also found support for the positive 
effect of legitimacy on stock market prices (Zuckerman, 1999).  
In contrast, other authors posit that legitimacy has no impact on 
performance, which is in line with the idea that the quest for legitimacy is 
independent of performance considerations (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). For instance, 
Staw and Epstein (2000) find that organizations adopt popular management 
techniques because of legitimacy concerns, but these adoptions do not affect their 
economic performance. Similarly, Wang (2010) finds that adoption and 
implementation of legitimated IT practices in fashion does not result in performance 
changes in the short-run. This is in line with the findings of Lo, Yeung and Cheng 
(2011), who uncover no performance effects for firms adopting the ISO 9000 
certification. Moreover, Guo, Xu, and Jacobs (2014) find that regulative legitimacy 
has no influence on a firm’s performance. Thus, even though the theoretical 
literature examining the relationship between legitimacy and performance is rich, 
most empirical studies testing this relationship have found no clear effect.   
In sum, empirical studies measuring legitimacy have predicted an effect of 
legitimacy on performance but have produced inconclusive results. That is, prior 
studies report varying effects of legitimacy on performance; either a positive, 
neutral, or negative relation. In order to consolidate this rich empirical literature, in 
the following section we study the evidence on the relationship between legitimacy 
and performance using meta-analysis techniques. By doing so we extend prior meta-
analyses on similar related concepts, such as: Orlitzky et al. (2003) who study the 
relationship between corporate social responsibility and corporate financial 
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performance; Drees and Heugens (2013) who consolidate the main predictions of 
Resource Dependence Theory; and, Bogaert et al. (2014) who provide an assessment 
of density dependent legitimacy using population ecology theory. Moreover, 
although our meta-analysis is similar to that of Heugens and Lander (2009) as it 
aims to address a central debate in institutional theory, our work differs from theirs 
because we specifically focus on the relationship between legitimacy and 
performance, whereas these authors study the relationship between institutional 
pressures and isomorphism, and between isomorphism and symbolic and substantive 
performance.3 Therefore, the contribution of our meta-analysis relative to that 
presented by Heugens and Lander (2009) is that we directly test the relationship 
between legitimacy and performance, instead of the relationship between adjacent 
concepts (i.e. isomorphism or conformity) and performance.  
Part II: A Meta-analysis on the Performance Consequences of Legitimacy 
Previously, we reviewed existing theoretical and empirical literature 
focusing on the relationship between legitimacy and performance. The findings of 
extant literature on this relationship as suggested by the discussion above are 
contradictory; legitimacy is found to be performance-enhancing, performance-
eroding, and/or performance-neutral. The importance of performance as arguably the 
ultimate dependent variable of interest in organizational research, along with the 
contrasting fragments of evidence regarding the effect of legitimacy on 
organizational performance (Miller et al., 2013), encouraged us to study the 
relationship between these concepts using meta-analysis. Meta-analytic techniques 
integrate all the relevant findings in relating to a given relationship. Consequently, 
                                                     
3 These authors define each of the study concepts as follows (Heugens & Lander, 2009: 68):  
- Institutional pressures: coercive, mimetic, and normative pressures.  
- Isomorphism: “The structural and strategic resemblance of one unit in a population to 
other units in that population, especially those facing similar institutional- and task-
environmental conditions”. 
- Symbolic performance: “The extent to which organizations generate positive social 
evaluations”. 
- Substantive performance: “The extent to which organizations generate accounting-based 
profits or increase their overall market value”.  
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the results of a meta-analysis are more objective and exact than those of any 
particular, individual study, allowing for an unbiased interpretation of the 
relationship between two concepts (Hunter & Schmidt, 1990). In the following 
sections, we outline the methodology and results of our meta-analysis on the 
performance consequences of legitimacy.    
Literature search 
Based on Geyskens and coauthors (2009), we identified studies for our 
meta-analysis by searching for articles in major databases in the field of organization 
and management for the period 1960-2015. We delineated the boundaries of our 
study by searching studies that used the keyword legit* (to capture studies on 
legitimacy, legitimation, legitimate, etc.) together with perform* (to capture studies 
on perform or performance) in the abstract or keywords. We first conducted a 
targeted search for articles in JSTOR, ECONLIT, PROQUEST, ISI Web of Science, 
and SSRN.4 Second, we searched all issues published over the last 55 years in the 
following top academic journals in the field of organization and management: 
Academy of Management Journal, Administrative Science Quarterly, Journal of 
International Business Studies, Journal of Management, Management Science, 
Organization Science, and Strategic Management Journal. Third, we examined the 
references listed in prior meta-analyses and in relevant articles on legitimacy 
(Aldrich & Fiol, 1994; Bitektine & Haack, 2015; Bitektine, 2011; Bogaert, Boone, 
Negro, & van Witteloostuijn, 2014; Certo, 2003; Fisher, Kotha, & Lahiri, 2015; 
Gioia, 1999; Harmon, Green, & Goodnight, 2015; Heugens & Lander, 2009; 
Kostova & Zaheer, 1999; Suchman, 1995; Vergne, 2011; Zimmerman & Zeitz, 
2002). Fourth, we sent a request for studies to 33 researchers identified from our 
database of studies. This procedure, which enabled us to conduct a broad search so 
that we did not exclude any relevant studies, resulted in 2,940 articles.  
                                                     
4 This broad search addresses publication bias or the “file-drawer” problem as it also 
searches for unpublished studies and work in progress. Additionally, we run Stanley (2005) 
formal test to confirm the absence of publication bias (p-value=0.562), the results are 
available from the authors upon request.  
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Data collection procedure  
 To identify the relevant studies to be included in the review, we read the 
abstracts of all the retrieved articles. We eliminated articles that use legitimacy in an 
everyday or nonacademic manner, or that use legitimacy but not as a central concept 
of study, which reduced the sample to 260 studies. Next, for a study to be included 
in the meta-analysis, it had to meet the following conditions. First, it had to use the 
construct of legitimacy as a generalized perception of social acceptance (Scott, 
2008; Suchman, 1995), and it had to use legitimacy as a central construct of study or 
as central to the conceptual argument presented. Second, it had to report the pairwise 
correlation between legitimacy and performance, and the sample size, as these 
values are required for conducting the meta-analysis (Lipsey & Wilson, 2001). 
Third, because our interest is in understanding the use of legitimacy in organization 
and management research, we excluded studies that explore legitimacy at the micro-
level. A total of 84 studies were eligible for inclusion in the meta-analysis; of these 
studies, 17 were unpublished at the time of data collection, which suggest that 
publication bias is not significant. The significant reduction in the number of studies 
is either due to the abundance of studies where the concept of legitimacy is used to 
develop the theoretical argument but not directly operationalized (i.e. mechanism), 
or to the large number of theoretical and qualitative studies (see Figure 2).  
Insert Figure 2 about here 
Estimation 
Correlations between legitimacy and performance were recorded for each 
study. In order to achieve independence among the correlation coefficients included 
in the meta-analysis, we included only one correlation per study and chose to record 
the correlation which was based on the largest main sample. All the recorded 
correlations were selected based on the operationalization of the constructs of 
interest, as presented in Table 2. After recording the correlations, we corrected for 
measurement error and for dichotomization of variables following Geyskens et al. 
(2009). We used standard meta-analysis techniques to transform the extracted 
correlations into Fisher’s z-coefficients (Hunter & Schmidt, 1990). We then meta-
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analyzed the resulting corrected correlations by taking the average and weighting the 
individual effects by an estimate of the inverse of its variance, and reconverted the 
pooled z-transformed effects back to correlation coefficients (Lipsey & Wilson, 
2001). Next, we calculated a 95 percent confidence interval around the correlation 
coefficient.  
Insert Table 2 about here 
Results 
Table 3 reports the meta-analysis findings. It presents the number of effect 
sizes reported (k) and the total observations (N), the mean (r) and average corrected 
(?̅?) correlations, the corresponding standard error (SE), the 95% confidence interval 
for ?̅?, and the tests for homogeneity (Q, I2).   
Insert Tables 3 and 4 about here 
 The correlation coefficient for the relationship between legitimacy and 
performance is 0.081. Thus, the correlation between these two concepts can be 
classified as rather small by conventional standards. The 95% confidence interval 
ranges from 0.073 to 0.088; the significant deviation from 0 suggests that there is a 
positive relationship between these two concepts. Moreover, the significant Q test 
for homogeneity reveals the presence of heterogeneity and suggest that there are 
unknown moderators in this relationship. The indication of heterogeneity is also 
supported by the value of the I2 statistic; typically an I2 greater than 75% indicates 
considerable heterogeneity (Higgins, Thompson, Deeks, & Altman, 2003). Hence, 
the meta-analysis reveals that the bivariate correlation between legitimacy and 
performance is on average positive but small, and indicates the presence of 
unobserved moderator variables given the high percentage variance that can be 
attributed to artifacts.5 A potential explanation for the low correlation found could be 
                                                     
5 In order to control for the large sample size of three of the studies compared to the sample 
size of the other studies, we analyzed the data with and without these studies and find no 
significant variation in the results (r=0.129, ?̅?=0.129*). The detailed results excluding these 
studies are available from the authors. 
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the presence of a non-linear relationship between legitimacy and performance. 
Although most studies formalize a linear relationship between the two concepts, a 
curvilinear relationship seems theoretically appealing, as it will naturally attenuate 
the correlation coefficients reported in the studies.  
Our results are in line with those of prior meta-analysis in the field of 
organization and management that find a substantial heterogeneity of the effect size. 
Geyskens and coauthors (2009) suggest the use of a random effects model to obtain 
more conservative estimates when there is high variation between studies. In meta-
analysis, the random effects model assumes that each study has a different effect 
size, whereas under the fixed-effects model the assumption is that the effect size is 
homogenous across studies. Given the presence of heterogeneity, we employ a 
random effects model and report the estimates in Table 4. The results are highly 
similar to those reported in Table 3.   
The findings of our meta-analyses provide strong support for relationship 
between legitimacy and performance. That is, our results provide evidence that 
legitimacy can be translated in a performance advantage (Suddaby et al., 2010). At 
the same time, our results reignite the debate surrounding the meaning and 
measurement of legitimacy as a variable in hypothesis testing. According to these 
results, research has neither fully explored the mechanisms, nor identified the 
processes, or defined the conditions by which legitimacy has an impact on 
performance. Perhaps the most important implication of our findings is that we 
cannot unambiguously predict whether performance decreases or increases over time 
given the presence or absence of legitimacy because multiple moderators may link 
these two concepts. In other words, the positive correlation between legitimacy and 
performance yields limited insights because a number of moderators could have 
either negative, neutral, or positive effects, which makes the net effect 
indeterminate. However, prior studies of legitimacy have not sufficiently determined 
which moderators play a role in this relationship, which suggests that a promising 
avenue for future research is to examine possible moderators of the association 
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between legitimacy and performance. Further research focusing on the factors that 
moderate the relationship between legitimacy and performance is, according to our 
analyses, more promising than research looking at the main effect, as it will serve to 
identify the conditions under which the positive impact of legitimacy on 
performance can be strengthened or weakened (either zero or even negative). 
Although our meta-analysis disentangles the relationship between legitimacy and 
performance, our results point to the importance of future research that will enhance 
our understanding by identifying the moderators that matter the most.  
Discussion 
Our meta-analysis shows that the positive relationship between legitimacy 
and performance is heterogeneous, implying the presence of unobserved moderators. 
This finding, along with the previous review of the concept of legitimacy, motivate 
us to explore possible mechanisms that affect the legitimacy-performance 
relationship. As an attempt to uncover these mechanisms, we present a model in 
Figure 3. The proposed model depicts the moderated relationship between 
legitimacy and performance to be contingent upon the nature of the antecedents of 
legitimacy.  
Insert Figure 3 about here 
Following Devers, Dewett, Mishina, and Belsito (2009), the first column of 
Figure 3 classifies the antecedents of legitimacy in three different categories: 
individuating, non-individuating, and de-individuating. Individuating refers to 
antecedents that set the organization apart from other organizations by conveying its 
unique aspects; that is, individuating antecedents differentiate organizations. In 
contrast, non-individuating antecedents relate to the organization’s conformance to 
the institutional environment or imitation of other organizations; as a result, they 
lead to isomorphism in the organizational field and do not convey the unique aspects 
of the organization. Lastly, de-individuating antecedents do not set the organization 
apart from others; instead, they de-individuate the organization by diminishing its 
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differentiation or increasing its sharpness (Hsu & Hannan, 2005). Thus, we build on 
the work of Devers et al. (2009) who define legitimacy as a non-individuating 
construct, but differ from these authors in that we posit that different antecedents of 
legitimacy affect the non-individuating nature of this construct, such that some 
antecedents may result in individuating or even de-individuating legitimacy.  
The second column of Figure 3 identifies some potential moderators of the 
relationship between legitimacy and performance. The model suggests that 
organizational and field-level moderators affect the direction and/or strength of the 
relationship between legitimacy and performance. Organizational moderators such 
as age, size, industry, scope, ownership structure, TMT and complexity, represent 
core organizational features. First, age has been commonly studied by researchers in 
the organizational ecology tradition (Hannan & Freeman, 1984); the basic argument 
being that over time organizations identify what is deemed appropriate and 
reproduce it (i.e. become more legitimate), which reduces their risk of failure (i.e. 
increases performance). Second, from an organizational ecology perspective, size 
has been found to be associated with a significant increase in legitimacy and to 
result in higher performance, as larger organizations are more likely to survive than 
smaller organizations (Ruef & Scott, 1998). Third, industry captures the idea that the 
performance benefits of legitimacy vary between emerging vs. established industries 
(Aldrich & Fiol, 1994; Sine et al., 2005) or between for-profit vs. nonprofit 
organizations (Ruef & Scott, 1998); and simultaneously refers to the fact that 
organizations operating in related industries command similar types of legitimacy 
when compared to organizations that belong to different industries. The next two 
moderators are related to international organizations for which it is expected that 
legitimacy confers distinct benefits to performance (Kostova & Roth, 2002; Lu & 
Xu, 2006). On the one hand, scope refers to the extent to which organizations 
operate internationally, as international organizations may potentially suffer from 
liability of foreignness (Kostova & Zaheer, 1999; Lu & Xu, 2006). On the other 
hand, ownership structure moderates the relationship between legitimacy and 
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performance especially for organizations that enter new markets (Chan & Makino, 
2007). The sixth moderator is the composition of the top management team (TMT); 
this micro-level moderator can affect the performance benefits associated with 
legitimacy because the characteristics of the TMT can significantly influence 
resource allocation (Certo, 2003; Cohen & Dean, 2005; Higgins & Gulati, 2006). 
Finally, the last moderator is the complexity or simplicity of the organizational form. 
According to Zuckerman et al. (2003), simple organizational forms contain less 
dimensions than complex organizational forms, which eases the definition of what is 
legitimate in the former vis-à-vis the latter case. In other words, the dimensionality 
of organizational forms suggests that organizations that exhibit simple 
organizational forms are more likely to reap the performance benefits of legitimacy, 
when compared to organizations with more complex forms.    
Field-level moderators of the relationship between legitimacy and 
performance are a function of industry structure. Firstly, the distribution of resources 
within the industry in which the organization operates affects competition within the 
industry, such that in industries where resources are homogeneously distributed 
competition is fiercer than in industries that have undergone resource partitioning 
(Yu, Sengul, & Lester, 2015). Secondly, in contested industries such as tobacco, 
arms, and alcohol, field disruptions might extend beyond the single organization to 
the organizational field, and as a result, organizations in contested industries are 
more likely to face impaired access to resources due to the lack of consensus among 
key audiences (Desai, 2011; Jonsson et al., 2009). Thirdly, technological shifts that 
entail a change in an industry profit model as a result of innovation that results in 
new technologies, may disrupt the potential performance benefits of legitimacy for 
organizations in the affected industry (Benner & Ranganathan, 2012). Fourth, the 
degree of interdependence among organizations in a given industry determines the 
repeated interactions between organizations and alters the associated performance 
benefits of legitimacy. Therefore, under different levels of interdependence 
legitimacy becomes a necessary condition to maintain a certain degree of 
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connectivity with other organizations in the industry, but not a sufficient condition to 
attain good performance (Cattani et al., 2008). Lastly, visibility refers to the extent 
that the industry in which the organization operates attracts societal attention. As 
posited by Dowling and Pfeffer (1975), visible organizations depend more heavily 
on support and acceptance from a wider segment of society for their economic 
performance.   
The third column of Figure 3 identifies the performance consequences of the 
moderated relationship based on the nature of the antecedents of legitimacy. The 
first row of Figure 3 proposes that legitimacy resulting from individuating 
antecedents is performance enhancing. This is because the individuating antecedents 
of legitimacy not only result in social approval or acceptance but also in 
differentiation for the organization. That is, individuating antecedents differentiate 
the organization by highlighting its distinctive attributes, which results in active 
support from relevant audiences that control critical resources and positively affect 
organizational performance (Deephouse, 1999). Hence, individuating antecedents 
not only result in organizational legitimacy, but simultaneously allow an 
organization to differentiate itself from others while still being perceived as 
demonstrating appropriate standards and structures, and invite or attract audiences to 
confer active support for the organization, both of which result in better performance 
outcomes.  
The second row of Figure 3 proposes that the legitimacy resulting from non-
individuating antecedents is performance neutral. That is, under non-individuating 
antecedents organizations become more similar to each other. The lesser 
differentiation between organizations that use non-individuating antecedents to gain 
legitimacy is a double-edged sword: it is useful because relevant audiences have no 
reason to disapprove of the complying organization, but at the same time, relevant 
audiences have few elements to attract their attention, and thus bestow active 
support and critical resources, to the focal organization. Therefore, non-
individuating antecedents result in isomorphism and deemphasize the level of 
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differentiation between conforming organizations, both of which are expected to 
have a neutral impact on their performance. 
The final row of Figure 3 proposes that legitimacy resulting from de-
individuating antecedents, such as decoupling, is performance eroding. As 
mentioned before, decoupling is the symbolic compliance with institutional norms; 
that is, the appearance of compliance without making any substantive changes to the 
organization’s processes (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). Prior research has shown that the 
outcomes of decoupling are twofold. On the one hand, in the short-run relevant 
audiences bestow the organization with legitimacy, which is performance enhancing 
(Westphal & Zajac, 1998). On the other hand, as shown by Maclean and Behnam 
(2010), decoupling results in the institutionalization of misconduct as organizations 
learn to symbolically comply while substantively deviate from regulative pressures. 
Therefore, decoupling results in organizational legitimacy and, simultaneously, in 
the institutionalization of misconduct. The latter implies that deviant practices in the 
organization become ‘business as usual’, which increases the likelihood of the 
deviance being uncovered (Devers et al., 2009). If uncovered, the organization is 
classified as being part of a fundamentally flawed or deviant group (Ashforth & 
Humphrey, 1997), which then reduces its access to resources as stakeholders may 
disengage or reduce the quality and quantity of transactions with the organization 
(Sutton & Callahan, 1987). Thus, the legitimacy gained from de-individuating 
antecedents is performance eroding, provided the symbolic conformance or the 
substantial deviance are uncovered. 
In sum, Figure 3 presents a model that uncovers the dynamics of legitimacy. 
Specifically, the proposed model depicts the relationship between the antecedents 
and consequences of legitimacy as moderated and contingent upon the individuating 
nature of the antecedents of legitimacy. The model further suggests that 
organizational and industry characteristics moderate the relationship between the 
antecedents and outcomes of legitimacy. In brief, the proposed model suggests that 
individuating legitimation efforts allow relevant audiences to provide active support 
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to a specific organization, which translates into performance benefits. Moreover, 
non-individuating antecedents of legitimacy imply that the focal organization gets 
passive support, which has no impact on its performance. In contrast, when using 
de-individuating antecedents in its quest for legitimacy, the organization may obtain 
legitimacy in the short-run but undermine its performance in the long-run.  
Future Research 
The studies reviewed highlight that legitimacy plays a central and increasing 
role in the organization and management scholarship. The diversity in legitimacy 
research also highlights its potential to theoretically and empirically inform a wide 
range of research questions. Therefore, in this section, we identify a subset of topics 
on which future research efforts can focus that are aimed at advancing our 
understanding of the concept of legitimacy in organization and management 
research.  
 Legitimacy as a non-dichotomous concept. An unexplored area of research 
is that of the conceptualization of legitimacy as a continuous concept. Prior research 
has theoretically characterized legitimacy as being dichotomous, that is, an 
organization either has or does not have legitimacy (Bitektine, 2011; Tost, 2011). 
Although it has been noted that the concept of legitimacy is difficult to manipulate 
empirically, to date measures of legitimacy have been somewhat disconnected from 
the theoretical conceptualization of legitimacy as a dichotomous concept (Vergne, 
2011). For instance, media-based measures (e.g. Janis-Fadner coefficient of 
imbalance), which are the most widely used measures of legitimacy, result in a 
continuous coefficient that can take any value between -1 and 1. Moreover, 
measures of organizational linkages can also be continuous as they often times are a 
cumulative count of the number of ties between the organization and a certain 
actor(s) in its environment. Hence, besides adoption that is usually measured with a 
dummy indicator, the current measures of legitimacy do not align well with the 
theoretical understanding of legitimacy as a dichotomous concept. Moreover, the 
idea of legitimacy being a continuous, instead of a dichotomous concept, is 
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theoretically appealing. Adopting this view on legitimacy would require, however, 
acknowledging that creating legitimacy is the result of the legitimation process, and 
therefore, that legitimacy is not only present or absent as it is unlikely that societal 
evaluations will change from one extreme to the other without including some 
intermediate points. That is, organizational legitimacy derives from the process of 
legitimation which occurs over time and which continuously changes organizational 
legitimacy by threatening or enhancing it. Hence, by abandoning the dichotomous 
approach to legitimacy, researchers will be able to include changes in the process of 
legitimation that over time may result in outcomes where there is no convergence on 
the societal acceptability or desirability of the organization (Bitektine, 2011). In 
other words, understanding legitimacy as a non-dichotomous variable will advance 
research by allowing legitimacy outcomes to reflect disagreements or polarization in 
the evaluation of society members, instead of favoring uniformly distributed 
evaluations (Zimmerman & Zeitz, 2002). In the same way, this will provide some 
insights into the non-linear nature of legitimacy discussed earlier. We thus hope that 
scholars will address the mismatch between conceptualization and measurement, as 
doing so will contribute to the advancement of the collective knowledge of the field.  
Legitimacy and illegitimacy. Whereas some authors have defined 
illegitimacy in line with Suchman (1995) as “the generalized perception that an 
entity’s actions are undesirable, improper or inappropriate within a socially 
constructed system of norms, beliefs, and definitions” (Glynn & Marquis, 2004: 
150); others have defined illegitimacy as negative legitimacy resulting from negative 
societal evaluations (Crane, 2013; Elsbach & Sutton, 1992; Farrell & Petersen, 
1982; Hudson, 2008; Kraatz & Zajac, 1996) or as the lack of legitimacy (Benner & 
Ranganathan, 2012; Dougherty & Heller, 1994; Sonenshein, 2016; Zuckerman, 
1999). Thus, there seems to be no agreement on a definition of the concept of 
illegitimacy, which is exacerbated by the fact that often times this term has been 
used without being defined (Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990; Bansal & Clelland, 2004b). 
Moreover, little is known about the antecedents and consequences of illegitimacy; 
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while some studies have uncovered the negative effects of illegitimacy (Bansal & 
Clelland, 2004b; Farrell & Petersen, 1982; Sullivan, Haunschild, & Page, 2007; 
Zuckerman, 1999), other studies have found no negative consequences associated 
with illegitimacy (Kraatz & Zajac, 1996) or have even associated positive effects to 
illegitimacy (Elsbach & Sutton, 1992). Simultaneously, researchers have attempted 
to reveal the strategies that organizations use to offset growing illegitimacy (Benner 
& Ranganathan, 2012; Sonenshein, 2016), but just a few efforts have attempted to 
uncover the dynamics associated with related concepts such as organizational stigma 
(Hudson & Okhuysen, 2009; Hudson, 2008). However, seeing the concept of 
legitimacy in terms of a continuous dimension of legitimacy or illegitimacy has the 
effect of suggesting that organizations can be both legitimate and illegitimate. 
Instead, we argue that legitimacy and illegitimacy are not necessarily opposites, in 
the sense that separating these two concepts creates a zone of neutrality (i.e. lack of 
legitimacy) that allows an organization to go from legitimate to neutral, and from 
neutral to illegitimate. That is, we suggest that breaking the continuous dimensions 
associated with the concept of legitimacy and introducing the idea of lack of 
legitimacy, opens up the possibility that organizations may lack legitimacy but not 
necessarily be illegitimate. As attempts to differentiate these concepts have been 
limited, addressing the differences between legitimacy, lack of legitimacy, and 
illegitimacy will lay the foundation for a more nuanced understanding of the concept 
of legitimacy, and will provide a better evaluation of what is legitimate and what is 
not. Lastly, disentangling legitimacy and illegitimacy can prove to be a fruitful 
avenue for future research as it will contribute to our understanding of the 
persistence of illegitimacy (e.g. “sin” industries), of whether this persistence is a 
precursor or a consequence of institutional change (Tost, 2011), and of how 
illegitimacy may become “institutionalized” (Bitektine & Haack, 2015). 
Legitimacy as a dynamic concept. Although legitimacy has been at times 
considered as static, it is a dynamic concept by nature (Cattani et al., 2008). At the 
level of organizational populations, research from an organizational ecology 
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perspective has studied legitimacy as a process (Haveman, 1993). This stream of 
research conceptualizes legitimacy at the level of the population as a density-
dependent process in which legitimacy grows with density at a decreasing rate while 
competition does so at an increasing rate (Hannan et al., 1995). At the organizational 
level, prior research has also attempted to depict the dynamic nature of legitimacy. 
For example, Kostova and Zaheer (1999: 66) define legitimation as a “process by 
which the environment builds its perceptions of the organization”. In the case of the 
multinational enterprise, these authors recognize that legitimation is a process that 
involves ongoing interactions with the environment as well as continuous 
evaluations of the organization. Similarly, Vaara and Monin (2010) in their study of 
postmerger organizational dynamics reveal that legitimacy is not static, instead, it 
evolves over time with different organizational and institutional factors influencing 
it. Despite previous efforts, future research assessing legitimacy at different points 
during an organization’s lifetime will allow uncovering the different stages in the 
legitimation process and will show how changes in the institutional environment in 
which organizations operate result in different legitimacy assessments (Vaara & 
Monin, 2010). Moreover, research that theorizes and tests the different stages in the 
process of legitimation as related to the different dimensions of legitimacy, and to 
how this process unfolds, will also advance empirical work that has attempted to 
explain the different antecedents and consequences of the process by which 
organizations lose their legitimacy, namely the process of delegitimation 
(Greenwood, Suddaby, & Hinings, 2002; Hudson, 2008). Finally, research that links 
the process of deinstitutionalization to changes in the legitimacy of the organization 
will bring much need clarity as it will disentangle the concepts of 
deinstitutionalization and delegitimation (Oliver, 1992).  
Legitimacy as a multi-dimensional concept. With respect to the previous 
discussion on the different dimensions of legitimacy, further research is needed to 
understand the differential antecedents for each type of legitimacy and the different 
outcomes associated with each dimension (see Table 1). Moreover, exploring the 
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antecedents and consequences of a misalignment between different types of 
legitimacy may also provide an interesting area for future research. For example, by 
conforming to tobacco control regulations tobacco companies may gain regulative 
legitimacy, however, the misalignment between their core business (e.g. cigarettes) 
and societal welfare may threaten their normative legitimacy. Therefore, research 
that explores how the misalignment between different types of legitimacy is brought 
about, and the consequences that this misalignment has on organizations, may 
contribute to our understanding of how in some situations one type of legitimacy has 
primacy over others. This is especially important in contested empirical settings 
where we can observe varying combinations of types of legitimacy with different 
levels of alignment, although it may also happen in stable empirical settings where 
the development of new practices or businesses may break the existing alignment 
and promote situations where legitimacy is threatened.  
Legitimacy as a multi-level concept. Our last suggestion for future research 
concerns the level of analysis at which scholars conceptualize and operationalize the 
concept of legitimacy. As mentioned before, given that the great majority of articles 
in the organization and management literature focus on organizational legitimacy, 
our review and meta-analysis mainly analyze studies at the meso-level of analysis, 
yet prior work has also used the concept of legitimacy at the micro and macro levels. 
Research at the micro-level tends to conceptualize individual legitimacy, whereas 
macro-level studies predominate at the level of the industry, population, or 
organizational field. Although differences exist among levels of analysis, we argue 
that the concept of legitimacy has the potential to address phenomena at any given 
level (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994). For instance, multilevel research can help uncover the 
dynamics associated with legitimacy threats, as often times these threats originate at 
the micro and meso levels and spread to the macro level (e.g. there is a transition 
from attention to individual organizations to attention to the industry). Therefore, 
given that meso-level relationships are constrained and enhanced by micro and 
macro level processes and vice versa, future research adopting multiple levels of 
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analysis in the theorization and operationalization of legitimacy (e.g. simultaneously 
considering an organization’s internal and external legitimacy), will contribute to the 
development of a multilevel and cross-disciplinary view of legitimacy.  
Conclusion 
In recent decades, the use of legitimacy as a construct of study has exceeded 
previous boundaries and expanded into the broader organization and management 
literature. In this review, we clarify the construct of legitimacy by: i) identifying, 
organizing, reviewing, summarizing, and analyzing existing theoretical and 
empirical research, and ii) proposing a framework to guide the future research 
agenda. Specifically, we examine the antecedents of legitimacy, provide an 
overview of the use of legitimacy as a moderator or mechanism, and contribute to 
the debate on the consequences of legitimacy by conducting a meta-analysis of the 
performance consequences of legitimacy. Thus, in this review we contribute to 
organization and management research and provide much needed clarity to the 
literature by synthetizing existing research that has tackled the construct of 
legitimacy, by examining the performance consequences of legitimacy, and by 
identifying a number of important issues that merit further scholarly research. 
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Table 1: Dimensions of legitimacy  
 
Dimension Definition Key references Operationalization (selected studies)
Cognitive Legitimacy Taken-for-grantedness.
Aldrich & Fiol (1994: 645), Suchman 
(1995), Scott (1995)
Survey instruments (Choi & Shepherd, 2005); Frequency of 
media coverage (Sine, Haveman, & Tolbert, 2005); Increase 
in population density (Carroll & Hannan, 1989)
Corporate Governance 
Legitimacy
Practices and structures within a 
nation that are perceived to result in 
corporate behavior that is appropriate 
to meet societal needs.
Judge, Douglas, & Kutan (2008)
A national index reflecting the degree to which shareholder 




The generalized perception or 
assumption that a firm's corporate 
environmental performance is 
desirable, proper, or appropriate. 
Bansal & Clelland (2004: 94) Janis-Fadner coefficient (Bansal & Clelland, 2004)
Managerial Legitimacy
Normative support for organizational 
mechanisms.
Ruef & Scott (1998: 883) Accreditations (Ruef & Scott, 1998)
Moral (Normative) 
Legitimacy
Normative evaluations of an 
organization and its activities. 
Suchman (1995: 579); Scott (1995)
Janis-Fadner coefficient (Deephouse, 1996; Deephouse & 
Carter, 2005; Lamin & Zaheer, 2012); Membership in a 
socially contested industry (Koh, Qian & Wang, 2014)
Pragmatic Legitimacy
Self-interested calculations of an 
organizaiton's most immediate 
audiences.
Suchman (1995: 578)
Firm value (Koh, Qian & Wang, 2014); past financial 
performance (Wang & Qian, 2011)
Regulative Legitimacy
Conformance with relevant legal 
requirements.
Scott (1995: 61), Stryker (1994)
Government's regulatory ratings (Deephouse, 1996; 
Deephouse & Carter, 2005); Government financial support 
(Sine, Haveman & Tolbert, 2005); Legal endorsements (Sine 
et al., 2005; Sine, David & Mitsuhashi, 2007)
Procedural Legitimacy
Authorities and institutions exercise 
their authority through procedures 
that people experience as being fair.
Tyler (2006)
Professional Legitimacy Conferred professional endorsement. Deephouse & Suchman (2008: 53)
Sociopolitical Legitimacy
The extent to which a new form 
conforms to recognized principles 
and accepted rules and standards.
Aldrich & Fiol (1994: 645-646) Frequency of media coverage (Sine et al., 2007)
Strategic Alliance 
Legitimacy
Market legitimacy, relational 
legitimacy, social legitimacy, 
investment legitimacy, or alliance 
legitimacy.
Dacin, Oliver, & Roy (2007)
Technical Legitimacy
Focused on aspects of core 
technology




Table 2: Construct definitions and representative measures 
Construct Definition Representative Measures 
Legitimacy 
“A generalized perception or 
assumption that the actions of 
an entity are desirable, 
proper, or appropriate within 
some socially constructed 
system of norms, values, 
beliefs, and definitions” 
(Suchman, 1995, 574). 
Adoption, number of ties or 
linkages, conformity, and 
media-based measures 
(Schneiberg & Clemens, 
2006; Vergne, 2011). 
Performance 
“Outcome-based indicators 
that are assumed to reflect the 
fulfillment of the economic 
goals of the firm” 
(Venkatraman & Ramanujam, 
1986: 803). 
“Firm outcomes: (a) financial 
performance (profits, return 
on assets, return on 
investment, etc.); (b) product 
market performance (sales, 
market share, etc.); and (c) 
shareholder return (total 
shareholder return, economic 
value added, etc.)” (Richard, 
Devinney, Yip, & Johnson, 
2009: 722). 
   
Table 3: Meta-analysis results for the correlation between legitimacy and 
performance 
k N r ?̅? SE 95% C.I. Q I2 
84 116,472 0.081 0.081* 0.004 0.073 0.088 3636.5* 97.7% 
k = number of effect sizes; N = total sample size; r = mean correlation; ?̅? = estimate of 
corrected average population correlation; SE = estimated standard error; Q = chi-square test 
for homogeneity; I2 = heterogeneity index; * p<0.01. 
     
Table 4: Random-effects meta-analysis results for the correlation between 
legitimacy and performance 
k N r ?̅? SE 95% C.I. 
84 116,472 0.057 0.057* 0.025 0.009 0.105 
k = number of effect sizes; N = total sample size; ?̅? = estimate of corrected average 




Figure 1: Definitions of legitimacy in management research (1995 - 2015) 
 


































































Figure 3: Proposed legitimacy model 
 
Performance outcomes
- Impression management strategies 
(Elschbach, 1994; Elsbach & Sutton, 1992; 
Lamin & Zaheer, 2012)
- Inter-organizational arrangements (Dacin, 
Oliver & Roy, 2007; Drees & Heugens, 2013)
-  Political ties (Guo, Xu, & Jacobs, 2014)
- Share repurchase announcements (Benner & 
Ranganathan, 2012)




- Conformity/Isomorphism (Deephouse, 1996; 
Glynn & Abzug, 2002; Westphal, Gulati, & 
Shortell, 1997)
- Mimicry (Khaire, 2010)
LEGITIMACY Performance-neutral
De-Individuating
- Decoupling (MacLean & Behnam, 2010; 





- Core organizational features: age, 
size, industry, scope, ownership 
structure, TMT, complexity.
- Industry structure: competition, 






Organizations are increasingly subject to external pressures from the 
institutional environment in which they operate. Simultaneously, organizations aim 
to have an effect on their institutional environments. The research presented in this 
dissertation contributes to the organizational theory and strategy literatures by 
studying how organizations shape and are shaped by the interactions with their 
institutional environments. Specifically, the essays that compose this dissertation 
shed light on the interaction between three types of actors: organizations, society, 
and the government. In the following section, I outline the contributions from each 
chapter and present the implications of the dissertation. Next, I discuss the 
limitations and include some suggestions for future research. 
Chapter 1 - On two sides of the smoke screen: How activist organizations 
and corporations use protests, campaign contributions, and lobbyists to influence 
institutional change – examines the simultaneous influence of activist organizations 
and corporations that use conspicuous (i.e. protests) and inconspicuous (i.e. 
campaign contributions and lobbyists) strategies to change institutions. The results 
of this chapter uncover the actions of corporations that attempt to shape the 
institutional environment in which they operate, alongside the actions of activist 
organizations whose preferences for institutional change diverge from those of the 
corporations. Specifically, the results raise awareness on the interconnectedness of 
actors and strategies in the process of institutional change, and indicate that there is 
more potential to influence institutional change for actors who attract and mobilize 
public support, when compared to actors that control important financial resources. 
Thus, this chapter contributes to the literature by uncovering the effect of the use of 
conspicuous and inconspicuous strategies by different actors in the process of 
institutional change (Soule, 2012). Specifically, this chapter contributes to the 
identification of the ‘countervailing effects’ of movements and counter-movements, 
by studying the mobilization of activist organizations that aim to change the status 
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quo and the counter-mobilization of corporations that aim to maintain the status quo 
(Walker & Rea, 2014).  
Chapter 2 - Clearing the smoke: Coercive pressures, legitimacy, and 
performance in the US tobacco industry – uncovers the mediating role of legitimacy 
in the relationship between increasing coercive pressures and industry performance. 
Though being central to the institutional theory literature, this mediated relationship 
has been ignored in prior research, as most prior work has focused on the direct 
effect of coercive pressures and legitimacy on industry performance (Heugens & 
Lander, 2009). The results reveal that increasing coercive pressures that operate as a 
normative influence affect industry performance through influencing societal 
perceptions about what is deemed legitimate, whereas this is not the case for 
pressures that transfer a set of incentives and sanctions. Therefore, this chapter 
contributes to the literature by revisiting some of the key concepts of institutional 
theory, namely coercive pressures and legitimacy, and showing that an 
undifferentiated usage of these concepts limits both their theoretical as well as their 
empirical usefulness. Specifically, this chapter contributes to the theoretical and 
empirical conceptualization of coercive pressures by including a fine-grained look at 
this concept, and by disentangling and separating the effects of increasing coercive 
pressures and legitimacy on industry performance. By doing so, this chapter expands 
institutional theory research by showing the importance of conceptually and 
empirically telling apart the concepts of coercive pressures and legitimacy. 
Moreover, this study contributes to the conceptualization of legitimacy in the case of 
contested industries and extends previous work by testing the performance 
consequences of legitimacy in an established contested industry (Galvin et al., 
2005). 
Chapter 3 - Performing by adhering? A review and meta-analysis of 
legitimacy – provides an extensive review of the concept of legitimacy, and reports 
the results of a meta-analysis of empirical research on the relationship between 
legitimacy and performance. The review part of this chapter examines the 
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antecedents and outcomes of legitimacy, and provides an overview of the use of 
legitimacy as a moderator or mechanism; while the empirical part contributes to the 
debate on the consequences of legitimacy by conducting a meta-analysis on the 
performance consequences of legitimacy. As a result, this chapter organizes and 
synthetizes prior research in an overarching theoretical framework and provides 
directions for future research. Hence, this chapter contributes to organization and 
management research by shedding light on the use of the concept of legitimacy and 
by providing a comprehensive and encompassing review of this concept. 
Furthermore, this chapter provides researchers with a timely framework to tackle the 
concept of legitimacy, and with a comprehensive list of important issues that merit 
further scholarly research. 
Taken together, the essays in this dissertation have two important practical 
implications. Firstly, the results suggest that the ability of organizations to perform 
well requires the legitimacy bestowed by others. That is, the results not only show 
that legitimacy matters for performance, but that managing legitimacy should be a 
priority for organizations attempting to achieve superior performance. Second, the 
results indicate that gaining and maintaining legitimacy is important if organizations 
are to shape the institutional environment in which they operate. Specifically, the 
results presented in the different chapters show that the engagement of organizations 
with their institutional environment should not be seen as detached from their 
corporate and business strategies, but should rather be seen as interconnected with 
their strategic efforts.    
The contributions and implications highlighted above should be tempered 
with an understanding of the limitations of the chapters presented in this dissertation. 
First, the first two chapters are restricted to the setting of the tobacco industry. 
Although the relevance of this industry, and the conditions under which the results 
could be generalized to other industries, have been addressed in the respective 
chapters, studying a single industry could limit the generalizability of the results. 
Nevertheless, I am confident that many aspects of the dynamics uncovered in this 
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thesis are also applicable to other contested settings (e.g. alcohol, gambling), and 
that some of the aspects apply to non-contested settings (e.g. the positive influence 
of legitimacy on performance uncovered in paper 3). To increase confidence in the 
results, replications of the studies using data from different industries is warranted. 
Second, given that the first two chapters use data at the industry level, the 
specific dynamics associated with the strategies or outcomes at the organizational 
level cannot be addressed. That is, the characteristics of organizations that make 
them more likely to influence institutions in their favor, or that protect them from the 
effect of institutional pressures and legitimacy threats, remain unknown. In other 
words, as the models are estimated at the level of the industry, it is not possible to 
infer directly the differential results for the various organizations in a given industry. 
However, given that the concepts of study are extremely relevant at the level of the 
industry, the selection of the industry level of analysis does not hinder the theoretical 
and empirical contributions provided by the chapters. In spite of this, further studies 
using the organizational level of analysis may bring new insights into how specific 
organizational characteristics moderate the dynamics uncovered.   
Third, with respect to the last chapter, it was not possible to test the 
proposed model on the antecedents, moderators and consequences of legitimacy 
with the available data. Therefore, data limitations impede testing the expected 
positive, neutral, and negative outcomes. Nonetheless, the proposed model is based 
on an extensive and comprehensive review of the organization and management 
literature that studies the concept of legitimacy, which increases the confidence on 
the expected relationships. Future efforts to empirically examine the proposed model 
using advanced meta-analysis techniques such as MARA and MASEM are 
encouraged.  
Notwithstanding these limitations, the essays that comprise this dissertation 
offer several opportunities for future research. To begin with, the first two chapters 
study the setting of the tobacco industry. This is a fascinating industry with the 
potential to shed further light into the dynamics associated with contestation. For 
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instance, with the help of current advancements in content analysis, future research 
could use the tobacco industry as a setting to enhance our understanding of 
contestation and its evolution, by exploring the discursive underpinnings of 
contestation and by tracing its emergence or development. Similarly, research on 
contested industries has the potential to contribute to the corporate political activity 
and the non-market strategy literatures by uncovering the market effects associated 
with contestation. Lastly, within the strategy literature, future efforts could benefit 
from bringing together insights from the literature on inter-firm alliances and 
institutional theory to examine whether industry-level legitimacy influences the 
selection of alliance partners.  
Collectively, the three essays in this dissertation go back to the basis of 
institutional theory in order to theoretically clarify and empirically test some of the 
key concepts and relationships of the theory, while simultaneously, enriching some 
of the core claims of the theory by bringing together insights from other streams of 
research. This dissertation has benefited from the development of a unique database 
with data collected and assembled from various sources and using various methods, 
and with the use of cutting-edge techniques to ensure that the results stand the test of 
rigor. I believe that the results presented in this dissertation open up a chapter on the 
importance of research that incorporates organizations, society, and the government 
when looking at the complete pathway of institutional change, ranging from its 
origins to its implications on the legitimacy and performance of the industry. 
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